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ABSTRACT 
Advocates of social investment claim it is a new way to solve society’s most intractable problems. They 
have proposed and begun to develop a market for social investment finance, where social sector 
organisations can go to find appropriate sources of finance, and investors can invest their capital for 
both social and financial return. In this thesis social investment is construed as a Foucaultian 
‘programme of government’ that operates within a form of liberal governmentality. Governing the 
self-interested individual is a central concern of liberalism, and the concept of interest proves fruitful 
in pulling apart contrasting lines of reasoning about what social investment should look like. First, I 
argue that the more radical of these versions of social investment puts forward an entirely technical 
vision of social change, one that assumes interests can ultimately be aligned without conflict. This 
vision relies on two mechanisms, the market and measurement, which together establish a factual, 
value-free basis for action. The technical nature of these mechanisms lends a neutral appearance to 
social investment, but I argue, second, that framing reality in this matter has a series of effects. 
Ultimately, the purpose of the thesis is not to attack social investment or assess whether it is a good or 
bad thing, but to arrive at a position where its neutrality is uprooted and its effects can be identified. 
The thesis therefore establishes grounds for much-needed ongoing critique of the effects of pursuing a 
technical vision of social change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On Thursday 23rd January 2014 Ronald Cohen, an influential figure in the development of the social 
investment market in the UK, gave a speech at an official function of the City of London at Mansion 
House. Cohen, a man who made his name bringing the model of high risk ‘venture capital’ 
investment to the UK, presented to his audience a potted history of philanthropy and the social sector 
in the UK. Charities, he explained, have over the past couple of centuries “tried their very best to 
improve the lives of those left behind”, but by the 1930s “governments had begun to realise that 
philanthropy alone could not cope.” Thus we saw the rise of the welfare state. But the welfare state is 
no longer fit for purpose:  
Today, welfare states designed for the twentieth century are throwing up their arms in the face 
of the struggle against the new century’s social challenges. They realise that they are not best 
placed to innovate in bringing solutions to social issues.1  
Cohen paints a picture of a world where the mechanisms that we have so far relied on to address social 
problems have shown themselves to be inadequate. “If both traditional philanthropy and government 
have struggled to do so, how should we tackle social issues?” Homing in on the problem, he brings our 
attention to the financing of those organisations that seek to address social problems, that is, the “social 
sector”. “What is the common characteristic of the charitable social service providers who are the 
backbone of the social sector?” he asks. The answer: “They are small and have no money. The Social 
Investment Task Force estimated that three-quarters of them had insufficient capital to look ahead 
more than three months.” So they are undercapitalised; they are also run in a way that is not focused 
on effectiveness. “Traditional philanthropy has focused on the act of charitable giving rather than on 
achieving social outcomes.” 
Cohen then turns to the way out of this predicament: 
I began then to see the challenge in different terms: how can we do for social entrepreneurs 
and organisations what we have successfully done for business entrepreneurs? How can we 
connect them to the capital markets? How can we harness the most powerful forces of 
capitalism: entrepreneurship, innovation and capital to tackle social issues more effectively? 
How can we fund those who are capable of creating and implementing innovative solutions so 
that they do achieve scale appropriate for the population group and the severity of the social 
issues they address? How can we help them achieve real impact in resolving the social issues 
that ruin so many lives? The Social Investment Task Force could see already in 2000 that the 
answer would require innovation. Just as venture capital was a novel response to the 
investment needs of high-risk, innovative businesses, so we now need a novel response in 
order for high-risk, innovative social organisations to access capital markets.2 
The solution, he proposes, is to look to the sector that, until now, has not been involved in sorting out 
social problems. What would happen if we look to the successes of private business for inspiring a way 
forward for the social sector? What would happen if the innovation and risk taking of venture capital 
could be replicated here?  
                                                   
1 Ronald Cohen, Revolutionising Philanthropy: Impact Investment. Speech given at The Mansion House (2014). 
2 Ibid. 
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By the time this speech was given in 2014, the idea of social investment had inspired an impressive 
catalogue of achievements: new primary legislation, millions of pounds being moved from one place to 
another, a variety of new institutions and companies, and reams of research. Cohen was closely 
involved in many of these initiatives, and echoes of the vision he sets out in this speech are found in 
many articulations of social investment. Clearly this vision was persuasive.3 
There is, however, a striking degree of variation in opinion over what precisely social investment is. Let 
us put ourselves in the shoes of a social sector organisation (SSO) trying to pin it down. We might 
start with definitions provided by official bodies, such as the UK Government. A 2016 strategy paper 
titled Social Investment: A Force for Social Change contains the following statement: 
Social investment is a tool to help organisations increase their social impact. It helps many 
social sector organisations do more by providing the capital that they need to deliver their 
services, grow or become more sustainable.4 
This tells us that social investment is aimed at SSOs, and the word ‘capital’ implies that the finance is 
repayable. This implication is confirmed in a document from Big Society Capital (BSC), one of the 
more prominent social investment institutions: 
Social investment is appropriate repayable finance that charities, social enterprises and 
communities can use to grow, become more sustainable and increase their impact on society.5 
The ‘sister’ organisation of BSC, The Access Foundation, states that its role is “to make it easier for 
charities and social enterprises in England to access the capital they need to grow and increase their 
impact.”6 Their definition is: 
Social investment is repayable finance which creates both social and financial returns. It is 
provided to charities, social enterprises and socially motivated businesses.7 
Putting these three definitions together, the SSO might ascertain that social investment is a kind of 
financial investment where there is an expectation that the money will be repaid, and that some kind 
of social good or social impact is created by the organisation receiving the investment. There are 
slightly different takes on who the recipients of social investment are: they might be charities, social 
sector organisations, social enterprises, socially motivated businesses, or even ‘communities’.  
Before we think about what the differences and overlaps are across these categories, we need to take 
account of two other very similar terms: impact investing, and social impact investing. The OECD 
produced a report in 2015 with a definition of ‘social impact investing’ that sounds very similar to 
social investment: 
                                                   
3 The term ‘social investment’ is used in relation to an entirely separate area of enquiry related to reform of the 
welfare state. One account characterises it in terms of “the promotion of labour market participation through 
activation and investment in human capital” in contrast to “the reduction of welfare benefits and the use of 
negative incentives to move people from welfare to work.” Francesco Laruffa, ‘Social Investment: Diffusing Ideas 
for Redesigning Citizenship after Neo-Liberalism?’, Critical Social Policy (2017). p2 
4 HM Government, Social Investment: A Force for Social Change. 2016 Strategy (2016). p6 
5 Big Society Capital, Better Finance, Better Society (2015a). p2 
6 https://access-socialinvestment.org.uk/us/mission/ Accessed 7th February 2017. 
7 https://access-socialinvestment.org.uk/us/mission/ Accessed 6th February 2017. 
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Social impact investment is the provision of finance to organisations addressing social needs 
with the explicit expectation of a measurable social, as well as financial, return.8 
The most noticeable difference here is that the ‘social return’ is described as measurable. The earlier 
definitions do not seem to preclude the measurement of social impact return, so the difference here 
may be one of emphasis. Measurement is a component that also features in the definition provided by 
the Social Impact Investment Taskforce, which states that: 
Social Impact Investments are those that intentionally target specific social objectives along 
with a financial return and measure the achievement of both.9 
This version, however, does not specify what kinds of organisation should be the recipients of this 
kind of investment. In this sense it is closer to the definition of impact investing. The Global Impact 
Investing Network (GIIN) states that impact investments are: 
Investments made into companies, organizations, and funds with the intention to generate 
social and environmental impact alongside a financial return.10 
So is impact investing the same thing as social investment, or as social impact investing? Is it in fact 
important that social return is measurable, or measured? Does social investment have to be into a 
social sector organisation – and what precisely is a social sector organisation? Researchers looking to 
this phenomenon of social investment (or social impact investing, or impact investing) find themselves 
plagued by these definitional problems, which hinder attempts to establish basic facts, such as the 
volume of activity in the market. This passage, for example, comes from an article published in the 
Journal of Business Ethics: 
Although this lack of definitional, conceptual, and terminological clarity is explainable—since 
it is also typical for related, nascent research domains such as social entrepreneurship or SRI 
[socially responsible investment]—it is nevertheless problematic. First, a fuzzy concept 
jeopardizes the credibility of the entire idea, as well as that of associated organizations and 
could lead to so–called ‘‘impact washing’’. Second, a lack of definitional, conceptual, and 
terminological clarity may hinder the market growth and broad adoption of impact investing, 
since it makes it difficult for mainstream investors to understand what it is and form an 
opinion about it … Last, definitional, conceptual, and terminological clarity is also vital for 
academics…. In the absence of definitional and terminological clarity, it is difficult for a 
concept to gain legitimacy and for respective theories to be developed.11 
There have been attempts to achieve clarity and consensus: one social sector organisation produced a 
report that carefully separates out different meanings, in an attempt to “find consensus … to act as our 
‘touchstone’ and help us all communicate more consistently and effectively.”12 But, as this thesis 
explores at length, terminological difficulties are only the surface level manifestation of faultlines that 
run deeply through the attempt to combine financial practices with those of the social sector. I am not 
going to aim for a definitive version of social investment that will provide clarity and consensus for the 
                                                   
8 OECD and Karen E Wilson, Social Impact Investment: Building the Evidence Base (2015). p10 
9 Social Impact Investment Taskforce, Impact Investment: The Invisible Heart of Markets (2014). p1 
10 https://thegiin.org/impact-investing/need-to-know/#s1 Accessed 6th Feb 2017. 
11 Anna Katharina Höchstädter and Barbara Scheck, ‘What’s in a Name: An Analysis of Impact Investing 
Understandings by Academics and Practitioners’, Journal of Business Ethics, 132 (2014). p451 
12 Phil Caroe, What Do We Mean by ‘Social Investment’? (2016). p4 
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field. On the contrary, I am interested in exploring these faultlines. How, then, can any analytical grasp 
be achieved on a topic that resists any definition? 
The clue is contained in Cohen’s speech. Social investment – or impact investing, as he called it on 
that occasion – is described not in concrete terms, as a specific kind of practice, but as a solution to a 
problem. The problem is a status quo where the social sector is reliant on grant funding, has 
insufficient access to capital, and pays scant attention to the effectiveness of their activities. This is a 
problem that can be addressed by introducing the practices of the private sector. Cohen’s claim is that 
entrepreneurialism has had a transformative impact on the UK economy and its citizens, and that the 
transformative success of these entrepreneurs was enabled by “the creation of a totally new investment 
class, venture capital and private equity.” The social investment market, then, “is for social issues what 
venture capital is for high-growth young businesses.”13 It is a way of not just opening up new sources 
of capital, but also stimulating the kind of innovative, risk-taking behaviour that is evident in the 
private sector and almost entirely lacking in the social sector. Viewing matters in this way, we can 
move towards grasping social investment in terms of a problematisation.  
The concept of problematisation brings us to the theoretical material that will ground our analysis. 
Problematisations lend structure and coherence to programmes of government. This is a Foucaultian 
notion rooted in his concept of governmentality. The practices that make up a programme of 
government are not unified or centrally controlled. They are diverse and varied. It is the shared 
problematisation that holds them together. This is one of the reasons why this is a theoretical 
approach well suited to the study of social investment: it allows us to recognise the common ground at 
the core of what social investment is, while recognising that it incorporates diverse and varied 
practices, without clear borders. It then becomes possible to enquire into the reality of social 
investment as it is understood and practiced, rather than building a (social) scientific analysis on the 
grounds of a static, analytical definition. 
In deciding what terminology to use, there are rules of thumb that can be helpful in some situations: 
‘social investment’ tends to be more closely associated with the UK context and with the endeavour to 
capitalise the social sector, while ‘impact investing’ is more often used to a more US-centric attempt to 
encourage investors to invest for social as well as financial return. ‘Social impact investing’ is a hybrid 
term that attempts to bring these two areas together in international discussions. But all three of these 
terms are used to refer to either or both of the two problem-solutions. I am forced to choose one of 
these terms simply because I need a way to refer to the topic of enquiry.  
For clarity, the approach I have taken is as follows: I have chosen to use the term ‘social investment’ 
throughout, but I use it to refer to the programme of government based on the problematisation 
described above, not to privilege those aspects of this space that tend to be referred to as social 
investment by actors in the field. In other words, I am not treating any given author’s choice of 
terminology as significant, and I will continue to use the term ‘social investment’ even when the 
excerpts I have taken from documents refer to ‘impact investing’ or ‘social impact investing’. 
Why is this a topic that warrants a PhD thesis? Having worked as a consultant in the UK social sector 
since 2012, I have seen first hand the changes brought about by the introduction of social investment 
onto the policy landscape. It has attracted large amounts of public money, and provoked a huge 
amount of soul searching over how charities and social enterprises should best be funded. The 
                                                   
13 Cohen (2014). 
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questions raised are not just about financial mechanisms and the role of profit, but also the need for 
measurement and evidence of social impact. These changes can be seen across a wider geography, too, 
with the same themes being discussed in other countries, with reference to international development, 
and in global NGOs such as the UN. Currently, the voices that promote and advocate social 
investment are louder and clearer than any that attempt to assess whether it is a direction that 
collectively we want to take. 
More broadly, the issues brought together under social investment have relevance beyond this 
programme of government. The idea that practices developed in the economic sphere can be 
translated across to the social (non-economic) sector, and that profit-generating activities can be 
combined with the pursuit of social good, are found elsewhere. They are foundational to the types of 
investment practice that are close neighbours to social investment – impact investing, responsible 
investment, microfinance, and others. These claims also characterise other areas of practice such as 
social enterprise and corporate social responsibility. These practices, in various ways, all challenge an 
economic model in which ‘business’ is required only to comply with the law, and take no 
responsibility for its position in society. These questions are central to the way in which Western 
societies in particular are governed. Similarly, the emphasis on measurement of social impact is by no 
means isolated to social investment. The imperative to measure and report on outcomes, and to 
demonstrate impact, is a far-reaching phenomenon in public life, faced by the social sector, education 
providers at all levels, the NHS, and in countless other contexts. A study of the techniques and 
concepts underpinning social impact measurement for social investment, therefore, can have much 
wider significance. In this manner social investment touches on a number of areas of practice that pose 
significant questions for the way in which our society is organised.  
Social investment is therefore having a real influence on the way things are done, which itself is a 
reason to study it, and yet academic enquiry has not yet caught up with the changes in practice. A 
study I co-authored in 2016 explored the current landscape of academic research into social 
investment, finding that there were still relatively very few academics working in the area, and very 
little peer-reviewed published work.14 That study frequently came across the sentiment that “more 
research is needed” to understand these new ways of doing things, but I would assert that there is a 
particular need for critical enquiry. If we were to mimic the urgency which is often found in the 
literature on social investment we might even suggest that there is a pressing need for engaged critique 
of an area of practice that is galloping ahead unchecked. The overblown and audacious claims of social 
investment have so far gone largely unchallenged. This thesis undertakes an extensive critique of the 
reasoning employed in the name of social investment. This does not amount to an attack on social 
investment, or an argument against its continued development. Instead it is a call for a more 
considered approach to changing the mechanisms used to bring about social change, one that 
recognises the effects of putting these apparently neutral mechanisms into play while discounting 
other ways of doing things. 
The rest of the Introduction proceeds as follows. The next section gives a detailed account of the 
approach taken in this thesis, including a discussion of its epistemological foundations, and the source 
materials or ‘data’ used to inform the analysis. The following section situates the research within a 
broader picture of academic writings, before the final section gives an overview of the thesis argument.  
                                                   
14 Jess Daggers and Alex Nicholls, The Landscape of Social Impact Investment Research: Trends and Opportunities 
(2016b). 
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APPROACH 
What, then, does it mean to ‘critique’ social investment? What do I mean by ‘critical enquiry’? In the 
first instance, I mean that everything about social investment is put up for question. As we wade into 
the reams of reports on articles on the issues, at every juncture we ask: what assumptions have to be in 
place for this to be a meaningful set of statements? What counts as a ‘fact’? What goes unchallenged? 
And what is dismissed as irrelevant or unimportant? Over the course of the thesis I will demonstrate 
that this is an approach that yields dividends, as it is the best way of gaining analytical purchase on a 
field of activity that is built on very shaky foundations. In other words, we do not ask what the facts 
are, but rather how different versions of social investment manage to present themselves as a logical 
response to ‘the facts’.  
Of course, more precision is needed. I have arrived at an approach where Foucault, and the 
subsequent working-through of his ideas by the Governmentality scholars (namely Peter Miller, 
Nikolas Rose and Michael Power), provides the primary grounding, along with the work of Mary 
Poovey. This was a long process, taking place over a number of years, in which I went back and forth 
between the literature on social investment – this was a debate unfolding as I worked, as I started my 
thesis in 2012 – and the wide variety of theoretical works available to help investigate it. I also went 
back and forth between my role as student and my role as consultant. My professional role gave me 
insight into how the claims of those evangelising about social investment were seen through the eyes of 
those finding themselves to be part of the ‘demand side’ or the ‘supply side’ of this new market. 
Eventually, I found a way to use Foucault and Poovey’s ideas to formulate the problem in a way that 
made it amenable to analysis, and to yield the insight present in this thesis. My use of these texts is 
quite self-consciously partial, and oriented wholly to the explication of social investment. I make no 
attempt to represent these writers’ overall arguments, or to reflect on different possible interpretations, 
or gaps in their reasoning, except where such observations have implications for my chosen topic.   
There are three core ideas to be introduced at this point: ‘programme of government’, ‘rationality of 
government’, and ‘production of knowledge’.  
My starting point is to frame social investment as a programme of government. A programme of 
government is a loosely connected array of ideas and practices which share a common goal – in this 
case, building a market for social investment. Programmes of government rely in part on the 
production of knowledge. The ‘social investment market’ itself is brought into existence through 
processes of knowledge production., while doing social investment also involves ongoing processes of 
knowledge production. Finally, we use the term ‘rationality of government’ to draw the wider context 
in which social investment takes place into our analysis. It is a way of referring to what we might think 
of as the ‘background knowledge conditions’ shaping the formulation of this programme of 
government.  
Each of these terms has extensive implications, which are explored in detail in the first few chapters of 
the thesis. Importantly, they share a common characteristic. They all draw attention to the reasoning of 
those involved in the day-to-day doing of social investment. They point us towards the arguments that 
are made, opening up the logic that is employed by actors in the space to examination. As a result, 
these terms introduce a particular formulation of the relationship between theory and reality, and 
between scholar and practice. It is important to set out this formulation clearly, as it has significant 
implications for the way the research has been conducted. 
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Much of the time in scholarly writing, ‘theory’ is seen as the domain of the scholar or philosopher, 
while ‘reality’ is inhabited by agents engaged in different forms of practice. On this model, scholars 
attempt to come up with theories that ‘explain’ reality. They test how well their theory can be ‘applied’ 
in particular cases. Empirical evidence supports or contradicts the theory.  There may be settings 
where such assumptions are helpful, and enable insight, but I would like to be clear in setting out an 
alternative. Actors’ reasoning is a form of theorisation. After all, people act in certain ways, they pursue 
one course of action over another, because the reasons for doing so are compelling. (To be clear, this 
enquiry does not extend to any kind of psychological theorisation of human action. I am interested in 
the way these reasons are presented for the consumption of others.)  
In this way, a different relationship is formulated between my ‘theories’, as scholar, and the ‘reality’ I 
seek to investigate, because the ‘reality’ is in fact a form of theorisation. This is not just a semantic 
difference. I emphasise the reasoning of actors because I believe this is the most appropriate form of 
analysis, that will yield the most insight. Why is this? Because over the first several years of the attempt 
to build a market for social investment, there has been so little conceptual stability in what social 
investment is that attempts to go beyond the way it is thought about to the ‘reality’ of the market are 
significantly compromised. They rely on assumptions that, much of the time, are not justified. For 
this reason this thesis does not attempt to report on the ‘objective’ reality of social investment. I do not 
attempt to give facts about the market, its size or development. I do not attempt to report on which 
types of measurement practice are most commonly used, or to provide comparisons between the 
‘theories’ of SI and what companies ‘actually’ do, or what ‘really’ happens. The only point at which I 
attempt any kind of discussion of the ‘reality’ of social investment comes in the final chapter, where I 
point to several examples of the reasoning internal to social investment coming under strain when 
brought into contact with certain aspects of reality. The puzzle of lower-than-expected demand for 
social investment, and the challenges of capturing impact through measurement techniques, are 
brought into focus here. 
Furthermore, it appears to me that the ‘theory vs reality’ version of scholarly research often yields 
results that lay claim to how things ‘really are’, to some greater insight arrived at through diligent 
pursuit of academic ‘method’ in handling ‘data’. Such insight is usually unrecognisable to those 
engaged in doing the thing being studied. At the very least, such work is generally focused on meeting 
the standards needed for academic publication. While I do not wish to attack the idea that academic 
communities should have their own conversations, potentially in language inpenetrable to outsiders, I 
think there is room for research that also seeks to communicate with actors outside academia, 
particularly in a field as live as social investment.  
Another risk to the ‘theory vs reality’ version of research is that what is said by scholars is prioritised 
over what the source materials are communicating. I was guilty of this at the outset of my studies – I 
was convinced there was a way of building a theoretical framework, based on the different sectors of 
the economy, that would give me a way of exposing the flaws in the models of social enterprise and 
social investment being put forward by practitioners. All this approach delivered was a headache each 
time reality refused to conform to the categories I was creating. Sometimes scholars manage to create a 
categorisation that is good enough to gain traction, to change the way people see a certain 
phenomenon, and to open up new avenues of research. But much of the time, the self-conscious 
attempt to create ‘theory’, especially when it attempts to consolidate and build on existing work, does 
little to elucidate whatever is being studied, and does more to demonstrate simply that the author has 
done their reading. These comments are particularly pertinent in this case. It would be not be fruitful 
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to ask how the reality of the social investment market contrasts with the theory. Neither category is 
stable, and the reality of social investment can only be constituted with reference to the way it is 
thought about. This may well change in the coming years, if the categories used to understand social 
investment stabilise and become more consistent. Should this happen, the most appropriate approach 
for studying the field will also change.  
Ultimately, one of my main motivations in writing this thesis is to develop a critique of social 
investment that speaks to the way it is thought about and done by actors in the field. I believe this is 
the best way to open up new conversations over how things are being done, and how they could be 
thought about, and done, differently.   
So how do we gain insight into the reasoning of actors in the social investment market? There are two 
kinds of source material in this thesis: a range of documents, and a set of interviews.  
There are hundreds of documents contributing to the social investment debate. We can refer to them 
collectively as the ‘social investment literature’. These hundreds of reports and articles are mainly 
published online – the so-called ‘grey literature’ – though there are also peer-reviewed articles, and 
some books and book chapters. This literature provides us with a window into the reasoning of actors. 
Each of these documents presents the idea of social investment for public consumption, or responds to 
it, either re-presenting these ideas for a new audience, or exploring some aspect in more depth, or 
presenting the results of some kind of data-gathering exercise.  They provide a wealth of insight that is 
drawn on extensively over the course of the thesis. While many of these documents are explicitly 
focused on the UK context, many of them are geographically non-specific. Some have been included 
that refer to other national contexts. While the overall focus is on the UK, where social investment is 
an influential set of ideas, geographical boundaries are generally not an important factor in this 
analysis, because the boundaries for our analysis are provided by the shared problematisation. Much of 
the discussion and reasoning is global in scope, not restricting itself to a particular national context.15  
I also use a series of recorded interviews between Oxford University researchers and senior figures 
involved in the creation and initial operation of Big Society Capital.16 The interviews were completed 
in 2013 to inform a case study of BSC, but the researcher involved left before the case study was 
completed, and I was asked to complete the project.17 I therefore gained access to interviews with 14 
individuals discussing how it was that BSC came into existence, and gathering opinions on what 
success would look like for the organisation. I was present at one follow-up interview in 2015 with one 
of the original participants. BSC is an important institution in the UK social investment market, and 
will be discussed in more detail below.  
At this stage, it is important to explain why I chose to include this material, and why I decided not to 
do my own interviews. I will answer the second question first. Published material is preferable to 
interviews. It is better suited to my approach. Written texts present a more polished version of a set of 
ideas, where there has been a process of editing and some effort put into ensuring consistency in the 
logic being presented. This provides helpful insight – it is the output of a process of deep 
consideration of what is meant, being put into the public domain for scrutiny by others. Often, the 
process is one of collaboration, and so written documents are the result of the synthesis of multiple 
                                                   
15 One exception to this is a number of examples in chapter 5 of formal attempts to define the social sector.  
16 The significance of BSC is explained on page 50 below.  
17 Jess Daggers and Alex Nicholls, Big Society Capital: The World’s First Social Investment Wholesale Bank (2016a). 
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views, a conscious attempt to find common ground, a presentation of reasoning and logic that (to a 
greater or lesser extent) makes sense to everyone involved. Interviews, in contrast, are not edited, and, 
for most individuals, will not set out the logic and reasoning on an issue as clearly as a written 
document. Often, interviews are used to help researchers orientate themselves in a field, to understand 
where actors place emphasis, and what they consider unimportant. Because I was already an actor in 
the field in my professional capacity, I gained this insight through other means. This is not to say that 
interviews would not have yielded any insight – people might say things in interviews that they would 
not publish – but the additional investment of time in setting up and conducting interviews did not 
seem warranted when the SI literature already offered such rich insight.  
It was, however, a welcome stroke of luck to gain access to the BSC interviews, which gave me 
additional insight into the creation of an institution central to the growth of the SI market. I decided 
to use them, but they do not play a central role, despite BSC’s central position in the SI market. This 
is because the idea of social investment is significant precisely because they extend so far beyond a 
single institution. They have captured the attention of a wide range of actors. Though the argument 
might be made that this is simply because of the capital held by BSC – its resources dwarf the rest of 
the market – that would be a simplistic analysis. The idea of social investment captures attention 
because it promises nothing less than a ‘revolution’ in the way social problems are ‘solved’.  Such 
claims might easily have been dismissed as bombast, and on some fronts they have been, but they have 
been taken seriously by a critical mass of people. BSC is therefore only one component of this new 
reality. After spending considerable time familiarising myself with the contents of the interviews, I 
therefore decided to use them as a source in the same way I have used the literature – as examples of 
reasoning that I have drawn on in the course of elaborating my argument.18 No part of the argument 
relies solely on the interview material; rather, the interviews help consolidate the argument. 
As a final set of comments before we move on to considering the broader research landscape, we might 
consider how defensible this approach is, and where its potential weaknesses lie. My argument is that 
the strength of this approach, and the analysis it yields, should be judged on its usefulness in thinking 
through the matters at hand. Rather than striving for some kind of objectivity, I present this argument 
as my best judgement of a situation that I have examined in great depth. My aim is to persuade the 
reader. It is not my concern to identify the ‘correct’ explanation to the exclusion of other, ‘incorrect’ 
explanations. The weaknesses of this approach will come to light as and when they are exposed by 
alternative explanations and perspectives, alternatives which themselves have something to offer. This 
is one of the senses in which I regard the approach and the argument to be two sides of the same coin; 
one cannot be judged without judging the other. 
SITUATING THE RESEARCH 
This approach, which will of course become clearer as the thesis argument unfolds, has implications 
for how we think about the relevance of existing research. For example, there is no clear distinction 
between the social investment literature described above as ‘source material’ and the academic research 
                                                   
18 The interviewees have remained anonymous and are not identifiable from the way I have described them. The 
interviewees had already signed a form agreeing their comments could be used for academic research in addition 
to the primary purpose of informing the BSC case study. As a courtesy, they were also informed by email that I 
had was intending to use their anonymous comments, and given an opportunity to request their comments be 
removed from the data. None of the interviewees objected to being included.  
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on social investment that would form part of a conventional literature review. We can conceive of a 
distinction between academic and practitioner research, but this distinction does not have much 
purchase, as some of the conceputally most detailed research is from ‘practitioners’, while some of the 
research published by individuals based at universities is driven by commercial considerations, and 
bears none of the hallmarks of ‘academic’ work. 
Instead of attempting to review all potentially relevant literature, therefore, we will start this section 
with a tour of the different areas of literature that are in some way relevant to social investment. The 
discussion is arranged under a series of headings, though many of the works described could sensibly 
be placed in multiple locations. As we go, at various points I will differentiate the theoretical 
approaches taken by others from the approach I have developed. This aim here is partly to illustrate 
the range of possibilities, and the impossibility of pursuing all of them. It is also to provide orientation 
for the reader, clarifying how this piece of work interacts with existing scholarship. This section 
concludes with a detailed analysis of the approach taken by sociologist Emily Barman in her book 
Caring Capitalism, as a rare example of scholarship that takes a similar approach to a similar topic – 
impact investing.  
FOUCAULT AND FOUCAULTIAN SCHOLARSHIP 
We will start with other scholarship related to Foucault. My interest in Foucault is transactional, in 
the sense that I have taken aspects of his work that are helpful to me, and left the rest of it behind. 
There is a huge amount more to Foucault’s oeuvre, and I make no claims to be a Foucault scholar, or 
to make an original contribution to the secondary literature commenting on his work. Others have 
gone to great lengths to put forward an overarching account of Foucault’s work (such as Mark 
Kelly19). Texts such as these put the aspects of Foucault’s work that I have used into the context of his 
life’s work, or lay out multiple different interpretations. In contrast my focus is not on ensuring a 
faithful reproduction. I am not aware of any texts using Foucault to look at social investment directly. 
There are examples of Foucault being used to analyse social entrepreneurship, that take up different 
aspects of his work, and use them in different ways.20  The work of David Beer is worth mentioning 
briefly, as he describes his affinity with Foucault’s approach in building his account of ‘metric power’, 
and draws on a number of the same authors I have used, including Hacking and Porter, in exploring 
the growing role of metrics in governing everyday life.21 Though he touches on many of the same 
themes as this thesis, his project is quite different in scope, as he attempts to provide insight into 
metrics in general, rather than taking a detailed look at a single area of practice. Unfortunately, a 
fruitful comparison between our findings is made more difficult by aspects of Beer’s analysis. He draws 
on a very wide range of scholarship, but is unclear about what relationship he has with those texts, and 
precisely how they inform his own argument. I have encountered the same issues with Emily Barman’s 
                                                   
19 Mark G E Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault (2009). 
20 Pascal Dey, ‘On the Name of Social Entrepreneurship: Business School Teaching, Research, and Development 
Aid’ (2008); Pascal Dey, ‘The Symbolic Violence of “Social Entrepreneurship”: Language , Power and the 
Question of the Social (Subject)’, in Third Research Colloquium on Social Enterpreneurship (2010); Pascal Dey, 
‘Governing the Social through “Social Entrepreneurship”: A Foucauldian View of “the Art of Governing” in 
Advanced Liberalism’, in Social Entrepreneurship and Enterprise: Concepts in Context, ed. by H Douglas and 
Suzanne Grant (2013); Chris Steyaert and Pascal Dey, ‘Nine Verbs to Keep the Social Entrepreneurship Research 
Agenda “Dangerous”’, Journal of Social Entrepreneurship, 1/2 (2010). 
21 David Beer, Metric Power (2016). 
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work, and so I will save a detailed explanation of what this means for the discussion of her work 
below. 
POLITICAL THEORY AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 
Another expanse of scholarship to explore is the study of politics. We will take neoliberalism as a 
starting point, because it frequently appears in discussions in this field, and benefits from clarification. 
There are several relatively recent book-length treatments of neoliberalism itself, such as those by 
Colin Crouch,22 William Davies23 and Wendy Brown.24 These texts are interesting because they talk 
about both markets and measurement in charting changing philosophies of government over the past 
few decades. Indeed, neoliberalism is discussed in the body of the thesis due to Foucault’s examination 
of a handful of foundational texts.  
I have not used the concept in analysing social investment, however. This is partly because my interest 
is not in neoliberalism itself, but in the way (Foucault’s construal of) neoliberalism helps me to 
understand social investment. The question then becomes whether neoliberalism is a helpful set of 
ideas and concepts to bring into the analysis. I decided that this was not the case, because 
neoliberalism is used in such a variety of ways that giving it analytical weight would open up more 
questions than it would answer. This observation is confirmed by Rajesh Venugopal’s examination of 
the way the term’s usage has developed since the 1980s. It has proliferated in multiple different 
settings, and has come to be used in contrasting and sometimes conflicting manners.  “The 
terminological proliferation of neoliberalism is such” he writes, “that a single moniker is shared by a 
confusing array of hypothesized real-world processes that are not just different, but stand in 
contradiction to one another.”25 At the very least, this suggests that the term should be used with 
caution, and some time devoted to acknowledging this broader confusion. 
I have chosen to avoid these difficulties by giving neoliberalism only a very minor role in my analysis, 
which I do not think suffers as a result. Scholars like Crouch, Harvey and Brown have done the 
opposite, setting out to develop a detailed, nuanced accounted of neoliberalism that helps to explain 
certain aspects of contemporary political life. So while we may touch on some of the same themes and 
topics, these writers are oriented to very different ends. Where this thesis is very contained in its scope, 
seeking only to explain a specific programme of government at a specific time, these writings on 
neoliberalism are very broad in scope. 
Looking to political sociology and theory more broadly, given the importance of the market to social 
investment, a way to narrow down a very wide field is to look to writings on (the politics of) markets. 
There is a collection of works that ask what role the market should play in a political system, with the 
argument often being made that there is some kind of sphere that should rightfully be beyond the 
reach of the market. Margaret Somers argues that the notion of citizenship is being undermined by 
market-based logic, and that the protection of a healthy civil society is required.26 Deborah Satz 
orientates her work around egalitarianism, arguing that markets are blind to differing levels of need, 
treating every individual as a market participant of equal standing whether they are wealthy or 
                                                   
22 Colin Crouch, The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism (2011). 
23 William Davies, The Limits of Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of Competition (2016). 
24 Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (2015). 
25 Rajesh Venugopal, ‘Neoliberalism as Concept’, Economy and Society, 44/2 (2015). p178 
26 Margaret Somers, Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness and the Right to Have Rights (2008). 
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starving, and should be limited regarding the provision of certain basic goods.27 Margaret Radin writes 
on commodification, warning of the market “chipping away at the nonmonetisable aspects of life”,28 
while Steven Lukes’ study Invasions of the Market charts the “increasingly market-driven” nature of 
social and political life.29 Michael Sandel, like Satz, is concerned about the implications of market 
exchange for equality.30 These concerns could certainly be brought forward in relation to the social 
investment market, which promises to reconfigure ‘traditional’ structures, bringing the market to bear 
on solving social problems, in new ways.  
There are several points of differentiation between the approaches these studies take and the approach 
taken in this thesis. They are broader in scope, seeking to elaborate a particular concept (such as 
commodification or equality), rather than a concrete programme of activity. They also rely on an 
intuitive separation between different spheres – the market, state and civil society, or perhaps the 
public and the private – that I wanted to problematise. That is, this intuitive separation is used in 
elaborating the notion of social investment, and I wanted to ensure I could gain sufficient perspective 
on what role these assumptions are playing.  
Finally, these texts all set out an argument, in one way or another, for how things should be. They 
make a political argument, seeking to persuade the reader that certain sets of affairs are either desirable 
or undesirable. This is something I emphatically am not doing in relation to social investment. In fact, 
here we are brought back to one of the distinctive aspects of Foucault’s work. Colin Gordon draws 
attention to it:  
His [Foucault’s] object is not to arrive at a priori moral or intellectual judgments on the 
features of our society produced by such forms of power, but to render possible an analysis of 
the process of production itself. It turns out in fact that this scrutiny of power in terms of 
knowledge and of knowledge in terms of power becomes all the more radical – and this is 
indeed the condition of its possibility – through its rigorous insistence on this particular kind 
of neutrality.31 
Foucault’s analysis is neutral in the sense that he refuses to advocate for one set of affairs over another. 
He strives to understand how something works, to elucidate his own analysis, and to allow others to 
take this analysis back into their own particular everyday experiences, better equipped to see what is 
being asked of them, and how things might be done differently. I strive for this form of neutrality32 – 
instead of advocating a world that has more, or less, social investment in it, I am seeking to change the 
way it is seen. The complexity of social investment is such that I see no point in striving to conclude 
whether it should be supported or resisted. Nor do I attempt to offer a solution, or argue for a 
particular way of doing things as better than what we find in practice. In Foucault’s words: 
The necessity of reform musn’t be allowed to become a form of blackmail serving to limit, 
reduce or halt the exercise of criticism. Under no circumstance should one pay attention to 
those who tell one: ‘Don’t criticise, since you’re not capable of carrying out a reform.’ … 
                                                   
27 Deborah Satz, Why Some Things Should Not Be For Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets (2010). 
28 Margaret Jane Radin, ‘Market Inalienability’, Harvard Law Review, 100/8 (1987). 
29 Steven Lukes, ‘Invasions of the Market’, Working Paper (2004). 
30 Michael J Sandel, ‘What Money Shouldn’t Buy’, The Hedgehog Review, Summer (2003). 
31 Colin Gordon in Michel Foucault, Power / Knowledge (1980). p237 
32 For clarity, the neutrality of my analysis being referred to here is entirely connected to the series of comments 
made in the course of the thesis about the neutrality of social investment.  
 20 
Critique doesn’t have to be the premise of a deduction which concludes: this then is what 
needs to be done.’33 
‘SOCIAL SCIENCE’ STUDIES 
The next area of literature is scholarly in tone and approach, but does not anchor itself in any 
particular set of academic ideas. The point of anchorage for these studies is the research method they 
have adopted – which is why I have labelled them ‘social science’ studies – and the topic being 
examined. In this way we have fields like ‘evaluation studies’, ‘entrepreneurship studies’, and so on. 
These studies often rely mostly on a ‘practitioner’ literature to formulate the research question.  
There are a number of papers that might be referred to as ‘social investment studies’. Rizzello et al 
turn their analytic attention to the definitions debate, setting out to “explore the stance of existing 
studies on impact investing in order to clarify the concept and to identify focal points and trends, as 
well as inconsistencies and research gaps,” relying on a “bibliometric analysis of the literature on the 
topic” to provide insight.34 A similar effort is made by Höchstädter and Scheck, whose article attempts 
to clarify just what is preventing consensus from being established over terminology and definitions.35 
On a different tack, Jay Wiggan notes the growth of interest in SI but perceives a lack of attention 
being paid to UK Government discourse. He seeks to “enhanc[e] our understanding of the 
development and representation of impact investment in the UK.”36 Wiggan takes it for granted that 
Government discourse is worthy of analysis by virtue of its status as Government discourse, which 
from my perspective is arbitrarily limiting, and attributes too much influence to the Government’s 
support of these ideas. The tool he chooses, a “critical policy discourse analysis framework”, he 
borrows from another scholar and “applies” to the case of SI, and presents as a “transparent” method. 
In this sense he relies on method to bring weight to his findings, rather than the strength or 
persuasiveness of the argument.37 
Neil Reeder et al. explore the matter of social impact measurement in the context of SI, casting a 
“critical eye on the roles and responsibilities within impact measurement”, making clearer the “clash of 
suppositions taken from older measurement traditions”. While we might agree on the usefulness of 
identifying multiple influences on the way impact measurement is thought about, the article sets out 
to identify “key measurement issues” that need to be addressed if we are to achieve an “effective way of 
measuring non-financial benefits”.38 A commitment to bringing about “more robust quantifications” is 
present in a second paper of theirs on the topic, which develops a framework for analysing the grounds 
for disagreements over what measurement should look like.39 Theorisation of reality is offered as a 
solution to a perceived problem, in a manner I am seeking to avoid. 
                                                   
33 Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (1991). p84 
34 Alessandro Rizzello et al., ‘Social Impact Investing: A Model and Research Agenda’, Working Paper (2015). p1 
35 Höchstädter and Scheck (2014). 
36 Jay Wiggan, ‘Policy Boostering the Social Impact Investment Market in the UK’, Journal of Social Policy 
(2018). p1 
37 Ibid. p2 
38 Neil Reeder and Andrea Colantonio, ‘Measuring Impact and Non-Financial Returns in Impact Investing : A 
Critical Overview of Concepts and Practice’, Working Paper (2013). p2 
39 Neil Reeder et al., ‘Measuring Impact in Impact Investing: An Analysis of the Predominant Strength That Is 
Also Its Greatest Weakness’, Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment (2015).  p2 
 21 
There is also a growing literature we might call ‘Social Impact Bond studies’. Edmiston and Nicholls 
recently published an article examining four SIBs in detail (a “heterogenous purposive sample”40), 
cautiously suggesting that SIBs present “a new set of risks and opportunities in the field of public 
service reform.”41 Earlier works, published before there was much information available on SIBs 
beyond descriptions of the idea, offered ‘critique’ that would be better termed a ‘criticism’ – they set 
out the various reasons why we should be concerned about SIBs, building the argument by linking 
SIBs to other trends such as privatisation and marketisation of welfare, which are implied to be 
undesirable. Joy and Shields42 and McHugh et al43 join this category, as does Emma Dowling.44 These 
latter critiques provide descriptive detail about what SIBs are, but introduce whole rafts of 
unexamined assumptions about how the socio-political system should work. Dowling, for example, 
frames SIBs as an aspect of “the financialisation of the British welfare state”, which she describes as “a 
vehicle for the transfer of wealth from the public to private investors, while subjecting the domain of 
social policy to the vicissitudes of global financial markets.”45 There may be a good case for viewing 
SIBs in this way, but Dowling does not back up her assertions, or consider alternative perspectives.  
Nicholls and Edmiston are more contained and measured in their assessment, instead engaging in an 
approach that uses (static) categories to ‘test’ the reality of SIBs against what was promised. As I 
explain on page X, I have chosen not to include SIBs in my analysis. Their study deserves similar 
caution to social investment, in the sense that the idea of a SIB is very unstable. Attempts to either 
analyse SIBs using static categories, or to critique them by presenting them as an example of 
marketisation or financialisation, therefore run a high risk of failing to gain traction at the most 
meaningful level of analysis available: the way SIBs are thought about by those involved in making 
them happen. 
The final area for discussion is ‘evaluation studies’. Evaluation is a professional field, and evaluators 
seek to generate knowledge about programmes of intervention. The field of practice is accompanied 
by a neighbouring field of scholarly research. Evaluation as a field (of practice and study) has been 
grappling for decades with the issues facing social impact measurement, such as the suitability of 
randomised control trials for organisations working in the field, and how the need for rigour should be 
understood in settings where resources are stretched and skills are focused on delivery rather than 
evaluation good practice. SIM guidance has largely developed without reference to this literature, but 
in 2018 two evaluation journals published special issues on the topic: The American Journal of 
Evaluation published a set of five articles examining the connections between evaluation and impact 
measurement,46  while the African Evaluation Journal, supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, 
                                                   
40 Daniel Edmiston and Alex Nicholls, ‘Social Impact Bonds: The Role of Private Capital in Outcome-Based 
Commissioning’, Journal of Social Policy, 47/1 (2018). p62 
41 Ibid. p73 
42 Meghan Joy and John Shields, ‘Social Impact Bonds: The Next Phase of Third Sector Marketization?’, 
Canadian Journal of Nonprofit & Social Economy Research, 4/2 (2013). 
43 Neil Mchugh et al., ‘Social Impact Bonds: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?’, Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, 
21/3 (2013). 
44 Emma Dowling, ‘In the Wake of Austerity: Social Impact Bonds and the Financialisation of the Welfare State 
in Britain’, New Political Economy, 22/3 (2017a). 
45 Ibid. p294 
46 Karim Harji and Edward T Jackson, ‘Facing Challenges, Building the Field’, American Journal of Evaluation, 
39/3 (2018); Lisa Hehenberger and Anna-Marie Harling, ‘Moving Toward “Impact- Adjusted” Financial 
Returns: Closing Remarks’, American Journal of Evaluation, 39/3 (2018); Jane Reisman, Veronica M Olazabal 
and Shawna A Hoffman, ‘Putting the “Impact” in Impact Investing: The Rising Demand for Data and Evidence 
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looked at social impact investing more broadly.47 These two sets of articles are very much at the border 
between academic and non-academic research. Some of them are not peer reviewed, and are written by 
practitioners. They do not look to bodies of academic theory to situate their approach. Of this group 
or articles, one example from Kate Ruff and Sara Olsen stand out as making an argument that gains 
sufficient distance from the day-to-day ‘doing’ of evaluation and impact measurement. They argue the 
quest for standard measurement is “misguided”, and suggest a way forward in which evaluators are 
drawn on as the “skilled analysts” needed to navigate the complexities of bringing data to bear on 
causal claims.48 This argument intersects well with my own observations regarding the incompatibility 
of different functions assigned to SIM within the context of SI.  
ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 
The more than 700-page Handbook of Economic Sociology describes the field as a broad discipline 
looking to “apply” the “sociological perspective” to “economic phenomena”49. As a starting point, 
there are several examples of scholars situating work on social investment or closely related topics 
within the discipline. 
Alex Nicholls at Oxford University was one of the first academic authors to publish on social 
investment. In a 2010 article he aims to build a “theoretical model” of social investment, drawing on 
institutional theory. He identifies a “typology of investor rationalities” which is applied to an 
“empirical survey of the social investment landscape.”50 Nicholls accounts for issues of definition and 
boundaries – “the potentially unstable diversity of institutional elements currently in play across the 
field” – by identifying “nine distinct models of investment, each with its own institutional norms and 
logics”.51 He therefore builds on the assumptions of an academic discipline, institutional theory, to 
suggest a framework into which empirical reality can be organised. A more recent work is a volume 
edited by Nicholls and others called Social Finance.52  Many of the chapters set out conceptual 
frameworks for understanding aspects of the ‘social finance’ market, but I would suggest that the 
overall aim is to suggest clarifications that will aid the development of this area of practice, overcoming 
the chaos and confusion of an ‘undertheorised’ space. Similarly, Glänzel and Scheuerle use 
institutional theory  (a “lens of conflicting institutional logics”)  to analyse “social impact investing” in 
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Germany,53 and Julia Morley analyses the spread of impact measurement in terms of the spread of 
norms, based on institutionalist theory.54 This corner of economic sociology, as it is formulated by 
these authors, certainly subscribes to the ‘theory’ vs ‘reality’ dichotomy that I have sought to distance 
myself from. 
Institutionalist theory provides one set of ideas; so too does the sociology of markets, a subdiscipline of 
economic sociology. Here we find long-running conversations about the role of markets in society. 
Much of this literature reacts to the ‘pure’ market model advanced by economic theory, and seeks to 
address the shortcomings of economics by viewing  markets as sociological objects. Zelizer55 and 
Fligstein and Dauter56 both review this literature. There are identifiable schools of thought within the 
subdiscipline, some of them suggesting the market be properly viewed as subordinate to ongoing 
historical and cultural constraints, others seeing it as an ever-expanding sphere that threatens other 
spheres of life.57 
In comparison to the approach I have taken, the sociology of markets literature pursues a different set 
of questions, and offer analysis at a different level. These authors are looking to address the 
shortcomings of economic theory by investigating the complex reality of the market. In the case of 
social investment, however, it is precisely the pure market model that provides structure and support 
to this field of action. As we will see, it plays an absolutely central role in the reasoning about social 
investment. As I have explained above, I am advancing a critique that takes this reasoning as the source 
of insight into SI as a programme of government. Though there is undoubtedly a need for a fuller 
understanding of how this model ‘actually’ works or is experienced in reality, in the case of social 
investment, for the sake of analysis, we need to keep this model intact.  
Economic sociology also incorporates the sociology of accounting and measurement. Once more, the 
focus is on exploring these features of economic activity as sociological phenomena, rather than as 
neutral or technical means for achieving other goals. The notion that social impact can be measured 
and reported on is central to social investment, and is thus amenable to analysis from the perspective 
of the sociology of accounting literature. Scholars have made this connection. Nicholls has published 
several pieces on impact measurement. The chapter he co-authored on measurement in his edited 
volume Social Finance is the only one to discuss measurement specifically in the context of finance and 
investment.58 Another discusses social impact accounting more generally, 59 with others focusing on 
accounting within social enterprise. 60  These works share a proclivity for defining theoretical 
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frameworks used to categorise the phenomenon at hand, whether it is “a theoretical model of three 
categories of metrics that can be applied to practice in social entrepreneurship”,61 “a contingency 
model to suggest the sorts of contexts in which social impact measurement (in its various forms) will 
and will not be appropriate”,62 “the development of a new theoretical construct – ‘Blended Value 
Accounting’ – that is used to illustrate how social entrepreneurs use reporting practices creatively as 
strategic tools to access resources and realize organizational mission objectives”,63 or “a conceptual 
model of social impact accounting based upon its particular materiality practices”.64 The focus here is 
on theory creation, aimed at providing theoretical infrastructure useful for other scholars in studying 
this phenomenon. This contrasts with my approach, which seeks to understand how social investment 
and social impact measurement are reasoned about by actors in the field. 
Looking beyond the social investment / social enterprise literature, there are many varied settings in 
which measurement and accounting take place, and the study of these practices must be assumed to be 
correspondingly broad. Several texts are used in the body of the thesis, such as Theodore Porter’s Trust 
in Numbers,65 and the discussion on Governmentality includes work by accounting scholars Peter 
Miller and Michael Power. The wider writings by these two latter authors, on areas far beyond social 
investment, are instructive in terms of the approach they take. Miller, for example, provides a robust 
defence of a previous article of his that had received criticism on methodological grounds. He defends 
an approach that is similar to what I am hoping to achieve, in which he and his co-author sought to 
explain the intricacies of a particular site (a factory in the US), to connect it with broader ways of 
thinking about labour and manufacture, and to avoid “metatheorising”.66 Meanwhile Power’s 2007 
book on ‘risk management’ puts forward an account of the concept of risk that is instructive for me in 
thinking about ‘impact’. 67 
Power and Miller are central to the ‘critical accounting’ field. They, and other authors like Nikolas 
Rose, are heavily influenced by Foucault, and several of their texts are used in the thesis. There is also a 
broader critical accounting literature. Some of it overlaps with Science and Technology Studies, which 
is discussed below. Another subsector use Habermas’ theories to unpack issues in accounting 
research.68 Considering the wide gulf between Foucault and Habermas’ ways of construing reality,69 
this Habermasian critical accounting project pursues quite separate lines of enquiry. In particular, 
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there is an illuminating discussion reporting back on the difficulties encountered when ‘applying’ 
Habermas’ theory to ‘reality’, which brings to the surface the differences in the way these authors 
formulate the relationship between theory and reality.70 
Many studies of accounting and measurement gather data about particular situations in which 
measurement is taking place, or a particular tool is being used. In this thesis, just as we do not look to 
the ‘reality’ of the market, we do not look to the ‘reality’ of social impact measurement. Our focus 
remains on the way the need for SIM practices is conceived of within social investment as a programme 
of government.  
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES (STS) 
I am not offering strict disciplinary boundaries with these headings, and some aspects of STS might sit 
within economic sociology. It is however worth addressing this set of literature under a different 
heading, in recognition of a more-or-less separate set of theoretical influences.  
STS self-identifies as interdisciplinary, a field that, according to the most recent Handbook, 
“investigates the institutions, practices, meanings, and outcomes of science and technology”. 71 
Originally developed in relation to the (‘natural’) sciences, the conceptual toolkit of STS has been 
brought into several areas of enquiry that are closer to our area of focus: economics and processes of 
economisation; markets and processes of marketisation; and value and processes of valuation. In 
2009/10 Çalişkan and Callon published a pair of articles on “economization”, the second of which 
suggests a “research programme for the study of markets”.72 After a detailed reading of these densely 
theoretical texts, I concluded that they were operating at a different level of analysis, seeking to move 
forward the academic community’s thinking about the presence of markets in contemporary life, in 
contrast to my own attempt to understand how the basic structure of the market is informing the 
reasoning of practitioners in the specific domain of social investment. 
Callon has published with Fabien Muniesa and Yuval Millo on the so-called “pragmatic turn” in the 
study of markets and economics, introducing the notion of “market devices”: “a simple way of 
referring to the material and discursive assemblages that intervene in the construction of markets”. 
They characterise this pragmatic turn in terms of an avoidance of “ex-ante explicative principles”, and 
as particularly well suited to “the study of situations of uncertainty.” 73  This suggests greater 
consonance between this work and my own than I have found in economic sociology.74 However, 
these pragmatic studies adopt a different level of analysis. At least in the volume being introduced by 
Callon et al, studies look at particular market devices, whether it is “the analyst’s report”, “the 
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financial chart”, or the “purchasing centre”.75 In this sense they extend to a greater level of granularity 
than I have reached in studying social investment. I do not consider this a weakness of either approach 
– they ask different questions, and yield different results. 
Donald MacKenzie’s work sits in close proximity. His book on financial markets is used in the course 
of the thesis. He has also written on the creation of carbon markets, where he examines efforts to find 
measures of carbon that make its trade possible, approaching it as an epistemological problem in a 
manner similar to the treatment of ‘impact’ in this thesis.76 His study with Yuval Millo on the 
“usefulness of inaccurate models” in financial markets also touches closely on my interest in the 
different knowledge orientations pursued within the context of social impact measurement.77  
EMILY BARMAN ON ‘CARING CAPITALISM’ 
To conclude this discussion of how the thesis is situated among the work of other scholars, we will 
take a more detailed look at the work of sociologist Emily Barman, who picks up the ideas around 
processes of valuation. Her work warrants more detailed examination because it is perhaps the only 
example of an extended attempt to explain impact investing using the same kind of scholarly works as 
I have used. Her text provides an opportunity to explore another’s attempt to tackle similar issues with 
similar resources, and to draw out the similarities and differences between our work. Though we share 
considerable common ground, there remain numerous points of differentiation between our 
approaches. Most obviously, where I have focused in depth on one area of practice, Barman looks to 
impact investing as one of a number of case studies. She builds a broader argument around 
developments in measurement of social value in the context of ‘caring capitalism’. A variety of 
comparisons can therefore fruitfully be made that help to elucidate where different approaches are 
suited to different forms of enquiry. Unfortunately, these comparisons are hindered by a degree of 
ambiguity and conceptual fuzziness in Barman’s work, so in the course of this discussion I will 
highlight these problematic aspects.  
Barman’s book examines what she calls ‘caring capitalism’. She draws attention to a number of areas of 
practice – nonprofit organisations, social enterprises, socially responsible investing, corporate social 
responsibility, responsible investment, inclusive business and impact investing – that seek to adjust 
business practices towards some notion of social value. “The idea seems simple enough: companies can 
pursue social impact and they can make profit in so doing.”78 Caring capitalism represents both 
exciting possibility and cause for concern. She sets up a contrast between how things used to be done – 
businesses stayed out of the social domain, leaving it to NGOs – and how things work under this new 
regime: 
What is the consequence when social goods are no longer donated by NGOs to the 
disadvantaged, both here in the United States and in the global South, but now are sold by 
firms on the market to paying customers? And what happens to our understanding of social 
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good when it is subject to companies’ quest for economic profit and investors’ desire for 
shareholder return?79 
She then sets out to explore “the effect of the rise of caring capitalism for the meaning and measure of 
social value.” 80 She describes the argument as proceeding in three stages. First she attempts “to identify 
the types of measuring devices present for social purpose organizations as a lens to understand the 
question of social value.” She then “seeks to determine how the rise of caring capitalism has affected 
the valuation of social good,” before, lastly, asking “when and why different measuring devices … 
come to prevail across this assortment of social purpose organizations.” She builds her analysis on a 
distinction between social value and economic value, where the latter is manifest in the use of “market 
indicators such as money and shareholder return”.81 
Barman therefore takes a different starting point in approaching a similar topic. The ideas she relies on 
most heavily are those of the pragmatic turn in sociology described just above. However, where I have 
taken great pains to explain which works I am using to lay the foundations for analysis and why, 
Barman does not provide such clear explanation. As a result, there is considerable ambiguity 
surrounding the way Barman formulates the relationship between her own argument, the arguments 
of other scholars, and the nature of the topic of her work. In other words, her epistemological 
assumptions are unclear.  
This lack of clarity is apparent in the way Barman handles the literature. The book contains references 
to a very wide range of texts. She brings in the work of others where there is a point of connection 
with her current area of discussion, without any deeper consideration of the compatibility of 
underlying orientation. This passage, for example, is followed by a reference to Foucault:  
Actors with the goal of altering others’ behavior, secondly, can commission a measuring 
device. A measuring device can be critical to a larger project of ‘governing by numbers’ by 
gathering knowledge about others in order to influence their activities.82  
In this way she suggests that her point is supported by Foucault’s analysis. However, this is a 
misleading representation of Foucault’s writings on the relationship between knowledge and power. 
Foucault, as I understand him, was not interested in how one person got somebody else to do their 
bidding, but in how the relationship between knowledge and power can be studied to reveal the ways 
in which individuals come to govern their own behaviour. My argument here is not that Barman is 
wrong about Foucault but that she simply does not engage with the text she is appealing to, which 
begs the question: why include it at all? What does it add to her analysis?  
This light-touch referencing makes sense if we assume a basic compatibility between the work of 
disparate authors working on similar topics, in which case these references act as signposting to where 
more detail on a topic might be found. But I do not think there are any grounds for this assumption 
of basic compatibility, and Barman certainly does not tackle this issue explicitly. The approach I have 
taken in developing my theoretical position, as I have outlined above, was to be extremely careful 
about relying on the work of other theorists, because doing so risks importing unwanted assumptions 
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into my own analysis. My focus was on setting out as clear an argument as possible, which means 
being clear in my own mind, as well as in what I write, about what claims I am making and on what 
grounds I make them.  
This is not just a complaint about referencing etiquette. The lack of clarity I am pointing to extends 
into Barman’s more detailed discussion of existing literature. The assumption of basic compatibility 
across disparate literatures is present in her discussion of the literature on markets and morals, for 
example.83 She characterises a number of different arguments theorists have made regarding the role of 
markets in society, then suggests what this would mean for her argument about caring capitalism. 
“One long-standing strand of scholarship emphasizes the distinct and colonizing nature of the 
contemporary economy for social action”, she remarks, citing Margaret Radin and Michael Sandel, 
before moving in the same paragraph to the work of social enterprise scholars Battilana and Dorado, 
who characterise the different logics of the nonprofit and market spheres. What does this mean for her 
argument?  
The expectation here would be that the measure of social value would be contingent on 
sectoral location. For nonprofits, the tools used to gauge organizations’ social value would 
reflect actors’ values-based beliefs about how best to achieve social good. For compassionate 
companies, in contrast, money should be the proposed metric of social value.84 
Because her engagement with the texts is superficial, so is the connection she makes through to her 
thesis on caring capitalism. Barman makes no attempt to understand or account for the considerable 
differences in orientation between Radin, Sunder and Battilana and Dorado, or consider how this 
disparity affects the claims she is making.  
This brings us onto the content of Barman’s argument. The significance of her findings rely on the 
difference between what we would expect of ‘caring capitalism’, and what her study reveals to be the 
case. What is her starting point for setting out what these expectations might be? 
Common sense, as well as one strand of academic theory, would make dire predictions [about 
the effect of caring capitalism for the meaning and measure of social value]. It would lead us 
to expect that caring capitalism does little else than marketize social value. Money and its 
pursuit take over, subsuming the very definition of social good to its unwieldy power. But as 
we will see, what I find is not as simple nor as calamitous in its effects. This book shows that 
caring capitalism has not resulted in the wholesale marketization of social value.85 
Undoubtedly, some readers’ common sense will point them in the direction she suggests, but it is quite 
a leap to suggest that we can all accept this as a commonsensical starting premise. We are left with this 
“strand of academic theory” to give us grounds for these expectations. But she does not offer us a 
critical appraisal of this strand of theory – in fact, she does not even tell us explicitly which theorists 
she is referring to. I am left with the distinct impression she herself approached her topic matter with 
this theory in mind, and was not able to entirely let go of this presupposition in developing her 
argument. Whether or not this is the case, this impression is created because Barman is not explicit 
enough about what her position is, and how it relates to the position of other authors writing on 
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similar topics. Indeed, this passage in the introduction to the book helps draw attention to the lack of 
clarity: 
As we will see, caring capitalism has meant the diffusion of social value into the private sector 
and, correspondingly, the marketization of the project of social value. Caring capitalism has 
entailed the proliferation of new meanings of social value, with each field characterized by 
proponents’ construction of a moral market in which economic exchange can be legitimately 
employed in a particular way to pursue social and financial ends. Yet, at the same time, caring 
capitalism has not resulted in the wholesale employment of market indicators to measure 
firms’ social value. … How can we account for this discrepancy between the meaning and 
measure of social value in an era of caring capitalism? Making sense of this puzzle constitutes 
the empirical task of this book. 86 
In this passage she mixes together ideas from across the literature on markets and morals, without 
specifying what she accepts and what she rejects. She borrows the idea of ‘constructing moral markets’, 
while structuring the passage around the opposition between the market as a colonising force (which 
would lead us to expect the “wholesale employment of market indicarors to measure firms’ social 
value”) and what her research has revealed – that this is not the case. But if these are moral markets, 
then should we not also reflect on what this term ‘marketisation’ means if we are suggesting that 
markets can actually be a domain for moral action? Even her formulation of the problem guiding the 
book’s enquiry is ambiguous – does she mean the discrepancy between the meaning of social value and 
the measure of social value (an opposition that is itself unclear, and is not presaged in the preceding 
text), or between these two elements and something else? To top it off, she introduces the notion of an 
“empirical puzzle”, as if she has set out a hypothesis that can be tested by appealing to the facts.  
The issues created by this lack of clarity are apparent in the section on impact investing. She sets out 
to explain why it is that impact investing has not chosen measurement devices that rely on market 
indicators. The main reason, she asserts, is that a contingent of investors in this field were morally 
opposed to market indicators: 
According to participants in the field, the lack of monetization of an investment’s social value 
was due to the expectations of one core group of resource providers. Compared to other 
participants, impact first investors wanted a“clear separation between financial returns and 
impact”(Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors 2010:12). Money, in other words, was viewed by 
these investors as an indicator of economic return and so was not considered a legitimate 
measure of social impact for that type of investor.87 
To reach this conclusion, she has to put some boundaries on what impact investing is. It is true that 
the US-based conversation around impact investing contained fewer cross-currents than the UK-
focused equivalent that I examine, as there was no equivalent focus on capitalising the domestic social 
sector. But she does draw attention to the huge variation across investor types and expectations. Her 
way of dealing with this is to suggest some kind of consensus was reached, which is reflected in the 
choice of measurement device. She describes a conference she attended in which an individual tried to 
make the argument that “all of his firm’s investments in emerging markets should qualify as ‘impact 
investments’ given that they served to grow the economy of developing nations, with corollary societal 
benefits.” This person was mistaken, Barman implies: “The other panel members and the audience 
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were quick to reject his claim, with many loudly noting that the specific purpose of Impact Investing 
is to place investment and loans with locally owned firms whose business models constitute a solution 
to a social problem.”88 
Her conclusion about impact investing, then, is that this argument prevails and is reflected in the fact 
that impact investing does not use market indicators of social value. I consider this a gross 
simplification, if not misrepresentation, of the dynamics internal to impact investing. It is misleading 
to suggest such a unified image of impact investing. It is misleading to suggest the question of 
financial proxies is not of any concern in impact investing, when it continues to be referred to as a 
future goal by some parties. It is also misleading to suggest that this individual simply got it wrong. I 
have heard the same point made at conferences myself, not because the person in question had 
misunderstood what impact investing is, but because they were drawing attention to the flimsiness of 
the distinction between impact investing and mainstream investing. Even if the attendees at the 
conference Barman attended agreed impact investing had to go to “locally owned firms whose business 
models constitute a solution to a social problem”, this is by no means a standard definition. As this 
thesis explores at length, the meaning of impact investing is contested and unstable; Barman seeks to 
stabilise it for the sake of the role she wants it to play in her own argument. 
By committing to exploring the dichotomy between market and non-market indicators, Barman also 
rules out the possibility of asking a whole range of questions about the nature of measurement in the 
context of impact investing. That is, she gains no insight into the debate over proving vs improving 
impact that I explore in chapter 6. Moreover, by starting with the question of measurement devices, 
she is unable to see how the need for measurement is connected with other imperatives, such as the 
need for accountability. She has created a narrative around impact investing that fits the argument of 
her book, without providing insight into the practice of impact investing itself.  
I have suggested a number of points of weakness in Barman’s argument, but I should reiterate the 
point that we are engaged in quite different projects, and so her book should not be judged on 
precisely the same grounds. The issue of clarity of argument does, of course, apply whatever the form 
of enquiry. But it is perhaps inevitable that in offering a relatively brief analysis of so many areas of 
practice, Barman opens herself up to criticism for the accuracy of her work from people who have 
spent much longer in one of those areas. While she does not offer deep insight in impact investing, 
Barman does enable comparison across multiple different areas of practice. This form of comparison 
helps to put impact investing in a broader context, and to gain some sense of different communities of 
actors working on similar projects. This draws attention to the downside of a very in-depth study of 
one area of practice. While I think this focus was warranted in the case of this thesis, it suggests 
possibilities for future research that opens up comparisons with related areas of practice.  
SUMMARY COMMENTS 
The topics and fields discussed above are some of the closest neighbours to this thesis, because they 
explore the roles of markets and measurement as sociological and political objects. But there remains 
plenty of territory we have not covered. The historical epistemological aspects of this analysis could 
lead us into the philosophy of science, or intellectual history and discussions of modernity. Straying in 
another direction, there may be research into social investment firmly planted in management studies, 
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finance, economics and law, but the orientation of these disciplines, and the conventions they impose, 
are so significantly different from those draw on in this project that I have not sought them out.  
Another broad set of material is opened up by looking to closely related areas of practice in social 
finance more broadly, such as microfinance, socially responsible investment (SRI), corporate social 
responsbility (CSR), community finance, crowdfunding, environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
investing, ethical banking, green investment, social enterprise and social innovation, venture 
philanthropy and philanthrocapitalism. All of these areas of practice are attended by varying amounts 
of scholarly attention, which shares an interest in the attempt to take financial principles and practices 
beyond the ‘pure profit making’ of the mainstream. All of these practices are approachable from 
multiple different disciplinary homes, as they are interesting to the economist as much as they are to 
the institutional theorist or student of public policy. Opening up all of these fields would be a lengthy 
process requiring pages of space better devoted to exploring social investment.  
THESIS OVERVIEW 
The first two chapters of the thesis provide detailed grounding for the approach taken, based on 
extensive discussion of the work of Foucault and Poovey. Chapter 1 starts with a description of the 
problematisation forming the foundation of social investment as a programme of activity – that is, it is 
a response to the problem of the undercapitalisation of the social sector, and the shortcomings of a 
financial mechanism that forces investors to choose between doing good and doing well. The solution 
to both of these problems is to build a market for social investment capital. The chapter also provides 
a brief description of some of the key institutions and individuals active in the development of social 
investment, to help orientate the reader. It then gives a detailed explanation of what it means to frame 
social investment as a programme of government, and introduces the idea of the production of 
knowledge. Chapter 2 looks to the broader context from which social investment has emerged, by 
exploring the liberal rationality of government. Following Foucault, liberalism is explained in terms of 
interests, and the importance of governing with respect to interests. The discussion then turns to the 
production of knowledge, and more specifically the production of disinterested knowledge – otherwise 
known as objective facts. This discussion helps us to appreciate the importance of the purpose for 
which knowledge is being produced for our ability to denaturalise the assumptions about what counts 
as useful or valid knowledge. These two chapters set us up to tackle the material on social investment. 
Next, chapters 3 to 6 contain a detailed exploration of the logic internal to social investment as a 
programme of government, drawing attention to the way in which knowledge about social investment 
has been produced, and to the tensions running through this reasoning. Chapter 3 looks to the way 
the notion of the market lends structure and direction to this programme of government. It treats the 
market for SI as an epistemological object, bringing to the surface the assumptions that are introduced 
by viewing matters in terms of a market, and drawing attention to a kind of duality in facts about the 
market that allow it to appear as a neutral mechanism, an innocuous matter of fact. This helps to 
ensure that as our argument develops, we avoid unwittingly carrying forward assumptions about the 
market that should be part of our analysis. Chapters 4 and 5 then spend time unpicking two quite 
distinct modes of reasoning about social investment that tend to be insufficiently distinguished within 
the debate. For the sake of argument, I label these the ‘innovative’ and the ‘principled’ modes of 
reasoning. Chapter 4 demonstrates that the differences between these modes of reasoning help to 
identify the root of the disagreement in the so-called ‘tradeoff debate’ – the question of whether 
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investors should expect the pursuit of social return to result in lower financial returns. Similarly, 
chapter 5 explores the debate over what qualifies an organisation to be the recipient of social 
investment. In both of these cases, the innovative mode of reasoning is keen to set out an 
understanding of social purpose that is entirely separated from the question of profit or returns. The 
principled mode of reasoning, in contrast, views social purpose not as incompatible with the creation 
of profits, but as related, so that social purpose should mean the prioritisation of mission over profit. It 
is argued that the innovative mode of reasoning supports a vision of social investment that takes a 
radical step away from how social problems have been constituted to date, both in terms of the role of 
profitmaking in addressing them, and the fact-based approach to understanding them. This analysis 
builds the argument that social investment carves out a technical domain, based on the basic 
assumption that interests can be aligned.  
Chapter 6 turns to the last area of social investment under investigation: social impact measurement. 
It focuses not on the measurement practices themselves, but on how the need for measurement is 
formulated within the vision for social investment. The discussion of different orientations to the 
production of knowledge from chapter 2 is drawn on to highlight the multiple orientations present 
within thinking about SIM. While some of these contrasting orientations are recognised within the 
debate, I suggest that reasoning about the need for measurement is also influenced, in underspecified 
ways, by the perceived importance of accountability. I argue that one way of making sense of the 
connection between measurement, accountability and the desire to protect the integrity of the field is 
to be alert to the needs of the market, which privileges some mechanisms (measurement, data flows) 
over others (oversight and regulation). This way of surfacing the often unspoken assumptions around 
the need for measurement is supported by an analysis of the nature of the facts supposedly generated 
by SIM, which make thinkable a neutral, fact-based version of social change. This analysis further 
strengthens the argument that the logic of social investment marks out neutral grounds for action. 
Finally, chapter 7 steps outside of the logic of the programme of government, and draws attention to 
the politics of social investment. That is, social investment is political both because of what it is trying 
to do – solve social problems – and because this neutrality is created, by all the techniques described 
throughout the rest of the thesis. The market comes to be seen as a neutral way of framing possibilities 
for action, for example, but in fact this framing of reality brings about a series of effects. It opens up 
new possibilities for action, while making other options seem impossible, unworkable or simply not up 
for discussion. Chapter 7 explores a number of examples that help to open up the matter of the 
politics of social investment. To end the thesis, the Conclusion chapter makes some final observations 
about how the insight into social investment connects back up with Foucault’s account of liberalism. 
It then highlights some of the main contributions made by the thesis, and concludes with a brief look 
at more recent developments in the field. 
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CHAPTER 1: SOCIAL INVESTMENT AS A 
PROGRAMME OF GOVERNMENT 
We’ve got a great idea here that can transform our societies, by using the power of finance to 
tackle the most difficult social problems. Problems that have frustrated Government after 
Government, country after country, generation after generation. Issues like drug abuse, youth 
unemployment, homelessness and even global poverty. The potential for social investment is 
that big. So I want to make it a success in Britain and I want to sell it all over the world.  
 
So how does it work? Businesses need finance to grow and make profit. Governments need 
finance to fund big infrastructure projects. That’s why we have banks, bonds, investment 
markets and all the rest. The idea here is just as simple and just as powerful. Social enterprises, 
charities and voluntary bodies have the knowledge, human touch and personal commitment 
to succeed where Governments often fail. But they need finance too. They can get it from 
socially minded investors. So we need social investment markets, social investment bonds and 
social investment banks. And here Government needs to help. Government needs to be more 
creative and innovative – saying to social entrepreneurs: “if you can solve the problem we’ll 
give you money.” As soon as Government says that, social entrepreneurs can go out and raise 
capital.  
Speech by Prime Minister David Cameron at the Social Impact Investment Forum,  
6th June 201389 
Social problems are a concern for any politician. As this excerpt demonstrates, the interest in social 
investment as a solution to these problems went all the way up to the top of the UK Government, 
attracting the attention of the Prime Minister. There is a kind of commonsense appeal to the idea. As 
he states, the idea of social investment is “just as simple and just as powerful” as conventional financial 
mechanisms. The social sector offers solutions to social problems “where Governments often fail”, so 
all that is needed is the mechanisms to connect them up with “socially minded investors”.   
Cameron’s words are useful in illustrating a central theme of this thesis: social investment offers a way 
of solving social problems that is commonsense, neutral, and technical. It does not prescribe any 
particular solutions. It does not favour one section of the population over another. It proposes merely 
to build the infrastructure needed for a diverse array of innovative social entrepreneurs and social 
investors to come together and create new responses to entrenched problems, to succeed where 
Government has failed. This chapter gives an idea of the extent of the popularity of this vision, giving 
an overview of the range of projects and intiatives that took place under the banner of social 
investment. It also begins to set out the conceptual tools we will need in building the argument that 
social investment is more than just a mechanism to connect the social sector with new forms of 
finance. The second half of the chapter begins to elaborate what is meant by calling social investment a 
‘programme of government’. First, we turn to a detailed account of the problems that social 
investment is set up to solve.  
 
                                                   
89 Text available: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-at-the-social-impact-
investment-conference Accessed 13th April 2018. 
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A PROBLEM WITH A SOLUTION 
We will start with a summary of the problem detailed in the documents setting out the vision for 
social investment.  We are informed that the way the social sector has been financed to date is 
unsuitable for the challenges that the social sector needs to meet. Social problems are pressing, and 
national Governments have proven themselves to be ineffective. Innovation and entrepreneurialism is 
needed, and innovation and entrepreneurialism can only be effective if there is sufficient access to the 
right kinds of financial capital. Unlike the private sector, where mainstream capital markets are 
accessible to companies who want to embark on a high-risk venture, the social sector has traditionally 
been funded using grants and donations. This dependency on grant funding inhibits the potential of 
the sector. It fosters a short-term, ‘hand-to-mouth’ existence which is not conducive to the innovation 
and entrepreneurialism that is needed to find solutions to social problems. In particular, to date there 
have been only a small number of SSOs that have managed to ‘scale up’. The majority of the sector 
operates at a very local level. If SSOs had access to a range of types of capital, suitable for different 
stages of development and different fields of operation, then the sector could achieve its potential. 
SSOs would be able to take on contracts with Government, and the solutions they find would be 
expanded to positively impact on the lives of more and more people.  
This is the view found across a collection of documents published by Government and by a collection 
of institutions and initiatives set up with a view to popularising the idea of social investment. Several 
of the people speaking in the BSC interviews were involved in these initiatives. Collectively they 
transmit a clear message.  
The first publication of this view of the world is the 2006 consultation paper by the Commission on 
Unclaimed Assets, which set out the case for a ‘social investment bank’ (the institution that came to be 
called Big Society Capital). The paper opens by pointing to problems of inequality, poverty and 
deprivation. The social sector, it notes, “is well-placed to meet this challenge.” But “funding for the 
third sector is often restrictive and inflexible, stifling creativity and growth. A more sophisticated 
funding system is needed for the third sector to thrive.”90 Comments from the interviews help to 
elaborate the work that went into producing this document: 
If you read the report on the Commission of Unclaimed Assets, you’ll see, we were becoming 
more and more exercised and more and more knowledgeable about the state of the 
undercapitalisation in the voluntary sector. The data […] was strong enough to show fairly 
clearly that you were looking at a sector which was never going to have, on the present scheme 
of things, were never going to have enough capital money to pay for scaling up or professional 
development or investment in growth. [Interviewee] 
A similar message is found in the strategy paper published by the Government in 2011: 
Britain is blessed with inspiring social entrepreneurs driven by a desire to improve the lives of 
their fellow citizens. They lead organisations bent on finding sustainable solutions for 
entrenched social problems. These organisations are social ventures – and it’s time to get 
behind them. We need their innovative approaches if we are to build a bigger, stronger 
society. We need their involvement to open up and decentralise our public services. But to do 
more, social ventures need easier access to capital. They need capital just as businesses do – to 
finance their expansion and build their resilience. …So our vision is to create nothing less 
than a long- term ‘third pillar’ of finance for our crucial social ventures, alongside traditional 
                                                   
90 The Commission on Unclaimed Assets, A Social Investment Bank: Consultation Paper (2006). p1 
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giving and funds from the state. This pillar of finance is social investment, money that blends 
financial return with social return.91 
The first annual report of BSC also tells a similar story: 
Social sector organisations play a critical role in our communities and in our society. … Yet, 
despite their critical role, they are chronically underfunded, often lack scale and struggle to 
access funding from mainstream capital markets. Big Society Capital’s mission is to change 
this by transforming the supply of capital to social organisations in the UK.92 
While Government might be a source of money for the social sector, it is not able to provide enough. 
The necessity of imposing an austerity agenda (a key plank of the newly elected Coalition 
Government’s agenda) placed additional emphasis on Government’s inability to pay. But more than 
the availability of resources, there are features inherent to Government’s attempts to help that make it 
unsuitable and ineffective. A general picture of Governmental ineffectiveness is appealed to: 
it’s not that Government hasn’t tried over 70 years since the Beveridge report in ‘42. Over 70 
years, the British Government has tried to pool more resources, human, financial, and all the 
rest of it. It just isn’t the most effective model for dealing with social issues. [Interviewee] 
A more specific kind of ineffectiveness is found in the model of grant funding. The same interviewee 
paints a picture of this situation: 
In the mid 1930s, Government began to realise that philanthropy couldn’t do it all and 
Government began to get involved. And Government, for 60 to 70 years, the welfare state 
and so on and so forth, tried to lead in this. And what had happened to the social sector 
during this period was that it had been constrained by the philanthropic model from allowing 
organisations to scale up. Nobody had any money. Virtually nobody could look forward more 
than three months. Everybody was living hand to mouth. [Interviewee] 
The “philanthropic model”, then, is “constraining”. In contrast, the social investment model promotes 
long-term financing that allows organisations to build their capacity and ensure their own 
sustainability. The 2011 Government strategy paper suggests social investment can be seen by SSOs as 
“a potentially useful tool to help them increase the scope, reach and longer-term sustainability of their 
activities.”93 What is more, repayable investment means that capital is recycled. As the same paper 
states, investment “can help many social ventures, because repaid money can be used again and 
again.”94 One of the interviewees explains this logic: 
Social investment should be about recycling the money. So another way of thinking about it – 
if [BSC] got the money we’ve got and it was a grant pool, it would be gone by now. Every 
penny would be gone. Nothing would be coming back. So what good would have been 
achieved with that 250m over the past 3 years? I think that’s the – what difference would 
250m of extra money in the NHS have made over the last 4 years? Not much. [Interviewee] 
                                                   
91 HM Government, Growing the Social Investment Market: A Vision and Strategy (2011). p7 
92 Big Society Capital, Big Society Capital Annual Report (2012b). p7 
93 HM Government (2011). p18 
94 Ibid. p14 
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Social investment, then, is a set of practices that sit in contrast to the restrictive and ineffective 
arrangements that have so far been place for funding the social sector. What is more, the social sector 
is best placed to find solutions to social problems – Government has shown itself to be ineffective – 
and the worsening state of social problems lends some urgency to the task.  
This vision relies on these new types of finance being provided through a market. The market allows a 
diversity of needs and interests to be satisfied in a healthy, self-sustaining ecosystem. As the 
consultation paper on the social investment bank put it, “we want to create a marketplace that 
develops its own dynamic momentum.”95  The importance of the market to the way social investment 
practice is structured is discussed at length in chapter 3. The social investment market, we will see 
now, is also a solution to a second problem. 
A SECOND PROBLEM 
The assumption is made in mainstream investment models that only financial return is relevant in 
deciding how to invest. Even if an investor wanted to invest their capital in way that created some 
kind of social good, they are largely unable to do so. They would have to give their money away as a 
charitable donation. This is an enormous lost opportunity.  
The idea that investment can be reoriented to the creation of both financial and social return appears 
to have originated in the US. An article by Jed Emerson published in the California Management 
Review in 2003 is an early working through of the argument that investment could be practiced on the 
basis of a broader notion of value. To date, he argues, we have operated a system in which social value 
is pursued by organisations funded by grants, while financial value is pursued using mainstream 
financial instruments: 
This arrangement has served us well, creating both a thriving nonprofit sector and 
economically efficient for-profit economy. Our understanding of both investment and return 
is founded upon a traditional separation in the creation of social versus economic value. It is 
logical. It is the common understanding of the world. It is also inherently wrong.96 
“What is required”, Emerson argues: 
is a unifying framework that expands the definition of investment and return beyond the 
historic one of finance and toward a new definition capable of holding a broader 
understanding of value than that most frequently reflected in traditionally endorsed financial 
operating ratios.97  
By 2007 the term ‘impact investing’ had been coined at a now-famous meeting of global leaders in 
finance at the Rockefeller’s Bellagio Centre, including Nick O’Donohoe of J.P Morgan, a large 
investment bank. (O’Donohoe went on to help create, and become the first CEO of, BSC). J.P. 
Morgan went on to publish a series of reports about impact investing. The first, in 2010, opened with 
an argument very similar to the one made by Emerson: 
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97 Ibid. p38 
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With increasing numbers of investors rejecting the notion that they face a binary choice 
between investing for maximum risk-adjusted returns or donating for social purpose, the 
impact investment market is now at a significant turning point as it enters the mainstream.98 
Impact investing provides a way for investors to both seek financial returns on their investments and 
pursue a social purpose. It is important to understand that it is not the behaviour of investors that is 
being treated as problematic, but the framework in which they have been forced to operate. The 
framework was built on the assumption that these two things were incompatible; what is needed is a 
new framework that enables investments that do both things at once. Investors who are so inclined can 
then choose to allocate their capital to social good. 
This is the line taken by the Social Impact Investing Taskforce (SIIT) – an initiative in which Ronald 
Cohen and several familiar faces from social investment and the creation of BSC were closely involved. 
In the main report from the SIIT Impact Investment: The Invisible Heart of Markets, the focus is not on 
capitalising the social sector but on diverting the huge resources present in mainstream investment 
markets into impact investing: 
Given that $45 trillion are in mainstream investment funds that have publicly committed to 
incorporate environmental, social and governance factors into their investment decisions, it 
would only need a small fraction of this money to start moving into impact investment for it 
to expand rapidly along the growth path to the mainstream previously taken by venture 
capital and private equity.99 
The authors suggest that impact investing represents a “new paradigm”, arguing that: 
This requires a paradigm shift in capital market thinking, from two-dimensions to three. By 
bringing a third dimension, impact, to the 20th century capital market dimensions of risk and 
return, impact investing has the potential to transform our ability to build a better society for 
all.100 
It is thus possible to distinguish two different problems: the undercapitalisation of the social sector, 
and a mainstream market that allocates capital on the basis of financial return alone. Both of these 
problems are concerned with the ‘solution of social problems’, but the former is focused on moving 
the social sector away from grant funding and towards a model of repayable finance, while the former 
is focused on persuading investors to reallocate their capital towards ‘impact’. It would be helpful if we 
could refer to the first problem-solution in terms of ‘social investment’ and the second problem-
solution in terms of ‘impact investing’. But these are muddy waters. Though this way of dividing 
things up is often found in the literature, there remains plenty of variation in the way actors use these 
terms. The hybrid term ‘social impact investing’ brings these two problems closer together. As stated 
in the introduction chapter, we will use the term ‘social investment’ throughout to refer to the 
programme of government built on this (double) problematisation.  
My intention in describing this problematisation is not to make any comment on its veracity or 
accuracy, but to draw attention to the grounds set out in justifying social investment as a desirable 
course of action.  
                                                   
98 J.P. Morgan, Impact Investments: An Emerging Asset Class (2010). 
99 Social Impact Investment Taskforce (2014). p1 
100 Ibid. p1 
 38 
KEY INSTITUTIONS, INITIATIVES AND INDIVIDUALS IN 
SOCIAL INVESTMENT 
It will be helpful to give the reader an introduction to the landscape of SII, to enable orientation 
among the key institutions and individuals who will appear over the course of the analysis. The 
following passages are simply for background information – I do not intend this summary to have any 
analytical weight, nor am I am making any claims as to what caused SI to come about. 
We might go back decades or even centuries, but we will start with brief consideration of the policies 
of the Blair Government, elected in 1997. Blair was keen to encourage the ‘third sector’ as a space 
outside of Government that could negotiate with Government. The first stage of this, in 1998, was the 
launching of a ‘Compact’ with the third sector that included commitments from the Government to 
recognise the sector’s independence, to consult the sector, and to use funding to assist the sector’s 
stability. One scholar described the Compact as “completely without precedent, representing an 
unparalleled step in the positioning of the third sector in public policy.”101 There followed extended 
critique and discussion of what kinds of organisations made up the third sector, how big the sector 
was, what might be done to improve its capacity, what its relationship with Government should be, 
and so on.102  
Part of the development of the third sector was the encouragement of ‘social enterprise’ – the idea that 
businesses can be run in a way that benefits society and the environment, or (to choose a different 
emphasis) that charities can be run in a more businesslike manner.103 An organisation called UnLtd 
was set up in 2000 with a £100m endowment with the aim of supporting social entrepreneurship, 
while The Social Enterprise Unit was created within the Department of Trade and Industry in 2001, 
intended to provide support and direction for social enterprises as a way of achieving social change. A 
new company legal form was created in 2004, the Community Interest Company (CIC), to make it 
easier for organisations to both generate profit and pursue a social purpose. Almost 11,000 CICs had 
been registered as of June 2015.104 A sign of the consolidation of the third sector came in the creation 
of the Office of the Third Sector in 2006, which brought all ministerial responsibilities for the sector 
together in one place.105  
There were also initiatives aimed at developing the third sector’s ability to take on forms of finance 
other than grant funding. The 2002 Phoenix Fund, for example, was used to provide investment 
                                                   
101 Jeremy Kendall, The Mainstreaming of the Third Sector into Public Policy in England in the Late 1990s: Whys 
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specifically for small companies in deprived areas, as well as capitalising Community Development 
Finance Institutions, providing the capital for them to lend onto individuals and communities. 
Futurebuilders, in 2005, used repayable finance to build the capacity of TSOs to take on Government 
contracts. Similar other funds were also released.106  This collection of policy initiatives lent weight to 
the idea, once the idea of the social investment market emerged, that there was a demand side to the 
market – a network of socially oriented actors and organisations who are interested in taking on 
repayable finance. 
Meanwhile, the term ‘social investment’ had been created to refer to provision of repayable finance to 
the third sector, or to disadvantaged individuals underserved by mainstream banking. The term was 
put to use by the Social Investment Task Force (SITF), which ran from 2000 to 2010 (and should not 
be confused with the later Social Impact Investing Taskforce (SIIT)). At its inception and for most of 
its existence SITF was focused on disadvantaged communities gaining access to investment capital and 
business support.107 The SITF was not a Government initiative, made up instead of a group of private 
individuals keen to explore the possibilities inherent in mainstream financial practices. Ronald Cohen 
led this group, and went on to play a very influential role in the growth of SI. The minds of SITF were 
focused by the prospect of new legislation being passed enabling access to so-called ‘unclaimed assets’ 
for an as-yet-undetermined social purpose. It had come to the attention of members of the SITF that, 
as things stood, any money deposited by individuals in bank accounts and subsequently forgotten 
about was simply held by the banks. The volume of capital involved was unknown, as the banks 
refused to make this information public, but was estimated to be at least in the hundreds of millions of 
pounds, if not in the billions. Ireland had already passed legislation creating the mechanism for this 
money to be transferred into public hands and used for social purpose. The SITF therefore set itself 
the task of lobbying for equivalent legislation in the UK, and making the argument that it should be 
dedicated to social investment.108  
The members of the SITF were successful: The Dormant Accounts Act was passed in 2008, specifying 
that one of the uses to which this money might be put was social investment. It was not until the 
General Election of 2010, and the arrival of the Coalition Government, that the idea of social 
investment began to gain real traction. From 2010 onwards Government ministers showed keen 
interest. They worked closely with the network of individuals centred on Ronald Cohen and the 
members of the SITF. The Cabinet Office published a social investment strategy paper in 2011 and 
another in 2016, plus update papers in 2012, 2013 and 2014.109 Material in the interviews suggests 
that some SITF members were involved in drafting at least some of the papers published by the 
Government.  
With the new source of capital available, directed by the Dormant Accounts Act, the new focus was to 
establish what was initially called the ‘Big Society Bank’; a financial institution acting as a wholesaler, 
providing capital to intermediary financial institutions who would go on to make investments in 
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frontline SSOs. In the end this new financial institution was called Big Society Capital. With access to 
more capital than any other institution in the space, it became the focus of third sector financing. The 
core logic of BSC’s operation was centred on building the market for social investment, and it was able 
to devote considerable capacity to pushing for a whole new ecosystem of activity on these ideas. 
Ronald Cohen became the chair of BSC, and brought on board Nick O’Donohoe, formerly of 
American investment bank J.P. Morgan, as CEO.110  
Alongside BSC, which stands apart in its status as wholesaler of social investment finance, there are 
various organisations that invest directly into SSOs, many of whom have received finance from BSC, 
and many of whom contributed to the debates discussed in this thesis. Bridges Ventures was set up in 
2002 (initially named Bridges Community Ventures) by Ronald Cohen, and was one of the more 
established institutions operating in the social investment market by 2010. ClearlySo, Social Finance, 
The Social Investment Business, Investing for Good, CAF Venturesome, Nesta, the Esmée Fairbairn 
Foundation (destination for Caroline Mason once she left her position on the team that founded 
BSC) and the City of London Corporation all played a role in distributing capital under the social 
investment label, among numerous others. Many of these organisations also commissioned and/or 
published reports discussing the development of the market. Other institutions were not involved in 
directing capital flows, but took part as advisors or providers of services to the industry. Consultancy 
New Philanthropy Capital (NPC) is prominent among these, as is the law firm Bates, Wells and 
Braithwaite (BWB). Social Value UK, membership organisation and advocates of the ‘social return on 
investment’ (SROI) approach to accounting for social value, were also active in putting across their 
position.  
While there was a particular concentration of energy in the UK, related activities were gathering pace 
abroad. Coined in 2007, the term ‘impact investing’ was gaining traction among communities of 
investors and philanthropic foundations, particularly in the US.111 J.P. Morgan, through the initiative 
of Nick O’Donohoe before he left to become CEO of BSC, had become an early participant in the 
impact investing conversation, putting funds towards some of the first publications on the topic. The 
Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) was founded in 2009 and has produced numerous 
publications. Social impact investing attracted the attention of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), which published a substantial report on the topic in 2015, 
as well as the European Venture Philanthropy Association (EVPA). Several US Foundations made a 
point of broadcasting their involvement in impact investing, particularly the Rockefeller Foundation, 
K L Felicitas Foundation, the Omidyar Network and Acumen Fund. The Stanford Social Innovation 
Review (SSIR), an online magazine, has been an important site for the exchange of ideas, as has (to a 
lesser extent) Pioneers Post in the UK. The debate around social investment in the UK therefore 
intersected with a debate around a very similar configuration of issues at an international level. 
An international focal point was created in 2014 when the UK devoted its presidency of the G8 to 
‘social impact investing’, creating the opportunity to run the Social Impact Investing Taskforce. The 
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SIIT brought together representatives from each of the G8 countries112 and set up a number of 
working groups tasked with exploring particular issues. Several of their reports are used in the course 
of this thesis, and the main SIIT report is a key document that we return to at several points. The 
SIIT was timebound, but a successor organisation was set up: the Global Social Impact Investment 
Steering Group (known as the GSG), which is a meeting point for the numerous National Advisory 
Boards (NABs).113 An Independent Advisory Group was set up in the UK to advise on how social 
investment might be made more accessible to retail investors (individuals with closer to average 
amounts of money available to invest, rather than wealthy investors), which reported in 2017. This 
report was followed up by the Prime Minister in 2018 commissioning a new ‘industry taskforce’ to 
implement the recommendations of the advisory group.114 
Over this period since 2010, various institutions and individuals in the UK stepped forward to 
interrogate the notion of SI from the perspective of ‘traditional’ SSOs. The Institute for Voluntary 
Action Research (IVAR) and CAF Venturesome both published pieces, as did Robbie Davison and 
Helen Heap, both of whom run small SSOs. In 2014 and 2015 a group of individuals including Dan 
Gregory, ex-civil servant and David Floyd, social entrepreneur, blogger and commentator, set up the 
Alternative Commission on Social Investment, which convened actors to reflect on the progress made 
in building the SII market, questioning the premises on which the whole endeavour had been built.  
SOCIAL IMPACT MEASUREMENT 
The development of social impact measurement (SIM) deserves its own introduction. As we will see, 
SIM plays a pivotal role in the vision for social investment, but it is an area of practice that extends 
beyond the boundaries of social investment.  
The push for social sector organisations to improve the information they collect about their activities 
has its own history. It is beyond our scope to tell this story, but a few key ideas, institutions and 
initiatives can be highlighted to help orientate the reader. The basic content of SIM has stabilised 
around a few key ideas: the importance of specifying a measurement framework, collecting data about 
the social change being created, then analysing this data and using it to for a variety of purposes 
including accountability to various parties and improving decision making. This set of practices is 
drawn from a mixture of sources. It is influenced by project management practices in mainstream 
business, by social science research techniques and evaluation practice, and by financial accounting 
and related ‘social accounting’ methods. 
Several institutions and organisations have played a prominent role in developing the conceptual 
groundwork around what SIM should look like. One of the first onto the scene was the Inspiring 
Impact programme, a collaborative effort across UK SSOs attempting to improve impact practice, 
which published one of the first guides to what counts as good impact practice.115 The SROI network 
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(now renamed and reorganised as the international membership body Social Value International, with 
national chapters including Social Value UK) has been promoting its own variety of SIM from early 
on in the debate, grounded in the Social Return on Investment methodology. A detailed working-
through of the idea of social value was commissioned by Big Society Capital and written by Adrian 
Hornsby at Investing for Good as The Good Analyst, followed up the following year by The Good 
Investor, which homed in on the challenge of measuring social value from the investor perspective.116 
Within this period from 2013-4 lengthy documents were published by the European Venture 
Philanthropy Association (EVPA)117, the GECES118 sub-group on impact measurement (a body within 
the European Commission)119, and the Working Group on Impact Measurement (WGIM), part of 
the Social Impact Investing Taskforce.120   
The advice in these documents is usually agnostic towards who precisely is doing the measurement; it 
can be picked up by SSOs, or their investors or donors, or by the SIFIs that direct funds. It is relevant 
to any organisation that is intentionally trying to generate social impact, and it describes what has 
come to be known as ‘good impact practice’. These organisations have set out overarching 
frameworks; there are then multiple and varied examples of published advice on smaller components 
of this cycle. This is an area where businesses develop proprietary tools, which they sell as ‘solutions’ 
for the need to do SIM. It is also a thriving consultancy field, providing advice for organisations 
struggling to navigate the complexities of measurement.  
An early attempt to make SIM easier was the creation of the IRIS catalogue, a freely available database 
of metrics offered to investors.121 BSC, in a simlar vein, developed an ‘outcomes matrix’ that helped to 
categorise different areas of social impact according to type of need, type of beneficiary, and so on.122 
New Philanthropy Capital (NPC) is one of the most prominent consultancies in the space, and has 
published multiple guidance documents on the tools they use to aid measurement, such as the ‘theory 
of change’.123 The sheer volume of tools available to help with SIM is often remarked upon, usually 
with an acknowledgment of the continued failure to consolidate or standardise what counts as good 
practice. The lack of specificity over what counts as good or bad measurement practice is a source of 
frustration for some organisations, who have published their own version of measurement in an 
attempt to move the debate on. Acumen Fund is a prominent example of this, with its ‘Lean Data’ 
methodology.124 Impetus PEF in the UK similarly published its approach to impact measurement as a 
response to ongoing confusion.125 
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SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 
We must also mention ‘social impact bonds’ (SIBs). They have to be mentioned because they are often 
included under the umbrella of social investment, but they are not given much space or attention in 
this thesis because they are oriented to a different problem-solution. The basic concept behind social 
impact bonds is described in a paper published by Social Finance in 2010: 
Social Impact Bonds raise funds from non-government investors to pay for the provision of 
services. If the services make a difference and social outcomes improve, investors receive 
success payments from the public purse. The size of these payments depends on how 
successful the services are.126 
SIBs are therefore a new mechanism for Government to commission services from external providers. 
Investors put their capital upfront to pay for the delivery of a service by an SSO. If the service is 
successful in achieving its outcomes, the investors are paid a return in proportion to the level of 
outcomes that are achieved. The more successful the service, the more they get paid. If the outcomes 
are not achieved, the investors lose their money. Payments from the public purse to private investors 
are justified by the savings that are achieved by the difference the service makes. If an intervention 
successfully reduces reoffending among a target population, for example, then the prison service makes 
savings, and the funds that they otherwise would have spent on keeping a larger number of people in 
prison are diverted to the investors.  
This mechanism is framed in terms of a transfer of risk of an intervention not working from 
Government to the investor: 
Historically, the public sector has struggled to fund preventative services as they require it to 
take a risk – it could end up funding not only the costs of preventative services, but also the 
costs of further services to deal with social problems if the preventative services fail. As Social 
Impact Bonds transfer the risk that interventions fail to investors, they should make it easier 
to address social problems earlier, generating benefits for both public sector budgets and wider 
society.127 
While there is enthusiasm in the discourse around SIBs for increasing the flow of contracts to SSOs, 
the development of SIBs is not oriented to addressing the undercapitalisation of the social sector. Its 
focus is modifying commissioning mechanisms. Apart from anything else, SIBs have become 
notorious for the complexity they introduce, and they vary enormously from one example to the next. 
Generating any insight would therefore need detailed engagement with what is a relatively distinct 
literature that pursues a different set of questions to those that interest us.  
This concludes our brief tour of some of the institutions, initiatives and individuals who will feature in 
the course of the thesis. This is by no means a comprehensive list, but it should prove helpful for the 
reader as they encounter these actors in the course of the discussion. 
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SOCIAL INVESTMENT AS A PROGRAMME OF GOVERNMENT 
We have now reached a point where we need to more firmly anchor the idea that social investment is a 
programme of government. The first half of the chapter drew out the double problematisation on 
which SI rests, but the notion of problematisation gains analytical weight from its association with this 
other conceptual tool. 
It is important to be very clear about the sense in which the term ‘government’ is used. Foucault 
described it as follows:  
This word must be allowed the very broad meaning which it had in the sixteenth century. 
“Government” did not refer only to political structures or the management of states; rather it 
designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed: the 
government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick. It did not only 
cover the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection, but also modes of 
action, more or less considered and calculated, which were destined to act upon the 
possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field 
of action of others.128 
Rather than focusing on the activities of the state, we are using ‘government’ to refer to something 
much broader. We are talking about systematic attempts, by various types of bodies and institutions, 
to identify certain forms of behaviour as problematic, and to identify programmes of action to change 
those forms of behaviour. There is no necessary connection between studies of government in this 
broad sense and the activities of the Government. Many studies in the governmentality literature do 
not engage with the activities of the Government at all.129 But in the case of social investment it so 
happens that institutions that we would think of as part of ‘the Government’, represented by 
Government ministers, are directly involved. This means that our discussion of the literature will 
inevitably have to switch back and forth between the narrow and broad sense of the term, because it is 
the former sense that is generally being employed when ‘the role of Government’ (for example) is 
being discussed. I will attempt to maintain clarity by capitalising the narrow sense of the term – talk of 
‘the Government’ – and keeping the broader notion of government in lower case.  
‘Governmentality’ refers to a particular form of governmental power that emerged, Foucault argues, in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.130 The term ‘power’, like the term ‘government’, can easily 
import various unhelpful connotations and assumptions. This passage from Foucault helps to 
moderate: 
Even the term power does nothing other than designate a domain of relations which are 
entirely analysable, and what I have proposed to call governmentality, which is to say the way 
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in which one conducts men, it is nothing other than a proposition of a grid of analysis for 
relations of power.131 
Power is not wielded by the strong over the weak, but exists in a network of social relations. As 
Graham Burchell puts it: 
When we are governed, when our behaviour is managed, directed or conducted by others, we 
do not become the passive objects of a physical determination. To govern individuals is to get 
them to act and align their particular wills with ends imposed on them through constraining 
and facilitating models of possible actions.132 
In this sense, power is present in the act of governing, but it is a feature of the relation between the 
governor and the governed. 
The fact that we so strongly associate the activity of governing with the state is a sign of the extent to 
which these diverse practices have slowly become pulled into the state’s orbit. Foucault has a name for 
this process – the ‘governmentalisation of the state’, described by Rose et al: 
at a certain historical moment, … the formal apparatus of the state [came] to embroil itself 
with the business of knowing and administering the lives and activities of the persons and 
things across a territory133 
The state has “managed to connect itself” to “a diversity of forces and groups that in different ways 
had long tried to shape and administer the lives of individuals in pursuit of various goals.”134 But there 
is nothing inherent to the state that makes it deserving of special treatment when it comes to 
understanding the power dynamics at play.  
Instead of seeing matters in terms of the formal boundaries and rules of institutions, then, Foucault’s 
approach encourages us to organise our analysis in terms of programmes of government. These 
programmes are dispersed collections of practices that act on the behaviour of individual subjects, 
united by a common problematisation. It is important to clarify that there is no assumption that a 
programme of government is conceived in the abstract world of thought and then operationalised in 
reality. This point is made by Foucault as he reflects on his method of analysing programmes of 
government: 
These programmes don’t take effect in these institutions in an integral manner; they are 
simplified, or some are chosen and not others; and things never work out as planned. But 
what I wanted to show is that this difference is not one between the purity of the ideal and the 
disorderly impurity of the real, but that in fact there are different strategies which are 
mutually opposed, composed and superposed so as to produce permanent and solid effects 
which can perfectly well be understood in terms of their rationality, even though they don’t 
conform to the initial programming.135 
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The concept of a programme of government does not, therefore, support a research project in which 
we take the ideal state of affairs as it exists in the imagination of protagonists and see how it translates 
into the real. Rather, it brings into focus the way the interplay between (to borrow a phrase from 
Colin Gordon) the “functioning totalities” we use to define strategies and the “target area[s] for 
intervention”. Gordon’s formulation is helpful: 
The existence of these discourses, whose object-domains are defined simultaneously as a target 
area for intervention and a functioning totality to be brought into existence, has a significance 
for historical analysis which prior to Foucault seems never to have been fully exploited. Our 
world does not follow a programme, but we live in a world of programmes, that is to say in a 
world traversed by the effects of discourses whose object (in both senses of the word) is the 
rendering rationalisable, transparent and programmable of the real.136 
On this view, social investment is just one of countless overlapping programmes of government with 
which we interact on a daily basis. Furthermore, a programme of government is an ongoing project, a 
set of strategies and activities pursued in practice, which can be understood “in terms of their 
rationality”. Here we have the link to power as operating through reasoning subjects. Governmentality 
studies resolutely avoids the structure-agency dichotomy by conceiving of subjects as governing their 
own behaviour in relation to the choices they perceive to be available to them. The programmatic 
element allows analysis of the systematic organisation of these choices. 
It is straightforward to fit social investment with these descriptions. It is made up of “different 
strategies which are mutually opposed, composed and superposed”, seen in the numerous different 
versions of social investment. There are also “permanent and solid effects”, seen in the changes enacted 
under the banner of SI. The argument of this thesis is built on an understanding of these changes “in 
terms of their rationality”, enquiring at length into the reasoning employed in making sense of the 
problem to be addressed and the strategies for addressing it. As we explained in the introduction, this 
understanding of reality is compatible with treating the social investment literature as windows onto 
the reasoning employed by subjects. 
Miller and Rose offer a schematisation of Foucault’s thought that is helpful in seeing how the notion 
of programmes of government fits with other aspects of his thought.137 They offer a helpful distinction 
between programmes and rationalities of government. The distinction appears in Foucault’s 
comments when he says “of course, this programming depends on forms of rationality much more 
general than those which they directly implement.”138 Miller and Rose elaborate, describing political 
rationalities as: 
the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualized, [and] the 
moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of 
the appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper 
distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual, military and familial sectors [are 
elaborated].139 
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Welfarism, for example, was a political rationality that provided a wider ‘discursive field’ within which 
various programmes of government, such as a national health service, could be worked out. It is a 
useful concept for us in demonstrating that programmes of government are not discrete, or pursued in 
isolation from each other. Chapter 2 provides a detailed account of the liberal rationality of 
government, helping us to locate broader historical trends in the way social investment produces 
certain forms of subjectivity.  
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION 
So far we have skirted around the importance of knowledge to the operation of power and the 
elaboration of programmes of government. Knowledge is certainly relevant with the emphasis on the 
reasoning of subjects. Gordon, in his afterword to a collected volume of Foucault’s writings on 
interviews on power/knowledge, speaks to this point: 
Every programme also either articulates or presupposes a knowledge of the field of reality upon 
which it is to intervene and/or which it is calculated to bring into being. The common axiom 
of programmes is that an effective power is and must be a power which knows the objects 
upon which it is exercised. Further, the condition that programmatic knowledge must satisfy 
is that it renders reality in the form of an object which is programmable.140 
The role of knowledge in governing is at the heart of the governmentality studies. By chapter 7 we will 
be in a position to see that social investment both requires and fosters quite specific forms of 
knowledge. This programmatic knowledge, we will see, introduces a series of assumptions about the 
area of intervention – the assumption that actors on the demand side of the market should strive to 
meet certain standards of ‘investment readiness’, for example, or that social change can be understood 
in terms of measurable, manageable ‘impact’. This is how I understand the notion of knowledge 
“rendering reality” in one way or another – by introducing assumptions that are not directly 
recognised as such, and which shape the way things are done.  
Turning knowledge itself into a subject of analysis is not easy. It is unwieldy, because we are trying to 
create new knowledge – new insight – while bringing attention to the mechanisms by which this is 
made possible. We risk chasing our own tail. Foucault is insightful on this topic, but it is Poovey who 
demonstrates an approach that can be transplanted across to our area of focus. In this section we will 
provide an account of the basic components of Poovey’s approach, setting us up for analysing forms of 
knowledge in several subsequent chapters of the thesis.  
The first step is to narrow down what we mean by ‘knowledge’. Inherent in knowledge of the social 
world is the imperative to make explicit connections to reality. That is, unlike deductive knowledge 
that gains its validity purely from the realm of thought and logic – Cartesian geometry is the 
archetypical example – the kind of knowledge we are interested in has to grapple with the issue of the 
evidence that exists to back up one or another statement about the matter at hand. Knowledge from 
direct observation also does not concern us. There is an entire branch of philosophy devoted to 
exploring what it means to consider it a true statement that “trees have leaves” or “there are three 
people in the room”, but it is not of interest to us. We are interested in attempts to generate systematic 
knowledge about the social world. As Poovey has shown us, a fascinating history surrounds the 
attempt to move from our own, individual experience of the world to being able to talk meaningfully 
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about the social world more generally. Of course, this history is bound up in the history of the natural 
sciences, where the same challenges were (and still are) faced concerning how observations from 
experiments can inform general laws of nature. The techniques that have been developed to cope with 
this problem – the ‘problem of induction’ – shape the way we understand society, economics, politics 
and matters of human interaction. They are therefore heavily implicated in the way we understand the 
market for social investment.  
We are dealing with expansive topics, so I would like to illustrate the basic components I would like to 
pick out with a simple example. Consider a piece of research that aims to establish various 
characteristics of a population, such as the prevalence of different eye colours among the population of 
France. Five thousand people are surveyed; each of them submits their eye colour. They are a sample 
of a wider population, and each person provides a piece of raw data (an ‘observed particular’). These 
particulars can be aggregated, generating in the first instance the knowledge that, for example, one 
thousand, or twenty percent of people in the sample have blue eyes. The results of this survey can also 
be used to generate knowledge about the proportion of the population of France with blue eyes. 
Various techniques will have been used when choosing who is included in the sample, and what biases 
or issues might be contained in the data, but it will be possible to establish with a reasonable degree of 
certainty that twenty percent of the population of France have blue eyes. The process of moving from 
observed particulars to a general statement is an example of an inductive process. ‘Induction’ has 
multiple dictionary definitions; the one that interests us is “a bringing forward of separate facts or 
instances, esp. so as to prove a general statement.”141 
It has become customary for us to accept statements such as “twenty percent of the population of 
France have blue eyes” as true. If we are operating in a more academic or technical setting, we might 
qualify the statement to acknowledge there is a degree of uncertainty about whether it is exactly twenty 
percent, but this does not undermine the core observation. The problem of induction in this case – 
how do we travel from information provided by a sample of people to knowledge about a whole 
population – is circumvented by statistical techniques. I use the word ‘circumvented’ because the 
problem of induction, in its formation as a philosophical problem, is not one that can be solved as 
such. In one sense, historical epistemology as a scholarly pursuit is concerned with exploring how 
different thinkers at different times have coped with this problem. I have provided a statistical 
example, but the problem of induction is faced by any attempt to generate systematic knowledge from 
observed particulars, and the problem is by no means always a numerical one. The problem of 
induction, as we will see shortly, also provokes the creation of abstract objects. It acts as a conceptual 
touchstone as we wade into the social investment literature, as it is surprisingly revealing of the 
assumptions at play in building up a body of knowledge. This very simple eye colour example helps to 
illustrate that sentences like “twenty-five percent of the population of France have blue eyes” are the 
result of a process of reasoning, and are not just a reflection of ‘objective’ facts existing ‘out there’ in 
the world, independent of human observation.  
The potency of this approach is demonstrated in Poovey’s text. The vehicle she creates for her 
argument is ‘the modern fact’. She notes her own dissatisfaction with this term: 
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‘the’ is no doubt too definite for a concept this capacious; ‘modern’ obviously raises too many 
assumptions about periodisation; and ‘fact’ is both too commonplace and too labile to have 
much meaning for most readers.142  
Nevertheless ‘the modern fact’ is the placeholder she chooses for this ‘epistemological unit’. Giving it a 
name is critical in communicating “how deeply embedded it has been in the ways that Westerners 
have come to know the world.”143 And what is this epistemological unit? Well, it is the ‘fact’, a piece of 
information detached from theory; it is ‘pretheoretical’. But it is simultaneously pre-theoretical and a 
unit of systematic knowledge. Francis Bacon, seventeenth century philosopher, regularly crops up in 
her analysis, because it was he who insisted that universals did not “coalesce spontaneously out of the 
common experience of particulars”, as ancient philosophers had had it, but had to be constructed from 
the “philosopher’s patient observation of natural phenomena”.144 Poovey’s project is to make explicit 
the epistemological claims inherent in this philosophical innovation. The separation out of description 
and interpretation, which was to become a foundational, invisible assumption that Poovey traces 
through the centuries, carries with it an inherent peculiarity:  
On the one hand, facts seem (and can be interpreted as being) simply the kind of deracinated 
particulars that Bacon claimed to value; on the other hand, facts seem (and can be said) to 
exist as identifiable units only when they constitute evidence for some theory – only, that is, 
when a theoretical reason to notice these particulars and name them as facts.145 
The modern fact is a particular kind of epistemological unit that is both an observed particular and 
evidence of some theory.146 By pulling to the surface the dual nature of the modern fact, Poovey equips 
herself to examine a broad literature and to successfully dig into how ‘facts’ have been used to support 
different kinds of argument. Abstractions play an important role in her analysis. ‘Society’ is an 
abstraction, as is ‘the market’, or ‘human nature’. Poovey’s work expands our perspective on how such 
abstractions have arrived at the centre of certain ways of knowing. “Abstraction has always played a 
critical role in the systematic knowledge concepts that depend on the modern fact”, she writes. “The 
history of abstraction”, moreover, “is inseparable from that philosophical dilemma we call the problem 
of induction.”147 In terms of our approach, this alerts us to the possible role of abstractions in 
reasoning about social investment. But there are certain abstractions that have played an active role in 
structuring disciplinary knowledge. Taking a group of “related philosophical enterprises”, all 
descended from natural philosophy, which include political economy and statistics, she observes that: 
One effect of efforts to generate systematic knowledge was the production of a set of 
abstractions, which rapidly became the objects of these sciences. These abstractions, which 
include ‘society’, ‘the market system’, (then, ‘the economy’) and ‘poverty’, now constitute the 
characteristic objects of the modern social sciences, including the sciences of wealth and 
society.148 
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The kinds of knowledge built with the modern fact tend to create abstractions which then play an 
active role as a vehicle for the advancement of various kinds of knowledge. These knowledges have 
become part of the canon from which social investment derives meaning.  
The final point is one of the most important. The problem of induction helps us to discern both that 
the difference between fact and value is a basic component of how we know anything about the world, 
and that this difference is not something natural or objective, but something produced by the forms of 
reasoning we adopt. Poovey writes: 
That so many of us still imagine observation can be separated from systematic accounts of the 
world speaks to the success of the long campaign to sever the connection between description 
and interpretation; that numbers seem to guarantee value-free description speaks to the 
triumph of some of the accounts of numerical representation I chronicle here.149  
Poovey’s work thus equips us with a way of discerning how ‘facts’ come to be regarded as ‘facts’, which 
makes it easier to see what role these ‘facts’ are being made to play in any given example of the 
production of knowledge. To be clear, this is not a process of undermining ‘facts’ and showing them 
to be fake. They are still facts, even when we describe the process by which their status as such is 
created. The point is to draw attention to how facts, once they achieve their status, go unquestioned, 
which curtails our ability to critically appraise what is possible or not possible. 
In this way we return to the relation between knowledge and power. Poovey takes us into the 
mechanics of how knowledge produced, which helps us to explain how power operates through a 
programme of government.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has put the first building blocks in place. The description of the two problems and shared 
solution of social investment provides anchorage for the upcoming exploration of how the logic of 
social investment plays out. In a space plagued by terminological difficulties and fuzzy boundaries, 
they provide a clear way of delineating the topic of interest. The description of a problem-solution 
only gains analytical weight when it is attached to the idea of a programme of government. This 
entails viewing SI as a loosely coordinated set of practices. These practices are programmatic in nature 
– they involve gathering information about the status quo, defining strategies, setting targets for 
action, etc. But this does not imply they work out exactly as planned, or that they need to work out 
exactly as planned for this mode of analysis to have traction. It is inherent to a programme of 
government that the actors involved are reasoning through the possibilities open to them, 
consolidating (their understanding of) the vision with (their understanding of) reality. The point is 
not how well the programme is realised in practice, or making comparisons between theory and 
practice, but rather seeing what effects are created by a programme of government working through 
the reasoning capacities of subjects. It also does not mean that everybody involved in the programme 
of government thinks about it in the same way. Indeed, actors in the social investment market are by 
no means in agreement over what the market should look like or how it should work. In due course 
we will elaborate two contrasting versions found within the programme of government. 
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This chapter also explored the connection between programmes of government and the production of 
knowledge. Poovey’s writings on the ‘modern fact’ intersect well with Foucault’s writings on 
governmentality, and provides us with the analytical tools needed to dig into the forms of knowledge 
production present in social investment. As we will see, building the market for SI requires producing 
knowledge about the current state of the market, and its future potential; and it requires knowledge 
about impact, generated through measurement systems. These forms of knowledge production, and 
others, are opened up by approaching them with the problem of induction in mind, which allows us 
to dissect the reasoning being put to work. 
Two of the main components of our approach – the concepts of ‘programme of government’ and 
‘production of knowledge’ – have now been put in place. The next chapter is devoted to exploring the 
third component, the concept of ‘rationality of government’ as the broader context in which this 
programme of government is operating.  
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CHAPTER 2: INTERESTS AND LIBERAL 
GOVERNMENTALITY 
Professional investors increasingly want to both “do good” and “do well” with a part of their 
portfolio. 
From the UK Cabinet Office’s briefing report  
Status of the Social Impact Investing Market: A Primer (2013) p9 
Impact investment … harnesses the forces of entrepreneurship, innovation and capital and the 
power of markets to do good. One might with justification say that it brings the invisible 
heart of markets to guide their invisible hand. 
Ronald Cohen’s foreword to the main report of the Social Impact Investment Taskforce Impact 
Investment: The Invisible Heart of Markets (2014) 
Social investment offers a compelling proposition: one can ‘do good’ – create positive social impact – 
while ‘doing well’ – making financial return for one’s own private benefit. We have established that 
this vision of change is made possible through a joint problematisation. The undercapitalisation of the 
social sector means that SSOs, if they can be given the support they need to meet the demands of 
investment, could be in a position to both generate solutions to social problems and generate financial 
return for investors. Simultaneously, innovations in finance mean that the old dichotomy between 
investment and philanthropy can be transcended, opening up new possibilities and new directions for 
the market.  
This programme of government operates within a broader rationality of government - liberalism. I 
think there are compelling reasons to view social investment as thoroughly liberal in nature. Interests 
are the point of connection. By pointing to Smith’s invisible hand Cohen draws attention to the role 
of interests in bringing about the solutions promised by social investment. The invisible hand, after 
all, is a metaphor for the unintrusive coordination of interests by the market, in contrast to the heavy-
handed and clumsy intervention by the state. Interests can easily be seen in the workings of the vision 
for social investment. The idea of ‘doing good and doing well’ suggests self-interested profitmaking 
can be combined with socially positive activity. The idea of the invisible heart as “guide” to the 
invisible hand suggests that social investment enables a similarly light touch approach that nevertheless 
achieves results unreachable by the state.  
Smith’s invisible hand also features in Foucault’s analysis of liberal governmentality. In fact, liberalism 
for Foucault is fundamentally about governing with respect to interests. This chapter is devoted to an 
account of Foucault’s writing on governmentality, dovetailing his analysis with aspects of Poovey’s 
writing on how certain forms of knowledge production produce disinterested knowledge.  
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INTEREST 
Interest has meant different things at different points in history. Hirschman warns that the term has 
been stretched and adapted to such an extent that “‘pursuing one’s interests’ can cover – to the point 
of tautology – all of human action”.150 Interests featured on the terrain of government long before 
Adam Smith, acting as a conceptual touchstone in theorising about human nature, and the best way to 
ensure an ordered society. The idea that “interest-motivated social behaviour was the best guarantee of 
a stable and harmonious social order”151 enjoys a long pedigree. 
Foucault associates the emergence of liberalism with the emergence of a kind of subject who is defined 
in terms of his interests. He searches for the beginnings of the concept of homo oeconomicus, economic 
man, who he calls the ‘subject of interest’: 
What English empiricism introduces … doubtless for the first time in Western philosophy, is 
a subject who is not so much defined by his freedom, or by the opposition of soul and body, 
… but who appears in the form of a subject of individual choices152 
Why is this moment in eighteenth century philosophy so important? Because it changes the terrain of 
government. Everything changes if the mass of people to be governed cease to be understood in 
religious or moral terms, and start to be understood as a collection of individuals, each pursuing their 
own interests, and each defined in terms of this aspect of their behaviour. I do not mean to suggest a 
story of sudden change, of two distinct epochs, one ending and the next beginning in neat succession. 
My point, summarising Foucault, is that the emergence of the subject of interest – by which I mean 
the spread of the view that individuals’ behaviour can be understood in terms of the pursuit of their 
own, peculiar interests – has long-reaching implications for the question of government, of how to 
govern, because it engendered the liberal rationality of government. This claim needs some unpacking. 
Rose, Barry and Osborne introduce Foucault’s version of liberalism as follows: 
It is clear that Foucault means something rather different by liberalism than do political 
philosophers. He does not speak of a liberal ‘period’, nor is he concerned principally with 
writing the history of the philosophical ideas of liberty or of rights. From Foucault's 
perspective, liberalism is more like an ethos of government. Liberalism is understood not so 
much as a substantive doctrine or practice of government in itself, but as a restless and 
dissatisfied ethos of recurrent critique of State reason and politics.153 
This passage is helpful in introducing the distinctiveness of Foucault’s take on liberalism. The other 
fundamental point about liberal governmentality is that it “is a reason that functions in terms of 
interest”.154 Interest forms an anchor point for this “recurrent critique of state reason and politics”. 
Where interest was once attached to the state, and political thought was oriented to maximising the 
interest of the state and therefore the people it governed, the liberal form of governmental reason is 
attuned to the multiple, diverse interests of the individuals that make up the population to be 
governed. If effective government is to be attuned to the interests of individuals, then it may be the 
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case that the best option is to limit government, to allow individuals space to pursue their own 
interests. In this sense, liberalism starts with the assumption that government is not always necessary, 
and questions the need for government at every opportunity. The need for government is tested in 
relation to the interests of those governed. To the extent that liberalism is tethered to and defined by 
its recognition of the subject of interest, liberalism is a constant and ongoing critique of the need for 
government.  
The critique of the need for government recognises that the political sovereign cannot possibly claim 
sufficiently detailed knowledge of the interests of individuals. Foucault states, paraphrasing Smith: 
since the economic mechanism involves each pursuing his own interest, then each must be left 
alone to do so. Political power is not to interfere with this dynamic naturally inscribed in the 
heart of man. The government is thus prohibited from obstructing individual interests.155 
Foucault places the subject of interest in contrast to another type of subject, the ‘subject of right’, or 
the political subject. We can use this device to highlight the significance of the emergence of the 
subject of interest. Foucault argues that these two figures represent two incommensurable forms of 
subjectivity. They behave differently, they reason and are motivated differently, and they are governed 
differently. This is not to imply that the population can be divided into two groups, where some 
people are subjects of interest and others are subjects of right. The division is in the forms of 
governmental practice and the model these practices use of the subjects at whom they are directed.  
This difference manifests itself in the subject’s relation to political authority. The subject of right is the 
bearer of rights in virtue of her humanity. She then agrees to cede some of these rights in the form of 
some kind of social contract. The subject of interest, in contrast is “never called upon to relinquish his 
interest.”156 The system of the market relies on each individual pursuing his own interest. In this sense: 
with the subject of interest, as the economists make him function, there is a mechanism which 
is completely different from the dialectic of the subject of right, since it is an egoistic 
mechanism … in which the will of each harmonizes spontaneously and as it were 
involuntarily with the will and interest of others. … The market and the contract function in 
exactly opposite ways and we have in fact two heterogeneous structures.157 
The implication, in marking out this basic division, is that two forms of power are needed to govern 
these two kinds of subject: “the economic subject and the subject of right have an essentially different 
relationship with political power.”158   
The purpose of making this comparison is to illustrate the different models of government that are at 
play within liberalism. Ashenden’s article on this section of The Birth of Biopolitics alerts us to the fact 
that Foucault, in posing these two forms of subjectivity as antonyms, potentially obscures further 
forms of subjectivity present in eighteenth century debate, namely a “subject of civic virtue.”159 For our 
purposes, this analysis warns against treating this duality as a comprehensive account of available forms 
of subjectivity. But it is still a useful device for bringing to the surface the peculiarities of the forms of 
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governmental power suitable for governing homo oeconomicus. It also speaks to the distinctiveness of 
liberalism. In Foucault’s opinion: 
Liberalism acquired its modern shape precisely with the formulation of this essential 
incompatibility between the non-totalizable multiplicity of economic subjects of interest and 
the totalizing unity of the juridical sovereign.160 
In other words, liberalism is characterised by the attempt to develop and bring together the forms of 
power needed to govern man as political subject and as economic subject. ‘Totalisability’ is a matter of 
knowledge, of what it is possible to know. We have already pointed out the impossibility of the 
sovereign’s knowledge of individual interests. This impossibility also applies at the collective level. 
Economic processes are the result of the interaction of individual interests. “It is impossible,” Foucault 
says, “for the sovereign to have a point of view on the economic mechanism which totalizes every 
element and enables them to be combined artificially or voluntarily.”161 Why is this? Because the 
sovereign cannot have sufficient knowledge of the intricate complexities at play. Eighteenth century 
political economy rejects the idea that the political sovereign could ever have sufficiently detailed 
knowledge of economic matters to be able to effectively encourage them in one direction or another. 
This claim is in fact contained in the notion of the invisible hand. “What is usually stressed”, Foucault 
says, “in Smith’s famous theory of the invisible hand is, if you like, the ‘hand,’ that is to say, the 
existence of something like providence which would tie together all the dispersed threads. But I think 
the other element, invisibility, is at least as important.”162 Invisibility inheres in the unknowability of 
individuals’ interests, and the unknowability of the economic process of which they are the 
component parts.  
Liberalism, then, is a governmental rationality that respects this invisibility. But liberalism and 
economics are not interchangeable, and nor are they oriented to the same ends. The ‘problematic of 
economic interest’, as Foucault calls it, is not one oriented to the government of population. 
“Economic science never claimed that it had to be the line of conduct, the complete programming of 
what could be called governmental rationality.”163 Rather, if we return to our point of departure, it is a 
challenge to the need for governmental power. It is a presence that must be acknowledged, and it is a 
principle for the limitation of government. The market, as an essential component of economic 
thought, is a mechanism that produces results that can be used as a point of comparison with the 
results achieved by governmental activity. In Foucault’s words, “the market’s role in the liberal critique 
has been that of a ‘test’, of a privileged site of experiment in which one can pinpoint the effects of 
excessive governmentality and take their measure.”164  The market informs this dynamic of self-
limitation.  
SOCIETY AND SOCIAL ORDER 
In completing this brief account of liberalism, we must acknowledge one more edifice on the political 
terrain: society, and what we might call ‘the social’. This same period, that saw the establishment of 
political economy and liberal political thought, saw the emergence of the notion of ‘society’. At this 
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stage it seems almost counterintuitive to suggest that ‘society’ is a concept. It has an innocuous, self-
evident character. One of the most effective ways to denaturalise a concept like this is to identify its 
emergence in history. Poovey aids us; she writes about a transition that occurred during the 18th and 
19th centuries by which “‘society’ came to be understood not from a particular participant’s point of 
view, but as an objective order with its own regulated dynamics.”165  Without downplaying the 
enormous complexity of the broader trajectory of ‘society’ and ‘the social’, this is an element that we 
can isolate, because it chimes in with Foucault’s analysis. That is, Poovey recognises a shift whereby 
society comes to be recognised as an abstraction in its own right, a domain of interaction among 
individuals, with its own dynamics and characteristics. To the mind of today’s politician or social 
scientist, this is an epistemological leap that raises no eyebrows. But in fact the notion of society carries 
with it all kinds of assumptions. It plays a function, or even multiple functions, and does so without 
the need to make them explicit. We will come onto this, but first we will draw the connection 
between Poovey and Foucault. I would suggest that the kind of ‘society’ that Poovey points out is the 
kind of society Foucault is talking about when he says: 
Liberal thought does not start from the existence of the state, finding in government the 
means for achieving that end that the state would be for itself; it starts instead from society, 
which exists in a complex relation of exteriority and interiority vis-à-vis the state. It is 
society—as both condition and final end—that makes it possible to no longer ask: How can 
one govern as much as possible at the least possible cost? Instead, the question becomes: Why 
must one govern? That is to say: What makes government necessary, and what ends must it 
pursue with regard to society in order to justify its own existence?166 
Once more we encounter the principle of self-limitation. Liberalism limits itself not (just) in relation 
to a mass of self-interested individuals, but to individuals in society. Society, in this new manifestation, 
becomes (and remains) a domain worthy of detailed and prolonged examination and investigation.  
With the emergence of ‘society’ as an abstract noun attributable its own “regulated dynamics”, as 
Poovey puts it, there also emerges what we might call ‘the social’. Put somewhat simplistically, ‘the 
social’ is simply a label that scholars use to refer to matters associated with the emergence of society in 
its new generalised form. In fact, I think that it is misleading to talk about ‘the social’ as if it is a 
concept with its own life and meaning. ‘The social’ does not come down to ground; it is a label that 
makes life easier for scholars attempting to make into an object of study what is characteristically 
imbued with unspoken assumptions. ‘The social’ is used as a noun in its own right only by those who 
are trying to say something meaningful about ‘society’ qua abstract noun with its own regulated 
dynamics, or about noun compounds that include ‘social’. 
That said, I include myself among those scholars who are engaged in such pursuits, and so I will 
conform to the literature on ‘the social’ by continuing to use the term, since there is no obvious 
alternative. Poovey informs us that it was in the 1840s that ‘social’ began to appear as the first part of 
noun compounds such as ‘social reform’, and ‘social economy’.167 She perceives a series of basic 
assumptions embedded in the use of ‘social’: 
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When modern theorists use social as a noun, they draw upon … theoretical assumptions 
[including]: (1) that a relatively autonomous and objectified society exists; (2) that the 
dynamics of this objectified set of practices or structures are lawful and, when manifested in 
institutions and practices, amenable to systematic analysis; (3) that this domain of sociality 
both informs the institutions that its dynamics help explain and, in turn, refers to some 
invisible but law-abiding system; and (4) that aggregates, which are also abstractions (the 
public, labor), constitute the agents of more foundational abstractions like the social. 168 
Immediately striking about this passage is the breadth of the claims Poovey makes on behalf of the 
social. It is also striking that although she is referring to modern thinkers in the late 19th and 20th 
centuries, these assumptions resonate with the attitudes and positions found in the social investment 
literature. Social investment certainly assumes an autonomous domain known as ‘society’; it assumes 
lawfulness (as how else would it be possible to justify programmatic responses to social problems, 
responses that are in theory replicable?); and it certainly encourages the creation and use of aggregates 
(viz: outcomes) that bear an assumed relationship to a broader pursuit of the social. This is a 
somewhat superficial analysis, intended only to lay the groundwork for more detailed discussion over 
the next few chapters, but it suggests that there are fruitful parallels to be drawn.  
It is worth spending a bit more time with Poovey’s analysis, and the matter of providentialism. The 
period we have been referring to repeatedly is one in which philosophers of government, economy and 
society gradually removed the hand of God from their reasoning. Modernity rejects the mystery and 
unknowability of God’s work, and seeks secular, scientific explanations for that which is observed. The 
social is intimately bound up in this process. “The concept of the social” she writes, “… ultimately 
functions to legitimate social arrangements that are no longer seen as resting on providential 
ground.”169 It is here that we arrive at the notion of order – social order – and rejoin our earlier 
discussion of the doctrine of self interest. Poovey elaborates: 
(Western) modernity is characterized by an “ideal of order as mutual benefit.” As part of this 
ideal of order as mutual benefit, second-order analytic categories like the social have been 
generated to explain how the more foundational abstractions—such as order and human 
nature—“naturally” produce the precise relationship (of mutual benefit, ideally) that 
characterizes society. In so doing, the social plays the role for the modern theorist that 
Providence did for philosophers of an earlier age: it explains why this relationship is necessary 
or natural, not arbitrary or simply a projection of wishful thinking.170 
These observations pull to the surface some of our most unarticulated and invisible assumptions that 
have to be in place for us to be able to explore the social world, confident in our rejection of anything 
as ‘unscientific’ as God’s will. Instead we have a kind of faith in society, that some kind of social order 
is in place. This is not a claim that refers to precisely what this order looks like or entails – “The idea 
that the orderly dynamics of philosophical abstractions refer to existing principles of order has proved 
more resilient than any particular account of that order.”171 But the presence of order is essential to the 
scientific approach to explaining social affairs: 
If we did not collectively assume that such order exists—no matter what we call it—no 
systematic organization of knowledge (i.e., no science) would be credible, no observations 
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about the past could purport to predict the future, and our ability to create and differentiate 
abstractions would have no explanatory power.172 
Here Poovey takes us beyond the borders of liberalism to a more general observation about Western 
attempts to generate systematic knowledge. It is helpful to have such a depth of analysis because it 
allows us to find the common thread to what is otherwise a disparate set of comments and analyses 
that talk in terms of the social. But we will keep our focus more narrowly on liberalism, and on 
elaborating the claim that liberalism is a governmental rationality that is developed in relation to 
society.  
ITERATIONS OF THE SOCIAL 
We have offered a general account of the social by connecting it up with Poovey’s observations about 
social order. We will now turn to a number of examples of how the social has been configured in 
response to historically specific problems of government.  
We start with (Foucault’s analysis of) the ‘ordoliberalism’ of mid-twentieth century Germany. The 
ordoliberals turned to competition as the principle of organisation for society. They were not the first 
thinkers to argue that competition was critical to economic freedom, but they were unusual among 
their contemporaries for arguing against laissez-faire, asserting that such models fall foul of a kind of 
“naïve naturalism” that assumes competition is a given of nature. “The beneficial effects of 
competition are not due to a pre-existing nature, to a natural given that it brings with it. They are due 
to a formal privilege.”173 The effects of competition can only be brought about through careful 
construction of the appropriate conditions. The ordoliberals therefore advocated a social policy that 
acted on society, in order to reduce the chances that social factors would inhibit competition. Foucault 
calls this an ‘inversion’ of the relationship between the social and the economic. In what sense is it an 
inversion? Contrast this social policy with the rationale underpinning a welfare economy. Welfare 
states seek to counteract the negative effects of the free operation of markets. They seek to reduce 
inequality, and to socialise elements of consumption (for example through collective provision of 
healthcare). So while welfare policy seeks to counteract the negative effects of the market on the social 
body, the neoliberal social policy seeks to reduce the negative effects of society on the proper 
functioning of the market:  
The Gesellschaftspolitik [social policy] must not nullify the anti-social effects of competition; it 
must nullify the possible anti-competitive mechanisms of society, or at any rate anti-
competitive mechanisms that could arise within society.174  
This is the first example of an interation of the social, the ordoliberals’ vision of a society built on 
competition, an economic model for society, that sits in contrast to a welfarist model that softens the 
effects of economic logic on the social body.  
The second context in which we find a configuration of the social on the terrain of government is 
Chicago School neoliberalism, again studied by Foucault. He finds in the American neoliberals an 
attempt to use the “economic grid” to analyse all areas of life: 
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American neo-liberalism … involves generalising it [the economic form of the market] 
throughout the social body and including the whole of the social system not usually 
conducted through or sanctioned by monetary exchanges.175 
What does the “generalisation of the economic form of the market” look like? Foucault is referring to 
a series of studies by Chicago school economists using an economic frame to understand ‘social’ 
matters. These economists published work examining the mother-child relationship, criminality, and 
marriage, examining these non-economic relations and behaviours in economic terms. Marriage, for 
example, is treated by one neoliberal theorist as essentially a contract between two people that is 
justified economically because it “enables them to avoid constantly renegotiating at every moment the 
innumerable contracts which would have to be made in order for domestic life to function” – the 
transaction costs of which would be otherwise prohibitive.176 Another prime example, not picked up 
by Foucault, is Landes and Posner’s article ‘The Economics of the Baby Shortage’.177 The authors open 
the study by observing “With the rapid development of the economic analysis of nonmarket behavior, 
the conceptual tools necessary for the economic study of social (as distinct from narrowly economic) 
regulation are now at hand.” They go on to develop a model for the supply and demand of babies, 
which demonstrates that regulation has created a ‘baby shortage’ that could be avoided through the 
operation of a free market.178 The American neoliberals thus formulate a version of the social that is 
amenable to analysis in economic terms. In both of these examples it can be seen that the social 
element is understood as a domain outside of and in opposition to the economic domain, a boundary 
that is then transgressed within neoliberal thought – a transgression identified in the term ‘inversion’.  
We also find an analysis of the social in relation to the neoliberalism of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald 
Reagan, in the work of Foucaultian scholars Nikolas Rose, Peter Miller and Mitchell Dean. Dean 
perceives neoliberalism as a rationality of government that “bypasses society”. He considers Thatcher’s 
infamous comment “there is no such thing as society” to illuminate a conception of the social body in 
which the state no longer takes the responsibility it assumed in welfarism. There are just individuals, 
responsible for themselves. This means that the liberal problematic is reformulated such that ‘society’ 
as a principle and outside of government is displaced by “the self-determining or free subject.”179 
Miller and Rose, similarly, argue that neoliberalism recodes the place of the state, meaning that “the 
analytical language structured by the philosophical opposition of state and civil society is unable to 
comprehend contemporary transformations in modes of exercise of political power.” 180  In this 
reordering, the role of the state is to provide a legal framework for social and economic life. Within 
this framework, political subjects are autonomous agents who exercise their freedom within this space, 
rather than members of a collective. There is a shift from solidarity to security, and the suggestion that 
individuals insure themselves against risk rather than relying on the state to do so.  
The work of Miller and Rose helps to flesh out what they call ‘social government’, that is, welfarist 
modes of government. The introduction to their book, which collects together their work on the topic 
from the previous two decades, states: 
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Governing 'from the social point of view', as we termed it, was grounded in the argument that 
began to take shape at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that 'government 
would have to be social or it would cease to exist', that a kind of social government was 
necessary if one was to be able to combat the twin threats of unbridled market individualism 
and communist revolution.181 
Welfarism embodies “a particular conception of the relation between the citizen and public powers,” a 
relation mediated through techniques of insurance, which they argue “fundamentally transforms the 
mechanisms that bind the citizen into the social order.” The distinctiveness of welfarist approaches 
was to use insurance to generate a sense of collective responsibility.182 For Rose, the emergence of 
questions of government framed in terms of a national economy “was a key condition for the 
delineation of a social territory,” as he locates the importance of ‘society’ in its connection with 
national identity. Governmental practice was concerned with the social coherence of a national 
population.183 Dean suggests a slightly different account of the social, less closely associated with 
welfarism: “the social is not first or necessarily tied to a centralized bureaucratic apparatus such as that 
embodied in the ideal of a ‘welfare state’”184. In the period of social government he sees the formation 
of a common vocabulary that sought a “general codification” of social problems “as issues entailing the 
whole of society.”185 
Miller, Rose and Dean all agree that we have seen the end of the ‘era of social government’, and a 
transition into what they call ‘advanced liberalism’, a shift that is broader than, and contains, the 
development of neoliberal politics. There is some disagreement over how to characterise this shift. 
Rose argues for ‘The Death of the Social’, located in a variety of shifts that displace this notion of a 
national society in the political imaginary. Rose explains these changes in terms of a new emphasis on 
sub-national features of civic and economic life, arguing that “government of the social in the name of 
the national economy” transitions into government of “zones”, such as “regions, sectors or 
communities”.186 In the context of our discussion of the social, it is important to note that Rose is not 
arguing for the death of ‘the social’ as such, but for the death of the version of the social that he has 
specified in his account of social government.  
Dean disagrees with Rose’s assessment – “we should remain circumspect about posing the question of 
the ‘death of the social’ to transformations in contemporary government”187 – because he supports a 
broader notion of the social. He argues that ‘the social’ should be discussed not in terms of its death 
but its “metamorphoses”. Welfarism may be over, but the social: 
will be reconfigured as a set of constructed markets in service provision and expertise, made 
operable through heterogeneous technologies of agency, and rendered calculable by 
technologies of performance that will govern at a distance.188 
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This is what Dean calls the ‘post-welfarist regime of the social’, in which the “older divisions” between 
state and society or public sector and private sector are bridged, “so that the structures and values of 
the market are folded back onto what were formerly areas of public provision”, and the latter 
reconfigured “as a series of quasi-markets in services and expertise”.189  
I make reference to these analyses because they are some of the most prominent and substantial works 
on governmentality besides Foucault’s own. But I think these texts are methodologically problematic. 
My concern is that these authors stray some distance from what I consider to be central features of 
Foucault’s method. Foucault’s approach is to use source material that is grappling with some kind of 
problem of government. He investigates how people – like the Chicago school economists, or Adam 
Smith, or staff at the American Enterprise Institute – employ reasoning that formulates a problem of 
government, and a solution, in a particular way. The intention is always to remain grounded in 
practices and to see what they reveal about governmental rationality. The opposite of this would be to 
start with abstractions and to see what history tells us about their development. Foucault states at the 
start of The Birth of Biopolitics: 
instead of deducing concrete phenomena from universals, or instead of starting with 
universals as an obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices, I would like to 
start with these concrete practices and, as it were, pass these universals through the grid of 
these practices.190 
The broader interest of these quite specific studies lies in the connections that can be drawn between 
the way problems of government were thought then and the way they are thought now. But it is not a 
valid or helpful approach to make these connections and from them deduce some kind of arc, 
narrative or progression through history.  
There are certain elements of Dean and Miller and Rose’s theorising where the anchorage in 
historically situated problematisations is obscured, if it is in fact present. We might compare Miller 
and Rose’s discussion of neoliberalism with Foucault’s. Focuault’s comments are grounded in detailed 
exposition of specific texts, by neoliberal thinkers. He is certainly open to accusations of getting the 
details wrong, of extrapolating too far or being imprecise in his summaries, but his claims are about 
what these thinkers are saying. He effectively discusses several different neoliberalisms, connecting 
them with real world institutions that operate on the logic he identifies, but without ever extending his 
claim to politics in general. Miller and Rose, in contrast, appear to start with the phenomenon of 
neoliberalism and ask whether a rationality of government can be found therein: 
It would be misleading to suggest that the neo-conservative political regimes that were elected 
in Britain and the United States from the late 1970s through the 1980s were underpinned by 
a coherent and elaborated political rationality that they then sought to implement, still less 
one that identified bureaucratic and professional power as a key problem. Initially, no doubt, 
these regimes merely sought to engage with a multitude of different problems… But 
gradually, these diverse skirmishes were rationalized within a relatively coherent mentality of 
government that came to be termed neo-liberalism.191 
                                                   
189 Ibid. p200 
190 Foucault (2008). p3 
191 Miller and Rose (2008). p211 
 62 
The problem is not that this is an unconvincing account of reality, or that it is entirely inaccurate, but 
that it appears to take a Foucaultian approach while also transgressing one of Foucault’s basic 
epistemological guidelines. Who did the rationalising that Miller and Rose identify here? Are they 
suggesting the existence of a unified concept of neoliberalism? The same issues occur with Miller and 
Rose’s account of what they call ‘advanced liberalism’. The following passage helps to illustrate this 
point further. In advanced liberalism: 
One finds the emergence of a new way of conceptualising and acting upon the relations 
between the government of economic life and the self-government of the individual …the 
economy is no longer to be governed in the name of the social, nor is the economy to be the 
justification for the government of a whole range of other sectors in a social form. The social 
and the economic are now seen as antagonistic.192 
These statements lack any anchorage in practice. This general statement from Miller and Rose locates 
antagonism between the social and the economic without saying who perceives this antagonism and in 
response to what. They do of course provide examples of what they mean by stating that “the social 
and the economic are now seen as antagonistic”, but these are examples that illustrate their point, 
which is general in nature. Advanced liberalism, we are told, can be seen across three characteristic 
shifts: “a new relation between expertise and politics”, “a new pluralisation of ‘social’ technologies”, 
and “a new specification of the subject of government”. 193  These observations are undoubtedly 
insightful. But on what grounds do Miller and Rose collect them together and give them a label? My 
point is not that Miller and Rose are wrong in identifying a shift – I am not in a position to judge 
whether such a shift has taken place or not. My point is that they make their argument in a manner 
that is too detached from specific, local problematisations – too detached from practice – and as a 
result risk a kind of self-referential theorising whose results are already contained in the way the study 
is set up. This is a very present risk when concepts as malleable as ‘the social’ are given an active role. 
In short, if Miller and Rose are committed to the ‘end’ of ‘social government’, and if ‘social 
government’ characterised an epoch of rule, then they are bound in advance to identify a new epoch of 
government and for it to be characterised by all that logically follows from the end of the social. 
Dean is vulnerable to a similar line of criticism. Pages 188-191 of Governmentality contain a discussion 
of neoconservatism and neoliberalism in which the generalisations about these two forms of political 
rationality take precedence over the concrete realities they are supposed to explain. Dean’s motivation 
appears to be to provide an explanation of how the nature of governmental practice has changed, 
rather than understanding the intricacies of specific articulations of problems and solutions to 
government. It is possible that this sense of abstraction results from the attempt to assimilate multiple 
governmentality studies, rather than using these studies to inform a close consideration of the 
rationalisation of particular practices of government.  But Dean’s text lacks the sense, so present in The 
Birth of Biopolitics, that the author has set out to explore what current governmental practice is taking 
place and how we might understand it. Instead, we are given the impression that Dean is constructing 
a narrative, identifying a series of stages of history that serve to elucidate the current epoch of advanced 
liberalism and the post-welfarist regime of the social.194  
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Despite these objections, these texts are helpful. Dean in particular observes aspects of contemporary 
governance that gesture towards social investment. We can begin to see that social investment, in 
partnership with the social enterprise movement, is perhaps a fresh iteration of the social. These 
movements help to reinforce Dean’s objection to the ‘death of the social’. Miller and Rose diminish 
the power of their insight by tying their version of the social so closely to welfarism and solidarity 
politics. Iterations of the social continue to be an aspect of liberal rationalities of government. 
RETURNING TO THE SUBJECT 
I would like to bring this discussion to its central and most important point. We started with the 
subject of interest and her emergence onto the political landscape. We have seen that liberalism 
accommodates the subject of interest, at the individual and collective level, and within society. But we 
so far have only a very superficial account of what this subject looks like and how she behaves. 
Successive iterations of liberalism each have their own version of the subject, their own model of 
human behaviour on which they base their assumptions and predictions. Self-interest may be a feature 
common to these accounts, but precisely what that looks like can be taken in multiple directions.  
There is interplay between the version of the individual being put into play and the version of society 
being envisaged. While classical liberalism emphasises exchange as the fundamental economic 
mechanism, neoliberalism distinguishes itself by shifting focus to competition. “The society regulated 
by reference to the market that the neo-liberals are thinking about”, Foucault observes, “is a society in 
which the regulatory principle should not be so much the exchange of commodities as the mechanisms 
of competition.” 195  As we have already established, within ordoliberalism a social policy was 
propounded that would seek to ensure society was arranged in such a way that it would encourage 
competition to work as effectively as possible. The counterpart to the central role assigned to 
competition is the enterprise.  
Foucault perceives strong links between German ordoliberalism and American neoliberalism, allowing 
himself to shuttle backwards and forwards between them, so we will do the same. It is within 
ordoliberal elaboration of Vitalpolitik (policy of life) and Gesellschaftpolitik (policy of society) that 
Foucault finds great importance placed on the enterprise form. These writers have in mind the 
construction of a “social fabric” in which the starting point is not individuals in nature but “basic 
units” in “the form of the enterprise.”196 We must interpret Foucault’s use of the term ‘enterprise’ 
sufficiently broadly – he means not just a small business venture but also the various other endeavours 
that individuals take on, such as owning private property, or running a household. On this view, the 
intention is “the generalization of forms of ‘enterprise’ by diffusing and multiplying them as much as 
possible”.197 Though it is not made explicit in Foucault’s discussion, it seems logical to assume that the 
centrality of the enterprise form would entail a figure of economic man who is correspondingly 
entrepreneurial in character. 
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Where the Ordoliberals concern themselves with social policy, the American neoliberals develop a 
theory of ‘human capital’. With this research agenda the science of economics embarks in a new 
direction. “For the first time”, Foucault points out, “…the worker is not present in the economic 
analysis as an object—the object of supply and demand in the form of labor power—but as an active 
economic subject.”198 The model of the enterprise is picked up and extended; the individual, or at least 
the worker, is a kind of “enterprise for himself.”199 Like with the ordoliberals, the basic units making 
up society are enterprise-units. Here we encounter a more explicit exploration of the subject: the 
individual is a kind of enterprise, “being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own 
producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings.” 200  The shift from a (classical liberal) 
governmental rationality oriented to economic exchange to a social policy grounded on competition is 
therefore reflected in a shift in the nature of economic man: 
The characteristic feature of the classical conception of homo œconomicus is the partner of 
exchange and the theory of utility based on a problematic of needs. In neo-liberalism—and it 
does not hide this; it proclaims it—there is also a theory of homo œconomicus, but he is not 
at all a partner of exchange. Homo œconomicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of 
himself.201 
Homo oeconomicus still pursues his own interests, but he has been embellished with entrepreneurial 
features. Through American neoliberal thought we are presented with a figure who competes with his 
fellow entrepreneurs-for-themselves, doing what he can to develop his own ‘human capital’. And 
because almost all areas of human life can be construed as relevant to the development of one’s own 
human capital, so almost all areas of human life become subject to economic analysis. This is one of 
the mechanisms by which economic thought has come to apply itself to so many areas of life. 
In a brief aside we could ask: what happens to the market in this shift from exchange to competition? 
The manner in which Foucault uses the terms ‘economic’ and ‘market’ suggests a certain level of 
interchangeability. In one passage, for example, he argues that a further aspect of neoliberal thought is 
what he calls a “market criticism opposed to the action of public authorities”, something he elaborates 
by claiming that the “economic grid” is used in “anchoring and justifying a permanent political 
criticism of political and governmental action”, and that “every action of the public authorities” is 
scrutinised “in terms of the game of supply and demand.”202 The “economic grid”, the “market 
criticism” and “the game of supply and demand” all seem to play a similar, if not interchangeable, role 
within his analysis. It seems that in suggesting the shift from exchange to competition in liberal 
thought, Foucault is not suggesting any change in the role of the market, because the market 
continues to be a privileged site within economic thought.  
In discussing this shift from classical liberalism to neoliberalism, I do not want to diagnose the 
political climate of the present, but rather to point to aspects of liberalism that will help us to 
understand social investment. I included this element of Foucault’s analysis because it fleshes out the 
issue of the subject as she is conceived within liberal thought, and the different versions that might be 
at play. More specifically, I want to return to a matter that was set out above: the incommensurability 
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of the subject of interest and the subject of right. We introduced the subject of right to emphasise the 
novelty of the subject of interest: she provides the grounds on which to question the need for 
government, on the basis of the unknowability of her interests – and of the economic processes that 
represent the complex interaction of multiple interests – from the perspective of the political 
sovereign.  
The incommensurability that Foucault identifies does not rest on the governability of the subject of 
right versus the ungovernability of the subject of interest. On the contrary, the shift of homo 
oeconomicus from man of exchange to man of competition has served to demonstrate that the subject 
of interest is perfectly susceptible to the application of governmental power. In fact, he is “eminently 
governable”. How is this so? Because the neoliberal line of reasoning figures economic man as 
somebody who acts rationally. In the most radical forms of this reasoning – Foucault uses the work of 
Becker to illustrate his point – the forms of behaviour considered amenable to economic analysis 
extend beyond rational conduct to any conduct that “reacts to reality in a non-random way.”203 Even if 
this is further than most economists would go, it is this kind of reasoning that supports the 
development of “behavioural techniques” by which “a given play of stimuli [are seen to] entail 
responses whose systematic nature can be observed.”204 Almost forty years later, we observe that the 
field of behavioural economics is alive and well, not least in the form of the ‘Nudge Unit’, also known 
as the UK’s Behavioural Insights Team. Though homo oeconomicus emerged in the eighteenth century 
as what Foucault calls an “intangible element with regard to the exercise of power”, in fact this figure 
turns out to be “a certain type of subject who precisely enabled an art of government to be determined 
according to the principle of economy.”205 It is easy to find other examples of the attempt to govern 
populations by treating them as economic actors. Creating Citizen Consumers, for example, is a book 
that examines a cornerstone of Third Way policy: the “strange figure” of the “demanding and sceptical 
citizen-consumer”.206  Citizens, accessing logics and behaviours associated with consumer (that is, 
economic) behaviour, would drive the quality of public services by exercising their right to choose. 
Third Way politics relies on the governed to behave as rational economic actors, who gather relevant 
information in order to make the choice that best furthers their own interests. 
The problem, then, is not that economic man is not governable. The problem lies in the 
incompatibility of the forms of power needed to govern economic man in comparison to the forms of 
power needed to govern other (political) forms of subjectivity. We can identify two aspects to this 
problem. The first aspect is the insufficiency of economics as a governmental rationality. Foucault states 
with confidence: 
Economics is a science lateral to the art of governing. One must govern with economics, one 
must govern alongside economists, one must govern by listening to the economists, but 
economics must not be and there is no question that it can be the governmental rationality 
itself.207 
I understand these comments in terms of the straight jacket economics operates within regarding the 
world view it makes possible. It is grounded in basic assumptions about human nature that have 
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enabled extraordinary progress, but nevertheless are blind to behaviours not easily represented within 
its peculiar brand of systematisation. This insufficiency is acknowledged by economists. The 
ordoliberals hoped that the generalisation of the enterprise form might compensate for, in Foucault’s 
words, “what is cold, impassive, calculating, rational and mechanical in the strictly economic game of 
competition.” But they acknowledged:  
Competition is a principle of order in the domain of the market economy, but it is not a 
principle on which it would be possible to erect the whole of society. Morally and 
sociologically, competition is a principle that dissolves more than it unifies. 208  
Dean reminds us that this is an enduring problem of sociology. Putting it in Durkheimian terms, “the 
problem of organic solidarity” (that is, the “existence of inequality and poverty in a society of equals”), 
“cannot be simply wished away by those who would retract the welfare state, individualize 
responsibility for the ills of the social system, and disperse risks onto the multiple communities and 
bodies which are to be made to bear them.”209  
I think that the book Why Nudge? The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism210 can be seen as another 
acknowledgement of the limits of economic as a rationality of government. Libertarianism is a test 
ground for the idea that society can function with barely any space for government at all. Written by 
an American legal scholar who played a central role in the development of ‘nudge theory’, it argues 
that “in certain contexts, people are prone to error, and paternalistic interventions would make their 
lives go better.” Sunstein’s point is not just that people are not always the best judge of their own 
interests, but that people’s decisions are unavoidably influenced by the choice architecture they 
encounter from day to day, and so whoever designs that architecture – the way items are laid out in a 
cafeteria, for example – is unavoidably implicated in influencing the choices being made. Sunstein’s 
argument is one articulation of the shortcomings of a politics that tries to make economics into a 
rationality of government in its own right. 
So one aspect of the problem at hand is the insufficiency of economics as a governmental rationality. 
The other aspect is the problem of accommodating both kinds of subject within a single rationality of 
government. Foucault describes it as “the problem of the specificity of homo oeconomicus and his 
irreducibility to the sphere of right”.211 He elaborates: 
the art of government must be exercised in a space of sovereignty—and it is the law of the 
state which says this—but the trouble, misfortune, or problem is that this space turns out to 
be inhabited by economic subjects.212 
For the sake of brevity I have not gone into the “space of sovereignty” or Foucault’s discussions of the 
change in the juridical structures that have accompanied the development of the liberal rationality of 
government. For our purposes, this aspect of the problem can be somewhat superficially represented in 
terms of interest. That is, this problem of incommensurability manifests itself in the conundrum: how 
is it possible to govern subjects whose are both expected to pursue their interests unhindered and 
expected to sacrifice their interests in the name of the public good? We know that economics cannot 
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act as a rationality of government in its own right, but how can a rationality of government that at 
least partially relies on the exertion of political sovereignty operate when the subjects it governs refuse 
(see no reason) to cede their interests? 
I am arguing that it is helpful to see this tension as an enduring and central feature of liberal 
governmentality. At this juncture, Foucault suggests that civil society is the “new plane of reference” 
that emerged in the eighteenth century in response to this problem, a “new ensemble that is 
characteristic of the liberal art of governing” and that will “envelop” actors as “both subjects of right 
and economic actors”.213 I have chosen not to recount the detail of this analysis because I think it 
mostly tells us about the specifics of eighteenth century conceptions of civil society. Where it has 
broader relevance, I think Foucault’s writings on civil society overlap with the earlier discussion of the 
social. That is, civil society is an iteration of ‘the social’. We can now add the observation, tying a 
number of threads together, that it is the social that is instrumental in bringing these two 
incommensurable subjects together in a (constantly changing) “ensemble” that will “envelop” them 
both.  
What bearing does this discussion have on the analysis in the rest of the thesis? We can now see that 
the social is so very deeply embedded in the way we understand our world and the possibilities for 
action that it is barely possible to properly uproot it. It plays a background organising function that (as 
Poovey states) is akin to the role God once played in organising our understanding of reality. This is 
why we cannot easily bring it into focus. As we will see in chapters 4 and 5 in particular, the ‘social’ 
element of ‘social investment’ is the batteground of competing versions. Our approach will be not to 
ask directly what actors mean when they use the term ‘social’, but to see how the distinctiveness of this 
field of activity – the thing that makes it ‘social’ where ‘mainstream investment’ is not – is built on a 
series of assumptions around the role of profit, the need for regulation and the role of measurement. 
The comments around the nature of the subject are picked up again in the Conclusion chapter, where 
the we consider what kind of subject is figured by the reasoning internal to social investment.  
KNOWLEDGE AND INTERESTS 
So far we have established that interests are critical to governing, and that governing takes place in part 
via the production of knowledge. It is therefore necessary to examine the relation between knowledge 
and interests. In this section I want to focus in on the role that (apparently) disinterested facts play in 
the ways of knowing that characterise social investment. I insert the word ‘apparently’ not to indicate 
that facts appear to be disinterested (objective) when really they are interested (self-serving), but rather 
to indicate that the appearance of disinterestedness is something we can denaturalise and investigate. 
With help from Poovey, we can identify the mechanisms by which facts come to appear as 
disinterested.  
Before we turn to Poovey’s text I will suggest a way of conceptualising the presence of disinterested 
facts on the liberal terrain of government. It strikes me that disinterested facts serve to efface the extent 
to which we are governed according to our interests. Facts offer a way of being and acting that is not 
about one’s values, but rather a rational response to an external set of circumstances. As we mentioned 
towards the end of the preceding section, Foucault identified a limit to the ability of economics to 
function as a rationality of government. Self-interest cannot be the model for all human behaviour. 
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But the disinterestedness of facts actually extends the reach of a model of human behaviour that 
encourages the pursuit of one’s own interests as rational. It expands the domain in which one can act 
as an economically rational individual, without resorting to values-based reasoning. Before, charity 
donation was about matters ‘close to the heart’; now, social investment is about maximising impact. 
The vision for social investment is a case in point. It makes a series of starting assumptions that appear 
simply to state the facts: Governments have been shown to be inadequate, social problems are getting 
worse, and the social sector is undercapitalised. Social investment is presented as, and operates as, a 
commonsense response to this state of affairs. On the perspective offered in this thesis, social 
investment provides a fact-based way to tackle social problems that continues to operate through the 
interests of individuals. We will return to this argument in the conclusion to the thesis. 
For now, our focus is on elaborating the notion that the disinterested nature of facts is brought about 
by mechanisms that we can identify and analyse. When trying to denaturalise aspects of the present 
that are taken for granted, a helpful starting place is the point in history when the current way of 
thinking emerged. To be clear, by using the following examples, I am not trying to introduce a 
historical element into my analysis. That is, I am not lending weight to these examples in virtue of the 
time at which they took place, and then suggesting that there is some kind of historical connection 
between what happened then and what is happening now, in the context of social investment. I use 
these examples because they illustrate something about the present we are looking at, and they happen 
to be situated in the past. I consider this to be part of the transactional relationship I have set out with 
Foucault, Poovey and (in this section) Porter and Hacking. They have studied these phenomena and 
offer an analysis that is useful for our purposes, so I present a summary of their insight as part of my 
argument, without engaging with any significance they might attach to the time at which these 
changes took place. 
Poovey, then, takes us back to the point at which the idea of interested / disinterested knowledge 
emerged, around the turn of the eighteenth century: 
interest was gradually being removed from its older, juridical context and recast as a political 
and economic term. Gradually, and in the context of subsequent developments in the domain 
of politics and religion, two new terms were introduced that carried the evaluative 
connotations familiar to modern readers: ‘disinterested’ (in the sense of being unbiased by 
personal interest), which came into use about 1659, and ‘interested’ (in the narrower sense of 
self-serving), which was in use by 1705.214 
Poovey marks out a shift that is consonant with Foucault’s take on the emergence of the subject of 
interest onto the terrain of government. She goes on: 
The appearance of these new terms suggests that within the domain of political theory and in 
the course of the seventeenth century, it gradually became possible to think that the producers 
of knowledge had – or were superior to – a personal, self-serving investment in the knowledge 
they generated, instead of simply seeking knowledge (or ‘truth’) for its own sake.215 
In the complex web of concepts and techniques making up the epistemological paradigm of the past 
few centuries, this passage points us to the emergence of one important component. Poovey associates 
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this change with a reconceptualisation of ‘experience’. Developments in the seventeenth century 
displaced the Aristotelian meaning of experience, as “how things happen in nature”, towards 
experience as “how something had happened on a particular occasion.” Emphasis began to shift away 
from “commonplaces and communities” towards “specific observations of particular events and 
specific – and eventually expert – observers”.216 This has implications for the status of knowledge as 
interested or disinterested: 
This realignment created the idea that abstract knowledge (theory) could be value-free because 
it was based on specific experience and because it different from another kind of knowledge, 
which was ‘biased’ because ‘self-interested’, usually (though not always) in an economic 
sense.217 
Poovey is incisive in pulling out the most deeply buried assumptions supporting the way we have 
come to understand the world. Her text describes an “epistemological revolution”218 that brought 
about many of the features of knowing that are now comfortably familiar to twenty-first century 
attempts to understand social life, and that are at play in the way social investment is known and 
reasoned about. More specifically, our understanding of how facts come to be thought of as 
disinterested is founded on her account of the modern fact. She provides us with the means to 
understand how disinterestedness is bound to standards of objectivity and validity that are achieved 
through different responses to the problem of induction.   
We are therefore adopting a mode of enquiry that regularly touches back on the question of how 
standards of objectivity, validity or truth are produced within an instance of knowledge production.  
From here we begin to gain more sense of how knowledge production intersects with governing 
according to interests. Looking ahead to forthcoming chapters, we will see that the duality Poovey 
identified in the modern fact is present in various aspects of social investment. It means the social 
investment market is seen as simply there, a matter of fact, not something to be questioned. It also 
means that ‘impact’ is (treated as) a kind of objective reality, a realm of (largely numerical) facts that 
can be used to inform decision making. For now, the rest of this chapter is devoted to a detailed 
recounting of certain aspects of Poovey’s text, drawing on Hacking and Porter where it is helpful to do 
so. We will start with four general points about her overall argument, then turn to three historical 
examples that have direct connections to the argument later in the thesis.  
First, Poovey demonstrates that the disciplinary boundaries by which we divide up knowledge are not 
a reflection of anything other than a series of conventions of knowledge production that are so familiar 
they now seem permanent and immovable. Economics, engineering, physics, political economy, 
mathematics and sociology and the social sciences all share common roots. This is a fascinating history 
in itself, but we bring attention to it only to make the point that our understanding of how we have 
arrived at the forms of knowledge employed in social investment is enhanced by taking a broad and 
open view of the knowledge production of the past. Bacon’s contribution to (what we now call) the 
natural sciences is just as relevant as works of sociology or politics.  
Second, Poovey’s method includes consideration of the context in which different thinkers produced 
their work. She considers the epistemological effects of prevailing forces, asking how the institutions 
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and other sources of authority with which thinkers interacted had an influence on what counted as 
valid or true. It is easy to look at Bacon’s method, for example, without realising that he “formulated 
[knowledge] in such a way as to serve the state… which … meant supporting the monarch’s ability to 
adjudicate and use what counted as truth.”219 Understanding these factors helps us to understand what 
Bacon was trying to achieve. In parallel, we must ask: to what end is any given instance of knowledge 
production oriented? What is it being used for? What problem does it respond to? That is, Poovey’s 
study brings our attention to a range of questions that we can ask of the forms of knowledge 
production native to social investment. 
Third, the role of numbers and numerical facts deserves special attention. The modern fact is not 
necessarily numerical in form, but it often is. “Numbers came to epitomise the peculiarity written into 
the modern fact.” Poovey elaborates: 
On the one hand, as signs of (what looks like or passes as) counting, numbers seem to be 
simple descriptors of phenomenal particulars, and because the mathematical manipulation of 
numbers is governed by a set of invariable rules, numbers seem to resist the biases that many 
people associate with conjecture or theory. On the other hand, however, because numbers also 
constitute the units of a system of knowledge production that is biased towards deduction – 
that is, mathematics – numbers inevitably carry with them the traces of a certain kind of 
systematic knowledge: to assign numbers to observed particulars is to make them amenable to 
the kind of knowledge system that privileges quantity over quality and equivalence over 
difference.220 
Numbers efface this duality because they fulfil both functions seamlessly. They behave as simple 
descriptors – a four here is the same as a four over there – but also lend themselves to numerical 
manipulation. They ease the transition from local, particular knowledge to general, systematic 
knowledge. Poovey historicises the role played by numbers, remarking that: 
the ensemble of knowledge practices that dominated the ancient world was reordered in such 
a way as to separate numerical representation from figurative language and, gradually, to 
elevate practices associated with numbers over those associated with metaphorical language. 
… the emergence of the modern fact coincided with this reordering – indeed, was 
instrumental to it – [and] effacing this epistemological unit’s characteristic peculiarity was 
central to creating, then sustaining, the illusion that numbers are somehow epistemologically 
different from figurative language, that the former are somehow value-free whereas the excess 
of the latter disqualify it from all but the most recreational or idealistic knowledge-producing 
projects 221 
Numbers have come to be endowed with a different epistemological character to other forms of 
knowledge, but this character is contingent rather than inherent. 
This takes us to our fourth point, that we must be alert to the multivalent  nature of various concepts 
used to structure the production of knowledge. That is, the concepts in question produce statements 
which are simultaneously statements of fact and of value. This notion enjoys a close relationship with 
the modern fact, because it is the modern fact’s duality that plays a crucial role in endowing some facts 
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with their objective, disinterested status. While multivalence is a feature of Poovey’s analysis, it is 
brought out most clearly by Hacking.  
In The Taming of Chance, Hacking draws our attention to the way in which the distinction between 
‘is’ and ‘ought’ – between statements of fact and statements of value – is a familiar, usually 
unquestioned feature of our ways of understanding the world. But the term ‘normal’ exhibits a kind of 
multivalence that allows a switching back and forth between the two senses of the word: 
One can, then, use the word ‘normal’ to say how things are, but also to say how they ought to 
be. The magic of the word is that we can use it to do both things at once. The norm may be 
what is usual or typical, yet our most powerful ethical constraints are also called norms … 
Nothing is more commonplace than the distinction between fact and value. From the 
beginning of our language the word ‘normal’ has been dancing and prancing all over it.222 
Normality, Hacking demonstrates, plays an important function in ways of thinking about humans in 
society. The concept of the normal, as it took on many of its modern day meanings in the 19th 
century, “created a way to be ‘objective’ about human beings.”223 
Once we are alerted to the possibility of multivalence, we find examples scattered across our field of 
interest. Poovey at several points remarks on the way concepts such as the ‘market’ introduce a way to 
simultaneously talk about what is and what ought to be. In the context of social investment 
‘accountability’ is a particularly striking example – it can refer both to accounting or enumerating, and 
to being held responsible – that is given extended treatment in chapter 6. 
The following three examples demonstrate how the features described above play out in the analysis of 
a variety of texts.  
ADAM SMITH AND ABSTRACT OBJECTS 
The first example is Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. Smith’s philosophy, Poovey argues, introduced 
epistemological innovations. He reasoned through new ways of connecting up facts and data about the 
world with systematised knowledge around what he called the ‘market system’. This example will help 
demonstrate the way abstract objects like ‘the market’ became a regular feature of ways of 
understanding matters of political economy.  
Bringing the question of induction to bear on Smith’s reasoning around the abstractions he used to 
structure his argument proves an illuminating strategy. Smith faced a number of epistemological 
problems in putting forward an argument for the existence of the ‘market system’ – a system that, if 
allowed to operate undisturbed, would coordinate interests to the benefit of all. Smith did not want to 
make a purely deductive argument, facing a tension common to political economic approaches: 
On the one hand, … [Smith] recognised that it was essential to invoke systematic 
assumptions about human nature (homo oeconomicus) … On the other hand, like a good 
Baconian, he wanted to use the available firsthand evidence, especially when this existed in the 
form of numbers.224 
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But the data he had available was insufficient in a number of ways. There was not much of it – “he 
lacked experiential data sufficient to ground his claims about the market” 225 – and what there was 
reflected a system which “had yet to be freed from interfering legislation.”226 That is, current reality 
was prevented from operating according to the economic laws that he wanted to argue existed. 
Smith therefore took a somewhat pragmatic approach to using the numbers available to him. He 
“wanted to create a way to interpret the data that did exist”.227 The result? In “Smith’s treatment of 
numbers in Wealth of Nations, numerical records are summoned, then dismissed”; they are used to 
support “the assumptions with which he initiated the analysis”, rather than the numbers themselves 
revealing anything new.228 The credibility of his argument, according to Poovey, “came from its 
internal coherence as much as its truth to nature.” He elevated precision over accuracy, and he made 
this precision, i.e. systematic coherence, the bridge that “linked observed particulars to the still 
unrealised potential that only the philosopher could see.”229  
This mode of argument must be understood in relation to the endeavour to create systemic 
abstractions like ‘the market system’. This involved putting forward a way of thinking that was unlike 
what had gone before, because it relied on an abstract object.  “Smith believed”, Poovey informs us, 
“that creating abstractions was essential to the production of general knowledge … because what one 
needed to analyse was nowhere visible as such.”230  This provides another view on the “role for 
numerical representation” in Smith’s work: 
In Smith’s account, abstractions like the market system created a new role for numerical 
representation, for as descriptors of the products (actually or theoretically) created by the 
institutions associated with the (idea of a) market system, numbers seemed to refer to entities 
that had been (or could be) counted. At the same time … Smith’s numbers also embodied his 
a priori assumptions about what the market system should be.231 
This passage draws our attention to both the duality and the multivalence present in the way Smith 
conceptualises the market system. Duality is identifiable in the way that the market system provides a 
theoretical reason for counting various entities, numbers which then act as descriptors. Multivalence is 
present in the way that assertions about the market system act simultaneously as statements about 
what is and what should be.  
Poovey writes that Smith’s epistemological approach in some ways typifies political economy more 
broadly: 
The numbers for which Smith created an epistemological place in Wealth of Nations – 
numbers that could seem simultaneously transparent to phenomenal entities and evidence for 
what (the philosopher believed) the market system would be if it were free – typify the variant 
of the modern fact produced by political economy.232 
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This feature of political economy should be understood primarily in terms not of numerical 
representation, but of “the peculiar combination of claims about descriptive accuracy and dependence 
on a priori belief.”233 That is, the political economist believes that facts about experience would reflect 
the system she argues exists if that system were allowed to properly function. Thus, we talk about 
matters in terms of a market, even though we are constantly having to explain why reality diverges 
from what the market model predicts. This variant of the modern fact will be useful in exploring the 
emergence of the social investment market.   
SYSTEMATISING UNCERTAINTY 
We move our focus now to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and to a field which, unlike political 
economy, is concerned primarily with numerical accuracy and the certainty of results: statistics. 
Hacking’s work on the development of statistics234 is useful in supplementing Poovey’s text on this 
front. The 19th century had witnessed what Hacking calls an “avalanche of numbers”. 235  The 
enthusiasm for collecting numbers provoked debate and reflection over the proper way to handle 
them. Hacking ably summarises the main trajectories of these debates, but we are just going to pull 
out a single example. Of all the questions provoked by the abundance of numerical data, our focus is 
more specifically on thinkers preoccupied with the question of causation. How is it possible to know 
with certainty that observed effects are attributable to one or the other cause, rather than a further 
cause that is unseen and unaccounted for? Even more specifically, our focus is on (Hacking’s account 
of) the work of Peirce, who developed statistical methods which acknowledge and then quantify the 
degree of uncertainty present in the results of a calculation. The ‘systematisation of uncertainty’ 
opened up expansive new terrain in producing systematic knowledge about the social world.  
The significance of Peirce’s work is brought into relief by placing it alongside that of Herschel, a 
philosopher examined by Poovey. Herschel discussed the limits of scientific method in a treatise 
published in 1830. He was concerned that induction alone was insufficient for dealing properly with 
the complexity found in the natural world. He advocated a process of iteration between inductive and 
deductive methods. “Verification by repetition was critical to the method Herschel described”, Poovey 
writes, “because repetition enabled the scientist to check his emerging theories against new data.”236 
Peirce, in contrast, writing in the 1890s, put forward a notion of induction where, in contrast to 
demonstrative (deductive) arguments, in which the conclusion is true whenever the premises are true, 
the conclusions of probable (inductive) arguments (given true premises) are usually true. What was 
remarkable about Peirce’s position was his assertion that “in either case, a valid argument has the 
truth-producing virtue.”237 This is so remarkable because Peirce is suggesting a version of scientific 
truth that includes a degree of uncertainty. “When the premises are quantitative,” furthermore, Peirce 
argues “we may be able to replace the 'usually' by a numerical probability.”238  
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What, exactly, is the point of contrast between Peirce and Herschel? Herschel’s method, like Peirce’s, 
“involved factoring the limits of epistemological certainty into the method of science itself.”239 But 
Poovey furnishes us with an important distinction: Herschel’s was not a “philosophical solution”, but 
rather a “professional solution”. ‘Professional’ seems to mean something like ‘pragmatic’: 
By agreeing among themselves to use empirical laws and by ensuring their public that they 
were honest about the limitations of the knowledge such laws generated, scientists could hope 
to earn the authority necessary to make their picture of nature seem more plausible than what 
ordinary observation revealed. 240 
Where Herschel accepts the limits of inductive reasoning but carries on anyway, Peirce finds a way to 
systematically include a measure of these limits in a manner that allowed a version of ‘philosophical 
truth’. Peirce had a philosophical response to the matter of error and uncertainty that Herschel lacked.  
Hacking identifies in Peirce’s work the opening up of considerable new intellectual terrain. The 
flowering of mathematical statistics engendered an array of techniques that have transformed 
knowledge production in the 20th and 21st centuries. Here we skirt another substantial history, making 
just a couple of quite general points. The systematisation of uncertainty made possible new kinds of 
disinterested facts. It has enabled scientific enquiry to enter the terrain of messy social reality, because 
the formidable complexity of social life can be broken down and investigated in ways that can now 
cope with the uncertainty encountered. Causal links can be scientifically established using 
experimental methods such as randomised control trials (RCTs). These forms of enquiry change what 
it is possible to know. The presence of these new statistical facts offer another way of producing 
disinterested knowledge about matters of social and political significance. 
SCRUPULOUSNESS / USEFULNESS 
Earlier in this chapter we emphasised the importance of recognising the orientation of any given 
system of knowledge production. Asking what purpose knowledge is being produced for provides a 
different kind of insight to simply examining the logic of an argument on its own terms. This is 
particularly true in the next area of discussion: cost-benefit analysis (CBA), and the production of 
knowledge oriented specifically to informing decision making. These examples are distinctive not just 
because they are developed for a practical purpose – this is arguably the case for many forms of 
knowledge production – but because they explicitly reject overly “scrupulous” responses to the 
problem of induction in favour of less precise but more pragmatic solutions.  
Our starting point in explaining this notion is the growth of CBA as an approach to making decisions 
of public significance. Here we draw on Theodore Porter’s book Trust in Numbers, a text that is 
broadly compatible with Poovey and Hacking’s texts.241 Porter’s enquiry into CBA allows us to 
identify an alternative response to the problem of induction. As background, the ‘engineer-economists’ 
of the 19th century French army corps were employed to work on public projects such as the building 
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of bridges and railways. They used a mixture of engineering and economic reasoning to aid decisions 
about the location and design of this infrastructure. In defining the best route for a railway or canal, 
for example, they would make commensurable a range of parameters such as mechanical efficiency, 
cost of construction and maintenance, and then seek to minimise the mean cost of transporting a ton 
of merchandise one kilometre.242 In some cases the ideas generated by these thinkers contributed to the 
body of abstract economic theory – marginal utility theory, for example, originated in this group. But 
in other cases the kind of rigour demanded by this kind of theorising was seen to be at odds with 
ensuring the reasoning was fit for purpose. An engineer comments on his method:  
If the observer is one of those men committed to exact and absolute ideas, who admits no 
approximations and rejects everything that lacks rigorous mathematical exactitude, he will 
have no use for this calculation, and the question will rest eternally at the same point, at least 
until a less scrupulous spirit takes it up.243 
He perceives a tradeoff between the scrupulousness of a study, and its usefulness. Here, then, we 
encounter a process of rationalisation that is not oriented to the ‘truth’ of the matter so much as the 
practical imperative of enabling decisions to be made. For Porter, the orientation is to objectivity in 
decision making. At this point our focus in not on the pursuit of objectivity so much as identifying the 
break that this signifies with scientific good practice at the time. It demonstrates that it is possible for a 
mode of reasoning to essentially ignore the problem of induction and still produce systematised 
knowledge that plays a practical function, and gains its validity from this practical use.  
This mode of reasoning was subsequently transported across the Atlantic to the USA, where it became 
an integral feature of public decision making over the course of the twentieth century.244 The basic 
idea, in practice since the 1920s and first enshrined in law in 1936, was that the US Army Corps was 
uniquely equipped in the US political system to assess (and quantify) the expected costs and benefits 
of a proposed public works project, such as a railway or a dam. The result of their work was a cost-
benefit ratio. A ratio of more than one indicated that the benefits exceeded the costs; the ratio also 
allowed comparison of different options. As a form of knowledge, its success did not depend on it 
achieving the most accurate possible representation of reality. Throughout its history CBA was 
criticised by both insiders and outsiders for making assertions that could not be backed up with direct 
observations. The quantification of intangibles went in and out of favour. Even for more tangible 
elements of the calculation, there was always room for interpretation on what should be included and 
on how expectations about the future should be integrated. These factors could make an enormous 
difference to the final ratio. As CBA practice spread more widely in the US government, different 
agencies would conduct their own CBAs for the same proposals, and arrive at quite different results.245 
If CBA had been held up to the highest standards of scrupulousness, it seems unlikely that it would 
have gained much traction. But in the US context, and possibly further afield, it has become 
progressively more widely and deeply embedded across almost every area of Government. Its success 
comes from its suitability for the practical function that it played. A process was needed for making 
decisions between competing interests that would be accepted by all sides. CBA was perceived as a 
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neutral, technical, objective form of knowledge. Similarly, the Corps largely enjoyed a reputation as 
neutral, objective experts who apply their methods without prejudice. Once established as part of the 
political process, the numbers produced by CBA went unquestioned in all but the most contentious of 
cases. The committees in Congress who accepted the figures from the Corps, Porter observes, were 
“dazzlingly uninquisitive” about how they were calculated.246 Where problems did arise, and CBA 
faced opposition, the outcome was not to challenge the appropriateness of CBA (though it may be 
more accurate to say that challenges to the appropriateness of CBA were not successful), but to try to 
standardise the values attached to the costs and benefits. Standardisation was not an attempt to make 
the overall analysis more accurate, but to improve CBA’s ability to fulfil its practical function of 
providing neutral, objective grounds for public decisions. 
A similar dynamic is visible in the development of accounting. Like CBA, accounting is oriented to a 
practical problem, and it is public in nature. It also faces a tradeoff between achieving results that are 
as close to truth (as ‘scrupulous’) as possible, and results that are standard and consistent across time 
and place. While CBA’s function is to provide grounds for decisions ex ante, the numbers generated by 
accounting practices must tally more closely with ongoing practices. Returning once more to the 19th 
century, Porter walks us through the dilemma that the accounting profession faced. The profession’s 
credibility depended on being able to achieve consistent results: there was a “political need for 
accounting uniformity”.247 But consistency was often achieved at the expense of accuracy. Porter gives 
an illuminating account of the kinds of rationalisations offered by accountants faced with this 
problem. Many of them decided to equate consistency of results with truth itself.248 Porter’s point is 
that the public nature of accounting numbers means they are subject to pressure from outsiders, who 
question how the numbers have been arrived at. As a result, the accounting profession moved from 
valuing expert judgement to favouring consistency and transparency of results, in order to demonstrate 
their objectivity. The shift towards numerical standardisation that took place over a number of 
decades did not signal more accurate accounting, but rather more defensible accounting in a wider 
system of competing interests. 
CBA and accounting are examples of knowledge production that are deliberately prioritising 
characteristics other than the most accurate or scrupulous use of numerical facts. The link between 
economics and engineering reminds us that economic thought extends beyond political economy, 
with the abstractions created by philosophers like Smith complemented by knowledge production that 
enables economic decision making – that is, maximising under constraints. Once more, we find 
ourselves on the border of another large history, this time of the development of economic thought. 
Satz alerts us to another transition in economic thought, the marginalist revolution beginning in the 
nineteenth century, that facilitated the mathematisation of economics.249 This undoubtedly is also 
worthy of examination, but we are limited by space. 
MORE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
These three examples – Smith and the creation of abstractions, the systematisation of uncertainty, and 
the tension between scrupulousness and usefulness – help to bring into relief the different purposes to 
which knowledge production might be oriented. It is worth briefly commenting on the work of 
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Donald MacKenzie, who pursues similar lines of enquiry in exploring a topic fairly close to our area of 
interest: the development of global financial markets.  
In the course of his study, MacKenzie uses essentially the same technique as Poovey in asking how 
financial economics connected its models with empirical data. Finance theory uses models that are 
marked simplifications of empirical reality. But “for half a century, economists have had a canonical 
reply to the contention that their models are based on unrealistic assumptions”. This response is based 
in Milton Friedman’s distinction between “’positive’ economics (the study of ‘what is’) from 
‘normative’ economics (the study of ‘what ought to be’).” Positive economics seeks to make “correct 
predictions about the consequences of any change in circumstances”, and it is to be judged by the 
“precision, scope and conformity with experience” of these predictions. In short, Friedman wrote, 
“positive economics is, or can be, an ‘objective’ science, in precisely the same sense as any of the 
physical sciences.”250 Similarly to Smith choosing to prioritise internal coherence over truth to nature, 
Friedman prioritised the precision of predictions over the accuracy of his models’ assumptions. 
MacKenzie identifies the thorough integration of Friedmanite views among the community of finance 
theorists he interviewed for his study, observing: 
that a model’s assumptions were “unrealistic” did not generally count, in the epistemic culture 
of financial economics, as a valid argument against the model.251 
Financial economics therefore proves to be another setting in which a form of knowledge production 
is used to inform decision making rather than striving for an accurate representation of empirical facts. 
And yet, Friedman claims the grounds of “objective science” for this form a reasoning. We will not 
engage with the detail of MacKenzie’s argument regarding the interplay of finance theory and the 
operation of financial markets. We can just note his concluding comment that “there is a deep 
ambivalence in the field’s attitude to the extent to which its models can be taken as realistic.”252 The 
terms ‘ambivalence’, to me, suggests those scholars and practitioners tasked with developing and using 
these financial models did not share Friedman’s confidence that they could both reject the need for 
their models to be realistic and claim grounds of objective science.  
More generally, the point here is to bring to the surface the way in which some forms of knowledge 
production are not intended to produce the most accurate or certain results, something that has to be 
recognised in any critical study. These observations are particularly pertinent for the discussion of 
social impact measurement in chapter 6, which is explicitly influenced by strands of reasoning oriented 
both to proof (social scientific research) and to decision making.  
MOVING ON FROM THE MODERN FACT? 
Poovey reflects on the continued prevalence or otherwise of the modern fact in contemporary ways of 
knowing. Moving into the twentieth century, the frontiers of knowledge start to move past the 
peculiarities associated with the modern fact. With the transformations in statistics described above, 
“mathematical modelling began to surpass induction as the method of choice in the social and 
physical sciences”, meaning modern day philosopher-scientists now have modes of reasoning available 
that ensure they no longer have to respond to the problem of induction. Poovey also talks about 
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“postmodern facts”.  One might “renounce the desire (or need) for systematic knowledge”, or one 
might “abandon not the desire for systematic knowledge but the need to yoke knowledge systems to 
observed particulars.”253 This latter approach is seen in postmodern theory, where the “conviction that 
the systems of knowledge humans create constitute the only source of meaning is gradually displacing 
both the problem of induction and all the variants of the modern fact that I have discussed in this 
book.”254 Indeed, the fact that Poovey could gain sufficient perspective to write this account of the 
modern fact indicates it no longer determines the parameters of how we understand the world, as does 
the fact that I can write a PhD thesis built in part on analysing the role the modern fact is playing in 
social investment.  
It might appear inconsistent or problematic to talk about the end of the modern fact while also 
promoting its usefulness for studying an aspect of the present, but it is neither of those things. The 
epistemological paradigm that pushes out the modern fact, Poovey writes, “will take a long time to 
unfold”.255 There are various fronts on which the kind of knowledge production associated with the 
modern fact is being challenged, but there are all kinds of scenarios in which it continues to play a 
role. Social investment is one of those scenarios. 
CONCLUSION 
We have used the notion of ‘rationality of government’ as a way of bring the broader context into our 
analysis. This rationality of government incorporates both the basic ideas of liberalism described in the 
first half of the chapter and the ways of knowing associated with liberalism. The notion of interests 
provides the bridge between these areas of discussion; liberalism organises itself around the satisfaction 
of interests via the market mechanism and the corresponding self-limitation of government. The forms 
of activity encouraged within this rationality of government rely in part on the creation of disinterested 
facts, which brings us to the discussion of how facts are created and handled within different ways of 
knowing. All of this prepares us for identifying the influences on the reasoning found within social 
investment as a programme of government.  
This chapter’s epigraph underlines the extent to which the vision for social investment relies on 
commonly accepted features of the liberal rationality of government in which it has taken shape. 
Certain versions of social investment, we will see, import the assumption that the market mechanism 
can be used to coordinate interests in a manner superior to what Governments are able to achieve. The 
newness of social investment, the feature that makes it distinctive, is the way it introduces the explicit 
orientation to social purpose that is lacking in mainstream investment. There is healthy debate over 
exactly how this orientation should be formulated and thought about, but a clear frontrunner is the 
commitment to measure social impact. So we see that our focus on the production of knowledge – the 
production of disinterested facts – is absolutely crucial to our account of the logic of social investment. 
Just as the doctrine of self-interest is drawn in and put to work, so is the notion that disinterested facts 
can be produced and used to achieve specified aims. The discussion in this chapter will help us to 
perceive where actors are introducing assumptions about the viability of generating certain kinds of 
knowledge, and to be wary of those points where the framework that has already been set out 
influences the way in which a set of affairs is being reasoned about. This helps us to move beyond 
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taking the arguments being made at face value to identify the underlying assumptions that are already 
in place.  
The examples in this chapter help us to see that ‘facts’ are not just ‘facts’; they are intimately bound up 
with the purposes for which they are generated, and there are ways of denaturalising and unpicking 
the assumptions on which they gain their status. We turn now to a detailed examination of the logic 
internal to social investment as a programme of government. We start, in chapter 3, with an analysis 
of how the market for social investment was created as a knowledge object that provides structure for 
the activity of social investment. 
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CHAPTER 3: CREATING THE MARKET 
This is a very “build-it and they will come” approach to the market. … What it does is it 
shakes it up and it gets everyone to notice. Whether logically it is the only way to build the 
market, I think it is probably not the only way and it is also way too early to say whether it is 
the right way.  
Comment from interview with a senior staff member at Big Society Capital (2013) 
Based on my own extensive collection of documents, back in the year 2000 the phrase ‘the market for 
social investment’ was not used. We can say with some certainty that this market, at that point, did 
not exist. Some of the activities that are now considered to be part of this market may have existed in 
the year 2000, but they were not thought of as part of a market for social investment. By 2011, there 
were all kinds of reasons to think that the market for social investment did exist. Not least, a new 
financial institution had been set up, BSC, with £600m of capital, with the explicit aim of having “a 
transformative impact on the social investment market in the UK”.256 The UK Government was in on 
the act, publishing in 2011 a strategy called Growing the social investment market: a vision and 
strategy.257 Not only does the market for social investment exist, but the Government wants it to grow. 
Of course, it might be possible that in the years between 2000 and 2011, an array of people decided to 
set up the various different organisations that make up this market. These organisations might even 
have existed already – for the market for social investment to come into existence, we might think that 
the need for capital from SSOs began to stimulate the supply of capital from social investors, or 
perhaps the other way around. We might think that the market came into existence because these 
different market players realised that there was mutual gain to be had from engaging in market 
transactions.  
I am fairly certain that this is not the way in which the market for SI came into being. I think it makes 
much more sense to see the market as having been brought into existence fairly suddenly, at a point 
closer to 2011 than 2000, by a group of actors who made a decision to pursue an agenda that used the 
framework of the market to convey a set of problems and solutions. The creation of BSC provides a 
focal point for this change, because its status as a financial ‘wholesaler’ effectively rebrands various 
other organisations into different market components.  
This is the first stage of our exploration of the logic internal to SI as a programme of government. We 
are starting here, treating this market as an epistemological object, because doing so allows us to 
denaturalise the framework being created to lend structure to social investment activity. As a reminder, 
the approach in this thesis is not to suggest a way of theorising the gap between the pure idea of the 
market and the messy reality. Instead, we are building an account of how the pure idea of the market – 
the basic structure of supply, demand and intermediary – was adopted by actors and used to make 
sense of what they were setting out to do. When we adopt this approach, we can identify the processes 
by which the market gained form and density from the research and reporting on its current state and 
future potential.  
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We will also see that the idea of the market does more than lend structure. As soon as it appears, it is 
endowed with the status of a simple matter of fact, a neutral, technical way of viewing matters.  
INTRODUCING THE MARKET STRUCTURE 
For this discussion to proceed we need to distinguish between the active and passive use of the term 
‘market’. When it is used in a passive sense, the term ‘market’ is loosely employed to denote an area of 
activity. When it is used actively, the term ‘market’ refers to a structured arena in which different 
components – supply, demand, intermediaries – interact in a specific manner. The project of market 
building employs the latter sense. The market is something with boundaries, with its own internal 
dynamics, whose size and other characteristics can be measured. This distinction can be illustrated by 
the following comments made by one of the interviewees, in talking about the social investment 
market.  The first usage can be seen in this comment: 
Myself and others were lobbying for a social investment bank for a long time. Because 
obviously we recognised that for our market, traditional banks didn’t understood what we’re 
doing, the usual thing, they hadn’t got a clue. [Interviewee] 
Contrast this with his comments on the functioning of this market: 
Well we needed something to capitalise the social investment market. Um so when my 
organisation started to look at investment there were very few players in the market. … So it 
was basically a cartel of lenders. And I think at that time it was a good cartel of lenders, but it 
was a cartel. What there wasn’t was a market. [Interviewee] 
In the first comment this person uses ‘market’ in quite a casual sense, referring to a collection of 
organisations bound by some common characteristic – pursuit of social purpose is probably what he 
had in mind – but with no suggestion of a properly functioning internal market structure. In the 
second comment, he asserts that there wasn’t a market, back when his organisation started to look for 
investment, because a (properly functioning) market (he implies) cannot exist where there is a cartel of 
lenders (who displace free competition and prevent the market mechanism from working). Indeed, he 
uses both senses of the word market within this second comment; in the first sentence he uses ‘market’ 
in its passive sense, before going on to use it in its active sense. The comment only makes sense if he is 
using the term in two different senses, as he is otherwise directly contradicting himself.  
It is the use of the active version of the term ‘market’ that I contend only came into circulation around 
2010-11. One of the clearest illustrations of this change is contained in the series of reports published 
by the Social Investment Task Force. The first three reports, published in 2000,258 2003259 and 
2005,260 all make mention of markets (in under-invested communities, or the market-driven system, 
or different markets for social investment), but it is only in 2010, in the final SITF report, that the 
‘social investment market’ makes an appearance.261  
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From this point on, it is striking that the market structure is picked up by a variety of authors as the 
backdrop to their research. They simply assume the existence of the social investment market as a 
starting premise. Here are a few examples. Diagrams representing the market are often employed to 
help readers visualise the argument being made. This one comes from the final report of the SITF, 
already mentioned. It makes explicit the notion that this market is transitioning from low to high 
“market maturity”: 
From Social Investment Task Force, Social Investment – Ten Years On (2010) p8 
A compendium of research put together by BSC in 2013 provides us with a clear graphical 
representation of the components of the market system: 
From Big Society Capital, Social Investment Compendium (2013) p3262 
This model of supply and demand interacting with the help of intermediaries, in a favourable, 
enabling environment, is explicitly or implicitly supportive of much of the discussion around the 
attempt to build a market for social investment. It comes out in the interviews, where the idea that 
there should be a variety of organisations on the supply side, providing choice to investees, is part of 
the justification for BSC’s existence: 
when my organisation started to look at investment there were very few players in the market. 
So we basically had 3 or 4 players who we were able to go to for investment. …. So it was 
basically a cartel of lenders… What there wasn’t was a market. So myself I was quite keen 
from the start that actually any social investment bank needed to be a wholesaler and not a 
retailer. Because the – there’s a lot of debate around should BSC or whatever you’re going to 
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call it – should be investing directly in social enterprise rather than through intermediaries. 
I’ve always been and we’ve always been on the other side of that. It should only go to 
intermediaries. Because what we need is a market and not just one player. [Interviewee] 
Another example is the following diagram, which addresses the matter of how the social investment 
market may be distinguished from other closely related types of activity. This report, Making Good in 
Social Impact Investment: Opportunities in an Emerging Asset Class, does take pains to point out it 
presents the “bottom-up perspective of social purpose organisations and entrepreneurs”263 but this 
“grounding” in no way brings into question the existence of the market for SI. The market is both the 
topic for discussion, and provides a framework for the discussion. The diagram therefore communicates 
a conceptual understanding of this market, abstract and detached, that the authors deemed helpful for 
readers. 
From Richter and Evenett, Making Good in Social Impact Investment (2011) p13 
Indeed, it is noticeable that the market is way of describing both the current state of affairs – a report 
will take the (extant) social investment market as its topic of discussion – and a way of communicating 
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a vision, a potential future state that is within reach if we all get behind the cause. The Making Good 
report is a case in point. They suggest SI in its current state should be viewed as an “emerging 
market”, and then make a series of quite detailed assertions about what a future “thriving” market will 
look like: 
Our vision for a thriving social impact investment market is one in which social purpose 
organisations at different stages of development and size can access a wide range of financing 
products of varying types and maturities. A market that provides affordable investment capital 
to organisations on terms most appropriate to their needs, that rewards success, that backs 
expansion, supports spin-outs and encourages start-ups. We would like to see a liquid market 
that provides the radically undercapitalised social sector with the capital it needs, so that social 
purpose organisations can realise their missions to the maximum extent practicable. A market 
in which follow-on funding is as important as initial funding, so that successful organisations 
are supported with second and third-round financings and more, and in which investment 
capital with a higher risk appetite is used to leverage in new sources of capital with a lower risk 
appetite.264 
The market for SI – which is currently an emerging market, remember – presumably does not 
currently exhibit these features, but at some point in future might provide “a wide range of financing 
products”, might “reward success” and “back expansion”, might be “liquid”, might provide “follow-on 
funding” and might use “leveraging” to support different “risk appetites”.  
This report is particularly interesting because we can see that the market has become an invisible 
backdrop to the research, a lens through which everything is viewed. The authors state they want to 
ground their research in reality –  “We interviewed social purpose organisations and entrepreneurs to 
ground our thoughts.”265 – and spend some time conveying the opinions of these people in the report. 
Overall: 
Feedback from social purpose organisations and the experience of investors confirms that it 
needs to be an integrated market with a range of different financial products for different 
stages of an organisation’s development 266 
That is, feedback confirms that the market needs to have certain characteristics, and not others. What 
we cannot now know is whether any of the feedback questioned the market, whether it is an 
appropriate mechanism for funding SSOs, whether they disagree with the notion of a market. The 
report is written in such a way that the market is simply the framework for discussion. Given that this 
market is in place, my suspicion would be that the authors’ attempt to ground their thoughts would 
only have been sensitive to views that made sense within this framework. 
As a final example, we use a report from 2010 that discusses the social investment market in relation 
to the Government’s proposed Big Society Bank (which became BSC). It is written by CAF 
Venturesome (the investment arm of the Charities Aid Foundation), and explicitly takes the 
perspective of “charities and social enterprises”. While the other reports we have used were 
propounding a vision of the potential of this market, the authors of this report are keen that the Big 
Society Bank develops a market that is “responsible and intelligent”. The “four pillars” that it 
identifies to achieve this are “confident and informed demand from the civil society sector”, “efficient 
                                                   
264 Ibid. p12 
265 Ibid. p17 
266 Ibid. p17 
 85 
matching of supply and demand”, a “variety of investment mechanisms” and a “resilient supply of 
finance”.267 They want the civil society sector (the social sector) to have access to finance. What is 
striking about this report is that the authors fully adopt the framework of the market for social 
investment to make their point. Already, in 2010, they were willing to take for granted that this 
market existed and could be steered in different directions, some of which were more desirable than 
others. 
Already we can see that the market has an intriguing epistemological status. It can be talked about in 
multiple different senses, with the author leaving it to the reader to glean from context which sense is 
intended. The market is both metaphorical and real – a collective fiction we all share in, but also 
something that guides action and has real effects. It is a description both of how things are and how 
things should be. In this sense it facilitates a form of multivalence, a crucial component of political 
economy’s ability to take social and political matters onto factual territory. We arrive straight back at 
the discussion in chapter 2: the market is an abstraction, and the social investment market displays the 
same ambivalent relationship with ‘reality’ as Poovey identified in Smith. The comparison should not 
be overdrawn. Poovey investigated in some detail the position that Smith took regarding the relation 
between the abstract objects he elaborated and the reality he could see and touch, and count. Smith 
used the concepts that eighteenth century philosophers had at their disposal – the coherence of his 
argument, for example, was judged partially on the satisfaction it elicited in the reader’s brain268 – 
which no longer carry meaning for us. It is also not possible for us to pursue the same question here in 
equal depth, because the social investment market is not the province of the philosopher, to date at 
least. Our source material is written for a general audience, without any reference to epistemological 
matters.  
That said, we can certainly probe further on the way the SI market is connected up with reality. It is 
becoming clear that we cannot think of the SI market as either ‘real’ or fake’. A comment from 
Foucault is helpful at this point: 
Politics and the economy are not things that exist, or errors, or illusions, or ideologies. They 
are things that do not exist and yet which are inscribed in reality 269 
Politics and the economy take on status as abstractions of the kind we are interested in. They “do not 
exist” in the sense that they have no concrete, real existence, but they should simultaneously be treated 
as if they exist in virtue of the effects they create. We can see how the social investment market is being 
inscribed in reality through the reports and documents making up our source material – decisions are 
being made, and resources allocated, in relation to this market. Our next area of focus is the attempts 
to attach numerical data to the market, and the reasons given for doing so.   
GATHERING EVIDENCE / DATA  
There is a collection of reports released around 2010-2011 that all share the goal of elaborating the 
idea of the social investment market. We have referred to several of them already. Reading them with 
the problem of induction in mind helps us to gain further insight into the epistemological 
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assumptions being made by the authors. We can start with the 2011 report Lighting the Touchpaper: 
Growing the Market for Social Investment in England, the foreword of which, from the CEO of BSC, 
states: 
What's been lacking, until now, is a comprehensive survey of the social investment market 
that goes beyond case study and anecdote to provide real data on the different players, their 
finances and their business models. That is why I believe this report is so important. For the 
first time we can put numbers on many of the hunches, observations and beliefs that have 
been debated in the sector for some time.270 
“Numbers” are clearly viewed as a superior form of knowledge to “hunches, observations and beliefs”. 
The numbers he refers to are identified and generated through a “bottom-up assessment of the size of 
the social investment market in England”– “bottom-up” denoting knowledge based not on top-down 
assertions from experts and politicians, but evidence gathered of reality. They aggregated these results 
and arrived at a number: “Total social investment in 2010/11 was £165m”.271 What does “assessment” 
mean? It means using the data collected through surveys and interviews to inform the assumptions 
that go into a model of the market. A model is not intended to be a direct, accurate reflection of 
reality. It cannot be, because the authors are trying to build a picture of a market that does not yet 
figure in the understanding of those who are supposed to participate. The authors would have had to 
come up with a way to decide what counts as a social investment within the bounds of this new 
market framework. The model is a way of generating facts that are informed by reality, while 
abstracting away from the complexity and uncertainty over how things should be understood on the 
ground. Note their presentation of the results: “Total social investment in 2010/11 was £165m”. This 
number is presented as fact. My intention here is not to make accusations of inaccuracy or 
obfuscation, but to enquire into the epistemological footing these authors are giving themselves. They 
allow the solidity and precision of the number to speak for itself, even though a more accurate way of 
presenting it would be to emphasise the contingency of this conclusion.  
A year later in 2012 came the report The First Billion: a forecast of social investment demand. This 
report finds that “the demand for social investment could rise from £165 million of done deals in 
2011 to £286 million in 2012, £750 million in 2015 and to as much as £1 billion by 2016.”272 And 
where do these numbers come from? They are estimates, of course, as they project into the future, and 
they are based on interviews with “market players” i.e. the best guess of people involved in the sector. 
But they are generated through a “logical” process. “For the first time,” the foreword points out, “this 
report provides us with a clear and logical approach to understanding the drivers of social investment 
demand. It applies this logic to provide a bottom-up forecast of what potential demand might be in 
the future.” The authors once more rely on a model, segmenting the market and triangulating 
information to arrive at a result that “provides evidence to support the contention that many believed 
out of faith: social investment is a market ready for growth.”273  
The observations made about the Touchpaper report apply equally here. Moreover, these two numbers 
– £165m and £1bn – appear repeatedly in subsequent pieces of research. Some authors are cautious in 
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their language, pointing out that there is a degree of uncertainty over the accuracy of these figures. 
Others extract the number, leaving behind the caveats and explanations of how they are arrived at. A 
brief handbook on social investment, for example, blithely states: “Latest research from Boston 
Consulting Group predicts that, from a social investment market size of £165m in 2010, the demand 
for social investment will” – ‘will’, not ‘might’, or ‘could’ – “increase to closer to £0.75bn in the next 
three years.”274 A paper from the Cabinet Office similarly states that “The social investment market is 
growing, with demand expected to reach £1bn by 2016.”275 I am not interested in the accuracy or 
otherwise of these claims. What I find interesting is the effect that these numbers have on the 
epistemological status of the market for SI. Once the £165m figure has been published, it becomes 
possible to state that “the size of the market for social investment in 2011 was £165m”, and for this 
sentence to be treated as fact. The market now appears to have a kind of solidity that it did not have 
before. The attaching of numbers helps to establish that the market exists, independently of the 
accuracy or precision with which the numbers are generated.  
There are other examples of research aiming to attach numbers to – to quantify – aspects of the SI 
market. Understanding the Demand For and Supply Of Social Finance: Research to Inform the Big Society 
Bank endeavoured to “Quantify the scale of demand”.  These authors resist any impulse to arrive at a 
single number, instead suggesting a way to identify several sectors, and estimate demand for each of 
these individually. They suggest £300 to £400 million in “hard or commercial capital” will be needed 
over the next three years, while £200 to £300 million of “soft, semi-commercial capital” will be 
needed over the same time period. Once again the numbers are arrived at by making estimates 
informed by interviews with intermediaries – “This was the most efficient way of getting a market-
level picture of the supply of, and demand for, capital” – as well as published accounts, “to build up a 
high-level picture of the size of demand for social finance in each market.”276 The authors here are 
more self-conscious about the limitations of the numbers they are producing. They describe their 
results as a “high-level picture”, a euphemism for results that are not especially true to nature. 
Nevertheless, they build on the premise that there is indeed a market, aspects of which can be 
quantified, even if there are limits to the quality of the data that is available. 
Another example is Investing for the Good of Society: Why and How Wealthy Individuals Respond. This 
report generates numbers, though in this case they are attached to the motivations of investors rather 
than the SI market itself. Instead, the quantitative nature of the analysis endows their findings with 
greater robustness: “This report presents compelling evidence from quantitative research, which when 
combined with earlier qualitative research, shows that many wealthy individuals (over £100k of 
investment assets) are motivated to try social investments.”277 How was this evidence generated? A 
“qualitative research phase” used interviews and focus groups to build an understanding of potential 
investment products; these prototype products were then the focus of an online survey with a 
“representative sample of mass affluent investors”. The data from this survey was then subject to 
analysis with “statistical techniques” – “regression analysis” and “cluster analysis”. The suggestion is 
that the use of these statistical techniques makes the findings more reliable than non-quantitative, 
non-statistical analysis. Once more, the effect is to lend greater objectivity to the notion that the 
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market for social investment exists. It should be noted that not all of the evidence of the SI market is 
numerical. Twenty Catalytic Investments to Grow the Social Investment Market, for example, uses case 
studies. They assert that their “resolutely practical approach shines a light on the actual state of this 
emerging market.”278   
The preoccupation with generating numerical facts about the market helps me to make one of my 
central arguments: that the market emerges as a way of understanding things, and then immediately 
comes to be seen as a matter of fact.   
DUALITY IN THE MARKET 
We can go into more depth about the relation between the social investment market and the modern 
fact. The duality that Poovey identified in the modern fact is present in the SI market. The modern 
fact is simultaneously pretheoretical and exists as a piece of evidence in a wider system of knowledge. 
As a reminder, here is the passage quoted in the previous chapter: 
On the one hand, facts seem (and can be interpreted as being) simply the kind of deracinated 
particulars that Bacon claimed to value; on the other hand, facts seem (and can be said) to 
exist as identifiable units only when they constitute evidence for some theory – only, that is, 
when a theoretical reason to notice these particulars and name them as facts.279 
Now, if we remain in abstract terms for a moment, we can see that the market form provides a 
‘theoretical reason’ to notice particulars and name them as facts. Think for example of the housing 
market in a given geographical area – perhaps a village somewhere in England. We can imagine that 
there was a time where the issue of where people lived was not talked about in terms of a housing 
market. All kinds of cultural conditions have to be in place for the matter of where people lived to be 
organised according to a market for houses. So just in the way that the market for social investment 
emerged we can imagine that this hypothetical housing market at some point came into existence. The 
market breaks down into two main components – the supply of houses, and the demand for houses. 
The houses in that village existed before they were thought of as part of this market. But then once it 
became useful or obvious to think in terms of the housing market, those houses were counted and the 
data aggregated to build a picture of the supply of housing. Similarly, the people demanding the 
housing existed before the situation came to be thought of in terms of a market, but their views and 
needs were only collected, aggregated and thought of as making up the ‘demand’ for housing because 
the market structure made it meaningful to do so. It is also important to note that in this hypothetical 
market, while both the ‘supply’ and the ‘demand’ can be thought of, researched and analysed 
independently, they ultimately derive their meaning from their interaction. It only makes sense to talk 
about the supply of housing if you are also going to talk about the demand for housing, and vice versa. 
Both of these designations are meaningful and useful because of their position within a market 
structure.  
It appears to me that the duality Poovey identified in the modern fact is relevant here. Think about 
the process of collecting the data about the supply of housing in this hypothetical village. The fact that 
the housing supply in this village is x number of houses is a ‘deracinated particular’, a simple 
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numerical representation of reality. But at the same time, they are only being counted and aggregated 
and thought of as making up the ‘supply’ of housing because the theoretical structure of the market 
deems it meaningful to do so. The same applies to the people demanding the housing – they and their 
housing needs existed before the situation came to be thought of in terms of a market, but their views 
and needs were only collected, aggregated and thought of as making up the ‘demand’ for housing 
because the market structure made it meaningful to do so. 
Bearing this example in mind, we can return once more to the market for social investment. Above we 
provided numerous examples of the SI market being talked about in an active sense, where the idea of 
the market brings with it a structure made up of different components that interact in specified ways. 
Consider once more the supply side of the market. Who makes up the supply? Research into the 
market identifies a number of sources. Charitable foundations and trusts hold assets that could be 
directed towards social investment, as do ‘retail’ investors – the mass population with small amounts 
of money kept in ISAs or other savings accounts: 
the opportunity is large. UK charitable investment and endowment assets alone account for 
nearly £95 billion. If just 5% of these assets, 0.5% of institutionally managed assets and 5% of 
retail investments in UK ISAs were attracted to social investment, that would unlock around 
£10 billion of new finance capacity.280 
Wealthy individuals may also be drawn into the supply side of the market, as explored by the 2011 
report Investing for the Good of Society: Why and How Wealthy Individuals Respond.281 These are all pre-
existing sources of capital, but it is only with the advent of the social investment market that they are 
being identified and grouped together as the ‘supply side’ of this market. This last example provides a 
particularly clear example, because they generate quantitative data (observed particulars) about the 
motivations of wealthy individuals via a process of qualitative research that allows them to specify the 
kinds of questions that would generate quantitative data. In other words, they specify a framework 
that helps them decide what to look for, and then use the framework to generate observed particulars 
that are then numerically and statistically manipulated in order to generate evidence of the supply of 
investment capital. 
A parallel process takes place on the demand side of the market. Who makes up the demand side? The 
social sector. Take for example BSC’s 2012 strategy paper: 
With earned income now representing a substantial proportion of the social sector’s income 
and more and more social sector organisations operating to a greater or lesser extent as social 
enterprises, the sector is moving away from a model based on grants and donations towards 
models that focus on developing more sustainable ways to finance core costs, to grow, and to 
invest in capacity to generate future income. Consequently the demand for finance in the 
social sector is ever increasing.282 
‘Demand’ is introduced as an almost self-evident way of referring to the capital needs of these 
organisations. Another report that explicitly tackles this issue is the 2011 report Understanding the 
Demand For and Supply Of Social Finance. Once again, that there is demand for SI is taken for 
granted; the purpose of the research is to better understand and quantify it: 
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The aim of this research is to: “set out the nature of current and future demand for capital 
from social finance intermediaries and to develop an understanding of the mix of financing 
the Big Society Bank will need to support.”283 
The social sector, of course, already existed before the emergence of the SI market, though not in a 
particularly well-defined sense. ‘Social sector’ is another label for what had been referred to in other 
ways (such as ‘third sector’ or ‘charity and social enterprise sector’), but these labels share a common 
referent: organisations that are driven to create social impact. Chapter 5 is devoted to examining the 
debate around what organisations should be included on the demand side of the market (and chapter 
4 examines the debate over what kinds of investor should be thought of as making up the supply side), 
so the point here is to draw attention to the way in which the social sector becomes designated as the 
‘demand side’. These organisations already existed, but it was not until matters came to be thought of 
in terms of the SI market that this designation was introduced. And once it is introduced, it becomes a 
matter of fact: the social sector simply is the demand side. 
Why is this significant? The statements above read almost as truisms. My point is that these 
designations are introduced regardless of how those affected by them feel about this change. They are 
not put up for debate. The factual, neutral character of these designations make them innocuous, not 
something to be objected to. They become the framework within which the debate takes place from 
this point on. The next two chapters explore this debate, marking out several points in which 
differences of opinion come to the surface. By chapter 7, we are in a position to mark out more clearly 
the effects of framing matters in this way. 
MARKET FAILURE? OR EXPANDING THE MARKET? 
The idea of the market for social investment did receive criticism from a group of individuals who 
wanted to challenge this reframing of the way the social sector is financed. It is instructive for us to 
look at which aspects they picked out as problematic, and which were left to operate in the 
background. 
The ‘Alternative Commission on Social Investment’ in 2015 published a report highlighting the gap 
between the rhetoric found in reports advocating social investment, and “the reality on the ground in 
the UK”: 
the idea of ‘social investment’ and the ‘social investment market’ are neither living up to the 
rhetoric of politicians and social investment leaders nor meeting the expectations of many 
charities and social enterprises.284 
The report grounds its analysis in the argument that the Government’s justification for building this 
new market for social investment is that it will provide something that is not otherwise being 
provided. The SI market means SSOs have access to capital of a kind that is not available from 
mainstream banks or investors. But the report identifies “in-built conflict” in the idea that a market 
can be built that  
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is ‘sustainable’ and which also offers access to ‘affordable finance’….Investees have to be able 
to afford the money but for a sustainable market to exist, players in the market i.e. investors 
need to earn sufficient revenues to cover their costs.285 
Logically, if there were opportunities for investment that already generated a healthy return, there 
would already be provision from mainstream capital providers. BSC, charged with building this 
market, is in a difficult position: 
BSC then, and others charged with developing the social investment market, have spent 
recent years attempting to solve the problem of how social investment can meet demand from 
social section organisations’ that is not currently met by commercial markets whilst also 
developing a viable commercial model.286 
They therefore recognise and extend the comments we made above about the expectations introduced 
by the market, directly questioning their applicability in a situation where certain parameters are 
fundamentally different.  
Interestingly, the viability of the market model is also questioned by a senior member of staff at BSC, 
interviewed in 2015. He challenges the notion that investment readiness can be expected of all SSOs, 
even in theory: 
the idea of investment readiness presupposes that everybody has the capability to run a 
business. Or to execute a business plan if they get enough support.  I’m not sure if that is 
necessarily the case. [Interviewee] 
He suggests the motivations that drive demand for investment may be missing, and that this is a 
function of why people tend to start SSOs in the first place, and the institutional structures that are in 
place: 
There’s no evidence that the sector has an appetite for loans. And it’s  - why is that? – I think 
some of that has to do with what Dai Powell describes as an entrepreneurial deficit in the 
social sector. And I think that is true to some extent. I think it’s partly the culture, it’s the 
type of people that start SSOs in this country. They tend to be very community focused. They 
tend to be motivated by making a difference in the community to people they know and see 
and touch. The idea of having a national organisation is not appealing. So there’s no need to 
grow their organisation. And I think partly it’s due to the natural conservative instincts of 
trustees, which are personally liable for losses. They are in actually a riskier position. 
[Interviewee] 
These comments touch on some of the basic largely unspoken assumptions about how individuals act 
in a market, and challenge their applicability in the context of social investment. The implications of 
these observations go beyond putting a drag on demand: 
That’s sort of an underlying thesis of a social investment market that you aspire to scale, and if 
you don’t aspire to scale then there’s a real mismatch there. And the idea that scale creates 
efficiencies, and by creating efficiencies you free up more money to help the people that 
you’re really trying to help. ...it doesn’t mean every social organisation has to aim to scale, but 
some do. And those that participate in the social investment market are those organisations 
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that have those aspirations. But if you’re constantly saying all the best social value is delivered 
by tiny community organisations, with four people in them…[Interviewee] 
This is potentially a devastating critique. He offers reasons to think not just that the assumptions 
introduced by the market are not applicable in this context, but that the pursuit of social impact is 
best pursued by organisations that do not display these characteristics – by “tiny community 
organisations” rather than organisations that “aim to scale”. But it is not a published opinion, and it is 
not an argument I have encountered anywhere else.  
What I have encountered is that even the market’s fiercest critics still use the market as a way of 
thinking about the current state of affairs, and what needs to change. This appears to be true of the 
Alternative Commission report. In its concluding paragraphs it argues that:  
the mismatch between the most heavily supported forms of supply and the research-backed 
demand are so great that there is need for more fundamental consideration of whether ‘the 
social investment market’ is a useful idea at all. 
But then later on the same page concludes: 
If we are going to create a social investment market primarily focused on meeting unmet 
demand from social sector organisations and/or based on broader, fundamentally social 
approach to investing we need to support the most promising models of truly social 
investment and the development [of] new ones. We also need to be clear about what we think 
the social investment market is for beyond sustaining its own existence and that of its most 
significant players.287 
That is, they suggest that a “more fundamental consideration” is needed over whether social 
investment should be thought of as a market, before going on to frame its concluding comments in 
terms of the “social investment market”.  
Now, we can explain these formulations in terms of the difference between the active and passive uses 
of the market described at the beginning of this chapter. It might be that the authors are objecting to 
the active sense of the term, with all the assumptions and brings with it, but are happy to use the terms 
in the more general, passive sense, as a way of referring to the general area of activity. It may be that 
this small qualification would help clarify their argument, and lend additional bite to their critique. 
For our purposes, this discussion helps us to see that even those keen to gain perspective on SI, in 
order to critique it, find themselves trying to work within the framework and step outside it at the 
same time. 
CONCLUSION 
Following this first area of discussion of the logic internal to SI as a programme of government, we can 
begin to see some our main themes emerging. An argument running through the thesis is that this 
programme of government sets out neutral, technical grounds for action. We have now seen that the 
duality present in the idea of the market enables it to appear as a neutral, innocuous matter of fact. 
This epistemological neutrality, if we can call it that, is of course corroborated by the way the market 
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figures in the broader liberal rationality of government. As we know from chapter 2, markets simply 
coordinate the interests of those who have something to gain from transacting with another party. 
There are plenty of settings in which the kind of neutrality we are pointing out would be entirely 
unremarkable. The ‘market’ for apples at a local farmers’ market, for example, where no party suffers 
from starvation or poverty, could quite unproblematically be thought of in terms of the structures of 
demand and supply. The reason it is worth describing at such length in the case of social investment is 
all the reasons we have to think that these designations might not be suitable. Is it plausible to assert 
that the social investment market simply brings together pregiven interests in social finance? Or is it 
more likely that the market creators introduced a set of assumptions around what is in the interests of 
investors and (especially) the social sector? As the interviewee quoted in the epigraph acknowledges 
“this is a very ‘build it and they will come’ approach to the market” – all very well, except for the 
degree of encouragement required for SSOs to turn up. As another market actor commented: “How 
many pilots and pathfinder and boosters and funds and government support and interventions does a 
market need? If you really want it to grow as a market you should just respond to demand...”288  
We are now at a stage where we can point out that introducing the market as a way of framing the 
conversation is itself a political argument, though it presents itself as neutral. The fact-based way of 
reasoning through the existence and relevance of this market effaces its political character, ensuring the 
(value-based) assertion that a market is a good way to deal with things appears as a matter of fact. The 
market as a political object provides a rich legacy. It strikes me that while Smith must have faced some 
difficulties in convincing others about this market system, it now seems entirely natural to talk in 
terms of a market, to switch between active and passive senses of the word, even within a single 
sentence, and to use it both to describe the current reality and how things should be. We switch 
between these different senses without even realising we are doing so. We also allow the facts about the 
market to slide in and out of focus: if we are thinking of the market as real, something that we are 
going to devote time and energy to growing and improving, then we can point to the facts about the 
market as objective sources of information, useful in supporting whatever argument is being made. 
But these same facts can simultaneously be seen as based on models and assumptions, as attached to a 
more metaphorical notion of the market, and certainly not as a direct reflection of reality. They are 
not undermined by being inaccurate, because there are no grounds for expecting them to be entirely 
accurate. That would be to misunderstand the nature of the market.  
We have now spent some time drawing out the assumptions introduced by starting to think in terms 
of a market. In chapter 7 we will return to the question of how well these assumptions fit with certain 
aspects of reality, and how actors in the market reason through these points of strain in the logic. 
Before that, we turn to how the debate over what it means for social investment to be ‘social’ plays out 
within this framework. 
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CHAPTER 4: PROFITS AND TRADEOFFS 
Social investors are sometimes described as being willing to accept "below market returns". 
This is because they are happy to trade-off social returns with financial returns. 
From a report commissioned by Big Society Capital,  
Lighting the Touchpaper: Growing the Market for Social Investment in England (2011) p20  
[There is a] widespread assumption that one can’t support social causes and produce market-
rate returns at the same time, …. In fact, that assumption is false – and a growing body of 
research shows it can be possible for investors who want to achieve market rate returns to also 
create positive social impact with their investments. 
From the report of the Independent Advisory Group to the UK Government,  
Growing a Culture of Social Impact Investing in the UK (2017) p8 
Here we have two sides of the ‘tradeoff debate’. The first of these quotes makes passing reference to 
the tradeoff, the existence of which is energetically denied by some parties, including the Advisory 
Group report to DCMS, source of the second quote. The discussion in chapter 3 focused on the 
market structure, temporarily putting to one side what is distinctive about this market: the pursuit of 
social as well as financial return. With the tradeoff debate, and a range of other related issues, we now 
turn our full attention to the social aspect of SI. We will see that the implications of introducing this 
social element are a source of contention, because different actors reason through this puzzle in 
different ways. 
Returning to the tradeoff example, we can see the authors of the first quote treat this feature of social 
investment as if it were obvious. It is easy to suggest a line of reasoning to back up this assertion: if you 
are prioritising social mission rather than financial gain, then it is reasonable to expect you will not 
generate financial returns on a par with those for whom profit is the main focus. But the Advisory 
Group are not alone in rejecting the assumption that there is a tradeoff. Three Harvard MBA 
students, for example, devote a paper to moving “beyond the tradeoff” in the social impact investing 
industry, based on the observation that “a destructive debate between the proponents and opponents 
of the tradeoff theory has created confusion about what different social fund managers truly 
prioritize”.289 Five years later, another team of academics published research demonstrating that funds 
targeting market-rate returns could also preserve social and environmental impact, lending weight to 
the argument that “there is little inherent tension between profits and ‘purpose.’”290 Importantly, those 
who oppose the tradeoff are not saying it is never the case that more social impact leads to lower 
financial returns, but rather that it is not necessarily the case. Investors in this market can choose to go 
for ‘impact-first’, lower return options, but there are also opportunities to generate market-rate returns 
while also creating social impact. The dispute is over what should be considered the general rule, and 
what should be the exception. And it is a dispute over what counts as social – those who refer to the 
tradeoff suggest there is something about being oriented to social mission that means profits will be 
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lower, while those who oppose it want to use the ‘social’ label more broadly, including activities that 
are profit-making.  
There are other key phrases that have become touchstones in trying to clarify the significance of 
‘social’ – the ‘mission drift’ debate questions whether there is a risk of more commercial capital 
influencing an organisation towards focusing more on financial return and less on social impact, while 
the ‘mismatch of demand and supply’ is often referred to in the course of discussions over who should 
set the terms of investments. In a more general sense, the terms ‘social investment’, ‘impact investing’ 
and ‘social impact investing’ are not only not used inconsistently by different authors, they are used to 
refer to sometimes entirely disparate versions of what this field of practice is all about. Some suggest 
that the label ‘social investment’ be reserved for situations where there is a tradeoff, while ‘impact 
investing’ be used in relation to a broader practice of investing for impact, whether ‘impact first’ or 
‘finance first’.  
In this chapter I am going to focus in on how the ‘social’ status of social investment feeds through into 
reasoning about the motivation of investors. What motivates the investor in the SI market? How 
should social returns be understood? And how do they interact with financial returns? I do not mean 
to phrase this as an empirical question, answered by going out and asking investors what motivates 
them to invest. Rather, I intend to investigate what motivations are assumed on behalf of investors in 
the reasoning through of social investment. 
Up until this point, no sense has been given of the differences of opinion over SI. We have pointed 
out the lack of conceptual clarity and the inconsistent use of terminology, but we have not yet touched 
on the presence of fundamentally quite different views. Bringing these differences to the surface is not 
entirely straightforward. They all operate within the same problematisation, accepting both the 
diagnosis of the problem and the solution. They use the same language and terminology. But, I am 
arguing, they are associated with different background assumptions over what counts as ‘social’. To 
bring these differences to the surface I have developed a schematisation of two constrasting modes of 
reasoning discernable in the literature. The chapter starts by elaborating on these modes of reasoning. 
It then turns to the question of investor motivations. The conversation in the literature often adopts 
the language of (‘social’) risk and return, so an overview is provided of how these concepts are picked 
up and worked through by different actors. The discussion then uses the two modes to draw out 
differences of opinion over what should be expected of social investors.  
TWO MODES OF REASONING 
A central difference between these two modes of reasoning is based on contrasting assumptions about 
the role of self-interest – profit-making, or financial return – in the operation of the social investment 
market. For convenience, we can refer to them as the ‘principled’ mode and the ‘innovative’ mode of 
reasoning.  
The principled mode of reasoning assumes a conceptual distinction between profit-making and 
creating social good. Within social investment, of course, both of these things are being pursued 
simultaneously. On the principled mode of reasoning there is room for both, but the distinction is 
maintained. Importantly, this provides a way to ground ‘social’ status. What makes social investment 
‘really’ social is the prioritisation of social impact over financial return. Following this reasoning, we 
anticipate tension between the pursuit of profit and the pursuit of social purpose. It will often be the 
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case that these things pull in different directions, and if they do, it is essential that social mission is 
prioritised. There are lots of kinds of investment that try to create social impact, and those other kinds 
that place more importance on financial return should be welcomed, but they are not ‘social 
investment’. The distinction is important when, as in the UK social investment market, public and 
philanthropic funds have been allocated to ‘social investment’ specifically. If we are to solve society’s 
most pressing problems, we should be making sure that the organisations set up for that very purpose 
– the social sector – are gaining access to the resources they need. 
On the innovative mode of reasoning, in contrast, social investment is understood in terms of the 
intention to create social impact, combined with  the demonstration (through measurement and data) 
that impact is in fact being created. If this goal is achieved then the degree of profit-making is 
irrelevant. There is no reason why people cannot “do well and do good”. Importantly, this is not a 
claim that it is always possible to create both financial and social return. There are of course situations 
in which investment is not an appropriate financing model. But these are a subset of the wider set of 
socially oriented activities. The assumption is made that such innovations in finance are necessary if 
we are to address social problems. It is only by opening up new sources of capital that we will be able 
to operate on the scale needed. 
A fundamental difference between these modes of reasoning is the attitude to the pursuit of self-
interest. On the principled mode, it is assumed that the pursuit of self-interest is legitimate as long as 
it is secondary to the pursuit of social purpose. It is committed to the principle that profit should be 
subordinate to social mission. A form of compromise is involved. Investors may not realise the 
financial returns they could achieve elsewhere, but they are achieving something else instead. On the 
innovative mode, in contrast, there is an insistence that there is no need to compromise. A basic 
compatibility is assumed between  the pursuit of one’s own interests and the pursuit of social impact. 
This is not a claim that all socially oriented activity is potentially profitable, but that what makes 
activity identifiable as socially oriented has nothing to do with the degree of profit-making. By making 
this assumption, this mode of reasoning opens up the possibility that large, established pools of capital 
can be brought into the social investment market even though they are restricted by commitments to 
minimum return levels. In this way unprecedented volumes of private capital can be brought to bear 
on social problems. 
There is an intuitive connection between these two modes of reasoning about SI and the two problems 
marked out in chapter 1. The principled mode sits well with the problem of the undercapitalisation of 
the social sector, and the emphasis on making new sources of capital accessible to existing SSOs. The 
innovative mode, in contrast, is compatible with the attempt to build new mechanisms for finance, 
providing a route for investors to create both financial and social return with their capital. So why do 
we need these two sets of distinctions? Because the two problems, at the level they are described and 
understood in the source material, are compatible. They are both solvable by the introduction of a 
market for SI. By also identifying the two modes of reasoning, we bring to light basic incompatibilities 
that, as we will see, currently lie beneath the surface of the debate, unidentified but causing problems. 
It will be helpful to clarify the (epistemological) relationship between these models and the social 
investment documents. The models will be used to draw out contrasting assumptions, but this does 
not amount to a claim to have complete knowledge of the assumptions made by the authors. I have no 
insight beyond what is written in these documents, and there is a degree of conjecture involved. 
Indeed, these are not works of philosophy, and the authors usually do not work their assumptions 
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through to their logical conclusions. My aim is to suggest an account of the reasoning being employed, 
in the hope that this account is convincing and useful to others. A possible criticism here is that I am 
simply determining the models in advance, then picking out examples of reports that align with one or 
the other. This would create a neat argument, but not one that reflects the reality of social investment. 
This criticism would be misplaced. As will become clear over the rest of chapters 4 and 5, the 
opposition brought to the surface by contrasting these two modes of reasoning is by no means clearly 
reflected in the literature. They are not a system of classification. Rather, after lengthy engagement 
with the literature, I have arrived at this distinction as a way of conveying the presence of basic 
assumptions about the interaction between private interests and the effort to create social impact – 
assumptions that do not sit easily alongside each other. It is in this sense that this distinction is an 
analytical tool.  
When I use the modes of reasoning as reference points, therefore, they are used to highlight when a 
comment or phrase suggests one or other of the basic sets of assumptions. There are two main ways in 
which this is a useful tool for analysing the literature. First, it is sometimes the case that both sets of 
assumptions are referred to within the same article or report. In such cases the argument is likely to be 
unclear, and the modes of reasoning can be used to pinpoint where this lack of clarity comes from. 
Secondly, and more importantly, the distinction can be brought to bear on the problems that arise 
when different actors, who have developed their own mode of reasoning about social investment, 
attempt to communicate with others, to discuss and debate and reach conclusions. Currently the same 
language and very similar concepts are used to advance arguments that seem to occupy the same 
territory, but it proves almost impossible to reach productive conclusions. I make this statement on 
the basis of all I have read, and also on the basis of my experience in meetings and conferences and 
interviews with people engaged in the practice of social investment. The two modes of reasoning, 
therefore, are intended to provide clarity on where (unarticulated) basic assumptions are actually 
precluding agreement ever being reached. 
(SOCIAL) RISK AND RETURN 
In general, as a basic model, it is assumed that investors make decisions about whether to invest 
according to the risk/return profile of the investment in question. Risk and return are assessed in 
relation to each other. More risky opportunities tend to offer higher expected returns as compensation 
for the risk involved. Low risk options tend to offer lower, but more certain, returns. We are told as 
much by writers in the social investment space. Alex Nicholls and Tomkinson’s chapter in the book 
Social Finance makes this point: 
It is a convention in mainstream finance to link the level of expected (or required) return to a 
calculation of the risk of a given investment opportunity, such that the higher the perceived 
risk of an asset the greater the return on capital.291 
As does a report on impact investing from an investment bank: 
In traditional finance, modern portfolio theory (MPT) evolved as an important portfolio 
management tool because it allowed investment managers to distill a multi-dimensional set of 
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information into a graphical representation using just two parameters: risk and return (and 
the correlation between them).292 
Of course, theories of investor behaviour are immensely more complex than this simple set of 
assumptions, but it is a conceptual touchstone that plays a central role. The Lighting the Touchpaper 
report, one of the early scoping papers for social investment, perceives matters in this way: 
The risk-return tradeoff is a fundamental financial concept. It describes the principle that 
expected return must rise with an increase in risk. Low levels of risk (uncertainty) only 
demand low expected returns, whereas high levels of risk (high uncertainty) demand high 
expected returns. In simple terms, investment opportunities ask investors to put their money 
at risk in exchange for the possibility of making a return in the future. This is no different for 
social investments, other than the fact that the returns can be both financial and social. 293 
This last statement, in perhaps overly modest terms, brings us to our real area of interest in talking 
about risk and return. How has this basic model been modified to cope with the addition of social 
returns? We will make a brief tour of the different approaches to this challenge.  
Overall, the focus has mostly been on how to understand the positive social gain achieved through a 
social investment, whether it is called ‘social impact’ (or just ‘impact’), ‘social value’, ‘social return’, or 
something else. These are all attempts to solve the same problem: expanding the idea of what is 
achieved by social investment to include more than just financial value, and expanding it in way that is 
not a vague gesture but using a robust analytical framework that can intersect with investment 
decision making. Indeed, in many ways social impact measurement, discussed at length in chapter 6, is 
a response to this problem. There have also been attempts to expand the notion of risk, in a similarly 
robust and analytical way, though these are fewer in number and generally sparser in detail.  
The earliest iteration of this idea that I have found is a 2003 paper in the California Management 
Review, which puts forward the ‘blended value proposition’: 
What is required is a unifying framework that expands the definition of investment and 
return beyond the historic one of finance and toward a new definition capable of holding a 
broader understanding of value than that most frequently reflected in traditionally endorsed 
financial operating ratios. In truth, the core nature of investment and return is not a trade off 
between social and financial interest but rather the pursuit of an embedded value proposition 
composed of both.294 
This articulation of the problem predates social investment by a number of years, but it is present 
enough in the social investment literature to be worth mentioning. The concept of ‘value’ is often used 
as a vehicle for this expanded notion of non-financial benefit. ‘Blended value’ asserts that it is possible 
to build investment decision making on a broader, “more fundamental” conception of value. It is a 
vision that relies on the measurability of this broader version of value: “we must build better social 
management information and tracking systems, while evolving a new set of metrics upon which to 
assess our progress”, the author, Jed Emerson, states. He places himself in contrast to prevailing norms 
in the social sector: 
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For many of those active in the social sector, it has been taken as a virtual given that most 
elements of social value stand beyond measurement and quantification. … Such logic is 
unpersuasive. There are numerous ways to “triangulate” around a given element in order to 
understand its worth from a variety of perspectives—numeric and otherwise.295 
This numeric, quantitative approach is so important because it means investors can start making 
decisions based on a comprehensive understanding of the returns being created, rather than a narrow 
understanding of financial value only. Emerson suggests that a notion of “blended return on 
investment” is what is required to direct investment capital: 
it is clear that coming years will witness an increasing number of funds and investment pools 
created with the direct intent of providing capital to investees on the basis of both social and 
financial performance. These investments will be assessed on the basis of a Blended ROI.296 
He makes no mention here of how financial return might be affected in this change of circumstances, 
possibly because blended value is intended to displace the notion that financial and social value should 
be conceptualised separately. 
This work on blended value fed directly into one of the most prominent types of social impact 
measurement – the social return on investment (SROI) principles. SROI is promoted in the main by 
Social Value UK, an organisation that places a broader concept of value at the heart of its message and 
position. A detailed working through of the SROI method is publicly available, providing a way to 
calculate ‘social return’ by identifying, measuring and processing outcomes into a format that is 
intended to help inform organisations (who might be investors) of the value created by certain 
activities.297 SROI is referred to again in chapter 6. In these two examples, the terms ‘social value’ and 
‘social return’ are used interchangeably. Slightly confusingly, SROI is applicable in a broader context 
than social investment, and the term ‘investment’ in the title refers to a more general concept of time 
and resources being invested in creating social outcomes. 
Another response to the problem of understanding what non-financial return is created is a 2012 
report from an advisory firm, Cambridge Associates. The report puts forward a “framework for 
investor decision making”. It suggests a concept of ‘combined return’, and also acknowledges the risk 
side of the equation with the parallel concept of ‘combined risk’: 
In our recommended approach, evaluating social investments is an extension of the familiar 
risk/return analysis applied to all investment assets. In this case, however, ‘risk’ is expanded to 
‘combined risk’, which incorporates both financial risk and social risk, while ‘return’ is 
broadened to ‘combined return’, which incorporates both financial return and social impact.298 
The authors visualise this as follows: 
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From Laing et al., The UK Social Investment Market: The Current Landscape and a Framework for 
Investor Decision Making (2012) p15 
This version of investor decision making sees social return as additive to financial return, suggesting 
that the two types can be placed on the same continuum. Investors who are focused on maximising 
impact therefore make an assessment of a higher return profile than the return perceived by an 
investor considering only financial returns. ‘Social risk’ in this context is understood narrowly as “the 
risk that an institution’s investments might alienate key stakeholders and/or compromise the values of 
the organisation.”299 This is not easy to quantify, the authors acknowledge, but it will be sufficient to 
increase the ‘combined risk’ measure “so that it is meaningfully higher than the financial risk measure. 
This will make it clear that a strategy with exposure to social risk is less attractive from a risk/return 
standpoint than a similar approach that is not exposed to the social risk.”300 This is represented by the 
move to the right of the green triangle in the diagram above. But, of course, an increase in expected 
social return might balance out the increase in social risk. 
A different account comes from investment bank J.P. Morgan, which published research presenting “a 
tool to analyze impact investments across the three dimensions that determine the performance of 
these assets: impact, return and risk.”301 The author describes and visualises the model as follows: 
To illustrate how different investors might map their portfolio targets, we present the graph of 
our own J.P. Morgan Social Finance target portfolio – the shaded grey area in Figure 2 – 
alongside the profile that might be targeted by an investor with a higher risk appetite and a 
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lower return threshold, and the graph that might represent the target for an investor pursuing 
only non-negative impact with a low risk appetite.302 
From J.P. Morgan A Portfolio Approach to Impact Investing (2012) p5 
The ‘impact’ axis represents the results of an ‘impact assessment’: “a due diligence exercise to come to 
a view on the intent and the impact of the proposed investment opportunity.” Scores are allocated to 
questions regarding the fund manager’s “intent”, and how the impact will be delivered. A weighted 
average is calculated that gives an overall score between one and five for the investment.303 Impact also 
appears in the ‘return’ dimension of the portfolio: “We assess the performance of the portfolio on a 
blended basis – the aggregate financial return and social impact of our invested capital are considered 
in determining success.” That is, if the “impact objectives” of the opportunity are “compelling”, they 
will accept an expected return that is lower than they would otherwise require. I find this 
representation of financial return and social impact as ‘aggregated’ to be somewhat at odds with the 
diagrammatic representation along three axes. Furthermore, the document suggests that the authors 
see no need to modify conventional understandings of risk; they simply explain that they “maintain 
flexibility with respect to all of the parameters that determine risk,” but “also try to find a balance 
across risk factors to reduce the net risk profile of any investment.”304  
Another report, this time from Bridges Ventures, focuses exclusively on the riskiness of impact 
investments, suggesting a way to “shift the lens”. The authors propose a way to “adjust the risk side of 
the equation – to ‘de-risk’ impact investment.”305 The impetus behind this effort comes from the 
observation that: 
a significant portion of asset owners, representing the lion’s share of potential capital available, 
simply cannot participate in the market today because of a variety of risk factors, or perceived
 risk factors, whether on a commercial or impact-first basis. To broaden the market, we 
therefore need to grow the range of lower risk opportunities available for investors. This 
report takes a practical look at how this might be done.306 
The authors highlight that risk is subjective, “since it is always relative to an investor’s particular 
expectations.” As a result, the “risk side of the equation” has to take into account the perspective of the 
investor in question, though they have identified some common concerns across investor groups.307 
They identify a number of risk factors that are thought to be enhanced by the use of an ‘impact lens’ - 
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“Capital risk”, “Exit risk” and others. The risk factor of interest to us is “impact risk”, which is 
conceived as follows: 
As with financial analysis, understanding the impact risk of an investment is as important as 
understanding its potential for impact return. Impact risks can take various forms. For 
example, there may be a lack of evidence that an intervention will lead to the desired 
outcome. Even if the intervention is successful, the investment could cause displacement, 
leading to reduced or no net benefit.308 
In other words, impact risk captures the uncertainty around whether impact will be created, and 
whether positive impact might be outweighed by negative impact. The report outlines a number of 
“de-risking features” that might be employed. The de-risking feature thought to counteract impact 
risk is “impact evidence”. That is, robust evidence of impact is conceived of as reducing impact risk: 
Impact evidence is most robust when the product’s method of intervention is well-understood 
and is supported by a randomised control trial (or other scientific study) that demonstrates 
the causal link between the investment’s outputs and the asset owner’s target social 
outcomes.309 
Impact measurement is important once more. Just as the article on blended finance suggested that 
investors would assess expected return using accounting for both social and financial return, so these 
authors suggest that authors will use information about social return to inform their risk assessment.  
There are two further examples to mention. The Good Investor, another guide for measuring impact, 
also maps out a notion of ‘impact risk’ – the certainty with which an organisation will deliver on its 
social impact. The assessment of this risk is grounded in an assessment of the organisation’s ‘impact 
plan’, pursuing questions such as how well integrated the pursuit of impact is into the operation of the 
organisation, and the level of existing evidence regarding the efficacy of this kind of intervention.310 
Puttick and Ludlow’s paper setting out a framework for standards of evidence in impact investing also 
uses the same concept of ‘impact risk’, but calibrates this risk to a series of standards of evidence, such 
that impact risk is reduced by higher standards of evidence.311 
So far, we can see that the extension of risk and return into social investment can take a number of 
different directions. The risks associated with social investment can be categorised as simply another 
type of risk within the already extensive catalogue of risks faced by investors. Only some of the 
versions above view ‘social risk’ (or ‘impact risk’) in relation to the likelihood of the social return (or 
impact) being achieved. We also get some glimpse into the complexity of implementing concepts of 
risk and return. The J.P. Morgan paper posits its three axes of risk, return and impact for 
consideration at the stage where a portfolio is being assembled, in which case the score on the impact 
axis is determined by a due diligence process, which focuses on the fund manager’s intent, and the 
organisation’s plans for delivering impact – not data on whether impact has been achieved. But then 
‘impact return’ does appear, as a component of ‘return’. The ‘standards of evidence’ approach suggests 
that the quality of information about social return helps to determine the level of risk involved in 
making an investment.  
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Sitting in contrast to these examples are two scholarly articles on the topic. First is Lehner and 
Brandstetter’s treatment of portfolio theory: 
[E]specially institutional investors commonly use a two-dimensional framework of risk and 
return to select investment opportunities and arrange portfolios. Since impact investors’ focus 
is to generate an additional social impact alongside a financial return, applying the traditional 
lens evokes the following questions:  
(a) How does financial risk change when adding a second return perspective?  
(b) What kind of risks influence the social returns? 312 
This article reviews the same materials as we have used above, perceiving “several conceptual 
overlappings” across these formulations, and concludes: 
the overall perception of practitioners is that impact investments face a multifaceted set of 
interdependent risks and further research is desperately needed to define risk factors and 
empirically analyze interdependencies between those risks and their effects on financial and 
social return.313 
Existing attempts fail to “describe how the [impact] parameters are concretely evaluated, measured or 
systematically embedded into a portfolio allocation framework”, and so Lehner and Brandstetter 
present a “verifiable mathematical theory” that “incorporates social investments’ specific parameters 
alongside financial values into the traditional logic of portfolio optimization”.314 That is, they take 
elements of existing frameworks and formalise them into the existing mathematical language of 
portfolio theory.  
Second, Nicholls and Tomkinson go a step further in mapping out two additional dimensions of 
social risk and return, that sit in parallel to financial risk and return: 
it is timely to reframe debates concerning risk and return in a more holistic context that  takes 
account not only of the limitations of existing risk calculation approaches in capital allocation 
but also acknowledges the distinctiveness of social risk and return. This social risk represents a 
calculation of the likelihood that an intended social return will be realized in a given 
investment context.315 
They suggest that the preferences that lie behind investor behaviour in social finance markets “appear 
to operate beyond conventional market logics”. That is: 
Social investors have often shown a willingness to accept a financial return below a 
comparable risk adjusted return expected in mainstream markets. Assuming that this 
behaviour is not completely irrational, this demonstrates that investors in social finance expect 
a compensatory value in social returns.316 
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Social risk, they argue, has to be conceptually distinct from financial risk. The argument proceeds by 
taking an account of different kinds of risk from conventional risk and return theory, and reframing it 
in terms of ‘social risk’. The argument is too detailed to recount here, but this passage gives an idea of 
the approach: 
The probability risk of a social investment is the likelihood that its social impact will be 
achieved. The social probability risk is determined by two factors: the reliability and 
extensiveness of the evidence base of historical data; differentiated populations potentially 
sharing similar outcomes. Figure 10.4 illustrates the perfect world of historical data on 
programme performance: here the data are assumed to be normally distributed along a single 
linear scale. The likelihood of the programme’s social return exceeding a certain amount 
(called here ‘k’) is calculated as the proportion of previous similar programmes that also 
exceeded this level of social return (in this case, 73 per cent).317 
From Nicholls and Tomkinson, Risk and Return in Social Finance (2015) p294 
This is one of several kinds of risk the authors identify as subcategories of social risk, which together 
open up even more dimensions to the problem of how to conceptualise social risk and return. They 
also tackle the matter of how the correlation of social return with the different varieties of social risk 
can be modelled.  
By placing all of these versions next to each other, we can better see the variation in approach. 
Nicholls and Tomkinson’s insistence that there should be four dimensions – risk and return, and 
social risk and social return – appears to contradict the J.P. Morgan model of three factors of risk, 
return, and impact. But the J.P. Morgan model is not obviously flawed, and has been developed for 
use by a bank in managing their clients’ portfolios. Similarly, if we think about non-financial return, 
we can see that sometimes it is thought of as equivalent to financial return, and so called ‘social 
return’, but sometimes it is seen as something that is intentionally created by an investment, in which 
case it is usually called ‘social impact’. The former suggests that the return in some sense accrues to the 
investor, which does not sit particularly well with the idea that it is an identified group of beneficiaries 
that are experiencing these outcomes. The latter avoids this connotation, but has a less obvious 
position within a risk/return model. ‘Social value’ has more of an alignment with ‘social return’, in 
that it suggests a parallel with financial value, but it also is associated with ‘blended value’, which 
suggests that these two types of value cannot or should not be seen as separate.  
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These observations are not intended as criticisms, but are an attempt to highlight the instability of any 
attempt to extend the conventional risk and return model to integrate the social aspect of social 
investment. We might anticipate a couple of objections to this assertion. It might be objected that 
they are overly general – that there are countless different kinds of investors, facing different kinds of 
investment decisions, and that they have to be taken on a case-by-case basis. It might also be objected 
that this is still a relatively new area of practice, and that more time is needed for these different 
approaches to consolidate. I would like to suggest two arguments for why the assertion of instability 
stands. 
Earlier in this section we emphasised the interrelatedness of risk and return in investor decision 
making. It is captured in the notion of “risk-adjusted return” referred to by Nicholls and Tomkinson, 
and emphasised when we note that the riskiness of an investment is calculated by analysing the 
historical returns data for that investment type.318 It is not clear that we can posit such a relationship 
between social risk and return. One of the reasons these concepts are so unstable is because it is 
unclear if and how we should think of either the risk or return accruing to the investor. ‘Social returns’ 
are the outcomes experienced by the beneficiaries, not by the investor. One possible understanding of 
‘social risk’ is the risk that the intended outcomes are not achieved, or even that things are worse than 
they otherwise would have been. The downside of the risk is borne by the beneficiaries as much as, if 
not more than, the investor. It is simply not clear how social risk and return can be logically 
interrelated either with each other or with financial risk and return in a manner comparable to the 
conventional risk-return model.  
This argument can be extended into epistemological territory. That is, financial returns data provides 
important empirical anchorage against which to assess the accuracy of previous risk calculations, and 
to ground such calculations going ahead. In extending risk/return to social investment, I contend, 
‘social return’ data cannot be called upon in the same way as financial return data. Unlike financial 
returns, social returns exist separately from the numbers used to capture them, and (as chapter 6 
demonstrates) there are lots of variations in the techniques used to translate social return into numbers 
in a spreadsheet. Whether social return is created or not is a separate issue to whether the data captures 
these changes, or how well the data captures them.  
This process of translation is not required for the reporting of financial returns, because financial 
returns are inherent in the numerical reporting that represents them. Of course, there are all sorts of 
questions around the accuracy of this reporting and the meaning they communicate, but it remains 
the case that there is no concept of ‘financial return’ that exists independently of the numbers used to 
represent it. I would suggest that this additional level of translation means social returns data cannot 
provide the point of empirical anchorage that financial returns data can. It is not just that the systems 
for measuring social returns are not yet adequate for generating data that can inform risk assessment, 
but that there are conceptual issues with the notion that social returns data could ever provide 
anchorage of a kind parallel to financial return. This argument is only strengthened by the variety of 
approaches already marked out to conceptualising this non-financial return.  
There are reasons, therefore, to be sceptical that social risk and return will eventually consolidate into a 
model capable of playing a parallel function to financial risk and return. But the main point here is to 
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familiarise ourselves with the reasoning that lies behind appeals to the concept of risk and return. This 
done, we turn now to the question of investor motivations. 
INVESTOR MOTIVATIONS 
The investor viewpoint is critically important to the successful functioning of the market. Investors, 
whether individuals or institutions, make up the supply of capital. Basic market theory asserts that 
investors choose to make their capital available because it is in their interests to do so. The potential 
for gain motivates them to transact. This means that the idea of a financial market carries assumptions 
about the behaviour and motivations of those who take part in it. Certain things have to be in place 
for it to work. Not only do there have to be investors motivated by potential financial reward, those 
investors have to be confident that the reward will materialise. This is not like a market for apples, 
where the quality of the apples can be verified before purchase. Investments are inherently risky, and 
may not turn out as planned, even with the best efforts of those involved. Confidence is rooted in 
having a good understanding of the market, and the risks involved.  
For social investment advocates, therefore, it is very important to provide as many reasons as possible 
for new investors to be confident in the future of this new market. It is also important to provide as 
much clarity as possible. Investors will only transact if they are confident that the risk is worth taking, 
in comparison to all the other things they could do with their capital. This is, presumably, a challenge 
faced by any attempt to build a new kind of financial market. The social investment market brings 
with it an additional challenge: what does the ‘social’ aspect mean for investors? If investor 
expectations and confidence are so important, then this is itself a very important question. This wider 
problem of convincing investors to risk their capital contains within it the problem of convincing 
them that they understand and are comfortable with what it means to be a ‘social’ investor. This is 
why the tradeoff is so contentious, because those who insist that there is a tradeoff, and that there is 
something different and special about social investments, are effectively telling potential investors that 
they have to be willing to take a hit on their financial returns, and this hit is justified because the 
investment is creating social good. Those who attack the tradeoff do so because they want to avoid 
cutting down the potential pool of investors. They want almost any kind of investor to take part, and 
to avoid creating any kinds of conditions that have to be met to ‘count’ as an investor in this market. 
Though we will not engage in detailed discussion of different investor types, one important 
differentiation must be made. Some investors, mainly individuals, are investing their own capital and 
are free to make whatever decisions they like. Other investors, usually managing capital on behalf of 
an institution, are bound by fiduciary duty, and have to observe certain restrictions and regulations. 
Often they have to meet certain return targets, and are not at liberty to put the capital at more risk 
than is necessary.  
As we have established, there are differences of opinion over how investor returns should be 
understood in social investment. The approach now will be to analyse these differences in terms of the 
two modes of reasoning described above. Two groups of reports will be used. The first group exhibits 
the principled mode of reasoning. The first example is a report published in 2016 by the Institute for 
Voluntary Action Research (IVAR), which “seeks to shine a light on the as yet underserved part of 
what ought to be a more varied social investment market place.”319 IVAR presents its own take on 
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social investment, asserting: “The aim of all social investments should be to leave an organisation in a 
stronger position not only financially but also in relation to its ability to pursue its mission.”320 Based 
on the interviews they did with a number of organisations that had taken on (or considered) social 
investment, the authors describe situations in which “some social investment purposes were not well 
thought through and led the charities into difficulties.” Their recommendation is that both sides take 
measures to avoid this happening again. For investors, this means “a willingness to engage with 
inexperienced charities to help them survive”, and for investors to both understand and share the 
charity’s commitment to mission and values. They also recommend that financial products be better 
tailored to what charities need.321 Charities are deserving of investment that is tailored to their needs; 
investors are called on to be sensitive to these needs. 
The next example is a 2011 report produced by a social investment fund which seeks to draw lessons 
from microfinance, as a similar market that has been around for longer than social investment.322 This 
report is striking in the language it uses to describe the market. “While it is heartening to see more 
mainstream pools of capital seeking to engage in impact investing,” the foreword states, “there are also 
good reasons to be worried about how much of this capital will actually produce positive social 
change.” The introduction suggests social investment is at “a critical juncture”, and that it “remains 
fragile.”323 What are the authors concerned might happen? The phrase “actually produce positive social 
change” is suggestive – the alternative, we can infer, is that capital supposedly devoted to impact 
investing produces not social change but financial return for the investors. Their concerns are brought 
more to the surface in the section discussing the “mission drift debate”. Several years into the 
development of the microfinance market it became partly “commercialised”: microfinance institutes 
(MFIs) would operate as commercial entities so that they could access more varied and bigger sources 
of capital.324 ‘Mission drift’ is the phrase used to describe the drift away from a focus on impact and 
towards a focus on profit: 
The argument is that a focus on generating financial profit and positioning MFIs to access 
commercial funding have weakened the industry’s preference for servicing ‘hard to reach’ 
(marginalised) clients, and that such mission drift has weakened the social impact of the 
industry. 325 
And mission drift is a way of referring to undue focus on profit. Referring to the man who created 
microfinance, the authors write: 
Yunus says he is not against making a profit. But he denounces firms that seek windfalls and 
pervert the original intent of microfinance: helping the poor. From Yunus’s perspective, it is 
essential that the industry move away from seeking maximum profits and get back to focusing 
on the poor. “If not, you are not helping poor people’s lives,” he says. “You are not patient. 
You are not restrained. You don’t have empathy for the people. You are just using them to 
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make money. That’s what blinds you when you are in the profit-making world. We need to 
see the people, not profit.” 326 
On the other side of the mission drift debate are those arguing that access to mainstream capital 
markets is the obvious and best option for scaling up microfinance. Profitable microfinance can be 
managed sustainably and responsibly. How is this relevant to social investment? The lesson for social 
investment finance intermediaries (SIFIs) is that ‘cherry picking’ of the most profitable clients can be 
avoided as long as intermediaries have “an explicit goal to appropriately balance its service offering”.327 
The authors are warning against social investment becoming a space in which financial returns take 
priority over social mission – implicit in these warnings is an assumption that investors should be 
motivated by social mission to a sufficient extent that they avoid prioritising their own financial gain. 
An article published in 2017 indicates that their concerns were legitimate. Bolis and West are two 
people unhappy with the tone of debate around impact investing. Under the title “Marginalised 
Returns”, they argue: 
Impact investing appears to have been seduced by a convenient narrative. According to the 
prevailing view, the achievement of both social impact and market-rate financial returns is the 
norm—not the exception. Those who question the financial returns aspect of this assumption 
are portrayed as lacking business savvy. … Impact investing was originally created to improve 
the lives of others; that impact investing could also deliver financial returns to investors was a 
means to that end. But nowadays, achieving predefined financial returns has become the 
primary goal, with the needs of investors taking priority over the interests of the communities 
their funding seeks to benefit.328 
Now, the focus of these authors is not on the social investment market in the UK so much as social 
enterprises operating in emerging economies. But it is relevant because the stance they take is 
applicable to the social investment market, and indeed appears to implicitly draw on the way social 
investment has been presented in making assertions about impact investing.  Bolis and West argue 
that “the most impactful” social enterprises are “likely to generate only low-single-digit financial 
returns”, because that is what happens when you prioritise creating impact. By nature, these 
organisations face: 
the challenge of testing, adapting, and refining business models appropriate to marginalized 
communities—who typically have previously either lacked access to the new product or 
service, or had it provided for free. Furthermore, such enterprises make business decisions—
on prices, wages, and hiring—in a way that maximizes long-term social benefit against short-
term financial gain.329 
They argue that the prevailing accounts of impact investing ignore the fact that many examples of 
successes have benefitted from years of subsidy before investors were able to make profits. Looking 
ahead, they highlight that impact investing has “changed finance by establishing social benefit as a 
goal,” but “the problem is that too many impact investors have predefined expectations of financial 
return that are both too high and too short term.” What can be done? Greater transparency in 
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reporting social return, and more independent research, in order to establish more realistic 
expectations. “Most promising enterprises do not meet the risk-return criteria of today’s impact 
investors,” they comment, “which gets reported as ‘lack of pipeline.’” But most of all, impact investing 
needs to return to the guiding principle of achieving impact, and so a voluntary code of conduct 
should be developed to enshrine principles such as the prioritisation of impact and appreciation of the 
challenges faced by social enterprises.330 Here investor motivations are front and centre, and the plea is 
made for impact investing to be kept in line with its ‘original’ aim – which means investors lowering 
their return expectations. 
One other report is helpful in this context, as it advances an argument that a different kind of finance, 
“builder capital”, is needed by the social sector, and is not currently provided by the social finance 
market. This kind of finance would support social enterprises “through a period in which they can 
develop products and services that meet social need in a financially viable way”; only then are they 
“able to deliver both social and financial returns and take on the kind of funding that is currently 
provided by the social finance market.” 331 Authors Heap and Davison describe the gap in terms of risk 
and returns: 
We ask are there any investors out there who are prepared to accept only social returns for an 
initial period with a high risk of capital loss, plus the prospect of sustained positive social and 
financial returns in the medium and long-term once the organisation achieves financial 
sustainability? The absence of genuine risk capital prepared to accept a period of social returns 
only is the key gap in the social finance market that exists today. 332 
Heap and Davison appeal directly to investors to accept very high risk for no financial return in the 
short term – though social return will be created – with the possibility of financial returns once the 
organisation reaches a stable position. This would be an investor who is almost entirely socially 
motivated. Such investors will be needed in order for all parts of the “market for social need” to be 
addressed, with particular urgency created by the way BSC has been set up: 
BSC’s “need to balance the overall levels of financial risk it takes in pursuit of social impact 
with the need to generate sufficient financial returns to remain operationally viable” means 
that there will be substantial parts of the social sector that will not be able to access any of the 
capital provided from this source.333 
Similar to the IVAR report, Davison and Heap’s position assumes that the social sector is deserving of 
finance, and calls on investors to make finance available on terms that the sector can afford. 
This is the first group of reports. Where IVAR, CAF, Bolis and West and Davison and Heap issue 
warnings and reassert the importance of impact, the next group of reports adopt a ‘big tent’ mentality, 
as it is sometimes called, emphasising breadth, variety, and opportunity.  
The first of these we have already referred to. The Shifting the Lens report referred to above notes that: 
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The debate about a supply-demand mismatch in impact investing has often centred on its 
characterisation as a relatively high risk strategy and therefore on whether sufficiently high 
risk-adjusted financial returns are achievable.334 
“Supply-demand mismatch”, therefore, is a way of referring to the problem of investor requirements – 
in terms of risk and return – not being matched by the kinds of investment opportunities in the 
market. Their focus is on presenting a different perspective on the riskiness of social investment 
opportunities. They provide recommendations “with the hope that [they] will translate into greater 
matching of capital and product – and ultimately into more capital flowing in service of society.”335 
The emphasis is not on what investees need, but on how investments can be made more palatable 
from the investor perspective.  
In 2011 ClearlySo, a SIFI, produced research on the same question of “investor perspectives” on social 
investment. This report is concerned with attracting sufficient volumes of capital to the market: 
“Without adequate investment,” they write, “there is a risk that the high expectations of the social 
enterprise sector to help meet society’s needs will not materialise.”336 They asked what would be 
needed for institutional investors to engage in social investment: 
Our research found that in general, investors are likely to engage if social investment can offer:  
- An expectation of market or close to market returns  
- Some guarantee or mitigation of risk while approaching market level returns; protection of 
the downside is more important than potentially high upside  
- Liquidity if possible, which helps reduce perceived risk 
- Robust measurement of the social returns generated by the investment  
- Larger-sized investment opportunities e.g. through pooled funds  
- Products and managers with a track record in which City institutions can develop 
confidence337 
Of course, precise requirements vary from one investor to the next. But the investment products 
available in the market were targeted not at institutional investors but at “philanthropic and individual 
investor[s]” who are “prepared to accept sub-market financial returns blended with social returns.” 
Institutional investors have duties and responsibilities to the capital owners, so the social investment 
has to find a way to accommodate them. ClearlySo’s recommendation is for future “product design” 
to take into account these needs, and for intermediaries to play a role in advising institutions on the 
opportunities that are available, and “to mentor and support immature social enterprises until they are 
ready for the more conventional markets in which City institutions are generally active”.338 The onus, 
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then, is not on the investors to meet the needs of the social sector, but on the social investment market 
to meet the needs of investors. “Immature” social enterprises must be mentored and supported until 
they are “ready” to take on investment. 
The Asset Allocation Working Group of the SIIT is oriented to a similar problem: 
To solve problems on a global scale, we need global capital pools to respond. This means that, 
alongside the pioneering investors already allocating for impact, we need impact investment to 
find its formal place within institutional portfolios.339 
The report is devoted to setting out the investment opportunities available to institutional investors, 
and to demonstrating that they can be made to fit with their existing fiduciary responsibilities. This is 
a group of investors who are not flexible in their requirements, but who sit on enormous amounts of 
capital. Impact investing, the report argues, represents a very attractive proposition to these investors. 
It provides additional, new options for investment, and is the “strategy of choice for those seeking to 
align their wealth with their specific social and/or environmental objectives.”340 More significantly, 
from our perspective, they also argue there may be “purely financial reasons to allocate to impact 
investment”, due to “potential diversification benefits”. That is, the returns achieved on impact 
investments are uncorrelated with many of the other types of investment that investors might have in 
their portfolios, meaning they react to different factors. So when other investments go down in value, 
it is more likely that impact investment will be unaffected. This is helpful in balancing risk.341 Far 
from suggesting investors have a duty to support the social sector, this report presents investors with 
purely financial reasons to invest in the social investment market. 
How can the presence of purely financially motivated investors be integrated into a market that is 
supposedly about the intention to create impact? The authors represent the supply-side of the market 
as a ‘spectrum of capital’, differentiating three types of impact investing: one where market-rate 
returns are expected, one where it is not clear whether such returns can be expected, and one where 
“addressing a social issue requires some financial trade-off.”342 They use the following diagram to 
represent the spectrum: 
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From Asset Allocation Working Group, Allocating for Impact (2014) p7 
The three types of impact investing are placed in an even wider spectrum. 
On the demand-side, any “impact-driven” organisation can be a recipient, “provided it can deliver 
social impact and a financial return.” These organisations are connected to investors through 
increasingly diverse investment products. These authors emphasise that there is a place for every 
configuration of risk and return:  
The resulting picture shows the powerful role that private capital can play in financing a wide 
range of impact-driven organisations to address social problems. It also highlights that the 
organisational form of the underlying investees need not dictate an investment’s ability to 
deliver either higher impact or competitive financial returns: for example, there are non-
trading charities who will access capital through financially-attractive SIB or DIB investments; 
there are Profit with Purpose businesses whose mission will prove so central to their 
commercial success that they generate competitive returns; and there are a whole range of 
impact-driven organisations that will generate competitive investment opportunities through 
use of tax credits, guarantees or first loss positions.343 
The point is driven home in a section titled “varying motivations”. Each investment is made up of a 
number of players along the “impact investing value chain”, and the intention to create impact does 
not have to be shared by every player. The investor may only seek financial returns, but the investee 
creates impact; an enterprise may not have stated intended impact, but its location in an underserved 
community qualifies it for investment from an impact-motivated investor. Or it may be that neither 
the investee nor the investor is impact-motivated: 
There are also situations where the impact intention (and measurement) is catalysed not by an 
investor or investee but by the surrounding policy environment, which attracts capital and 
enterprises to deliver societal outcomes that governments can measure. Tax incentives to 
attract investors and enterprises to renewable energy projects are one such example 344 
An investor reading this report is encouraged to think that impact investing is broad enough to 
accommodate any kind of investor preferences, including those who are motivated only by maximising 
financial return.  
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The final example is a report from the UK Cabinet Office on “co-mingling social investment funds”, 
which combine different types of capital in a single fund. There are three types of co-mingling funds: 
on the first, all investors take the same risk with the expectation of equal returns; on the second 
investors taking on different levels of risk according to their motivation, and those that take more risk 
take higher returns; on the third “Foundations and other impact-focused investors take a subordinate 
position in the fund which means that they accept a higher level of risk for a smaller proportion of any 
financial returns.” Why would any investor, even an impact-focused one, take high risk and low 
return? The authors explain: “They do this to attract commercially-focused capital that otherwise 
would not be invested, and so create a fund to tackle an issue at a scale that could otherwise not be 
achieved.”345  Indeed, once more the vision is one in which the impact investing market can be 
expanded by tapping into new sources of capital. Co-mingling funds are exciting because they change 
the risk-return profile that can be offered to potential investors who are not interested in below market 
rate returns, due to the presence of a different capital source (i.e. a philanthropic foundation) willing 
to put their capital at risk. The justification is the scale of impact that can be achieved: “In many cases, 
co-mingling funds enable foundations to achieve impact at a scale that cannot be achieved with their 
philanthropic capital alone.”346 Once more different kinds of investor can find a home here, as those 
who are unwilling or unable to accept high risk or low financial returns can see expect these elements 
to be appropriately rebalanced by another investor with complementary motivations.  
In this second set of reports, therefore, we encounter very different attitudes towards what should be 
expected of investors. Their needs and motivations are treated as predetermined, and the emphasis is 
on reasoning through a version of social investment – more likely to be referred to as social impact 
investment in this context – that retains some commitment to social impact while also 
accommodating all kinds of investors, even those uninterested in (or legally prevented from) pursuing 
higher-risk, lower-return opportunities. There is a determined agnosticism towards what investor 
motivations are. Investors in social investment are not necessarily motivated by either financial or social 
return.  
These are two quite different views of what social investment is for. The reports in the first group 
exhibit assumptions consonant with the principled mode of reasoning – they suggest that what makes 
an organisation ‘social’ has a direct bearing on its ability to generate financial returns, with direct 
implications for investors, who need to recognise these differences. Too much of a focus on profit-
making is seen as a threat. In contrast, the reports in the second group are in line with the assumption 
that the level of profit is irrelevant to the identity of social (impact) investing – what matters is the 
creation of impact. To reiterate, this does not amount to an argument that these reports demonstrate 
the accuracy of my distinction, or that they ‘prove’ that the distinction is ‘right’. The two modes of 
reasoning are simply a vehicle for expressing the underlying differences perceptible in these contrasting 
accounts of social investment.  
EXPANSION VS PROTECTION, ENDS VS MEANS 
We can push this argument further. The contrasting assumptions go further than just the matter of 
profit-making. They extend to epistemological assumptions about what kinds of reasoning counts as 
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valid. To recap, we can see that on the one hand, there is a clear thrust to expand the market as much 
as possible, and on the other hand, there is a movement to prevent this expansion, to protect what it 
means to be ‘social’ or ‘mission driven’ from the threat of profit-seekers. The innovative mode of 
reasoning treats the social aspect as grounded not in the limitation of profit but in the explicit 
intention to create impact, and the measurement and reporting of results. As we have seen, this logic 
supports a spectrum of investor motivations – a broad church in which all kinds of investors are 
welcome. The motivation here is to maximise the amount of impact created by maximising the 
amount of capital devoted to the cause. Following the principled mode of reasoning, in contrast, 
prioritising impact means putting impact ahead of financial returns. The market is open to investors 
who are happy to prioritise impact, and impact will be maximised by ensuring it is always the priority.  
This is a difference that can be framed in terms of ends and means. The innovative mode of reasoning 
is ends-focused. The ends justify the means. What is important is the creation of impact; the focus 
should be on creating the conditions that enable impact creation to happen as easily and quickly as 
possible. Think back to the report on co-mingling funds. Some of these funds are structured so that 
‘philanthropic capital’ agrees to high-risk, low-return terms in order to attract commercial capital that 
needs higher returns. Why would they agree to such terms? “To attract commercially-focused capital 
that otherwise would not be invested, and so create a fund to tackle an issue at a scale that could 
otherwise not be achieved.” 347  Co-mingling funds mean “foundations are creating mechanisms 
through which they are able to unlock more of their endowment capital in pursuit of their charitable 
mission”; their involvement “multiplies the impact of their assets by creating opportunities for other 
investors who would not otherwise invest”.348 If the important thing is that as much impact as possible 
is created, then this is a sensible arrangement.  
But if we focus on the means, the question arises: doesn’t this arrangement amount to foundations 
subsidising the returns of commercial investors? Why should a foundation do this, when its resources 
could be channelled directly to an SSO? Isn’t it wrong on principle that charitable funds should end 
up in the pockets of investors? The principled mode of reasoning, as the name suggests, is based on 
principle. It is grounded in the principle that public and private benefit are distinct, and that the 
former should be limited. It follows from here that what makes something ‘really’ social is a matter of 
principle – SSOs must be able to demonstrate limits on profits because of the principle that public 
benefit should take priority over private benefit. The means are important, not just the results. 
In the final section of this chapter, we will explore how the difference between a focus on ends and 
means entails not just framing things differently, but a basic incompatibility of reasoning that leads to 
actors talking past each other. We will return to the Bolis and West argument used above. 
Bolis and West argued that social investment has begun to lose sight of what it was set up to achieve, 
placing more emphasis on the returns available to investors at the cost of being realistic about what 
returns are possible from working with the world’s poorest and most disadvantaged populations. I 
have suggested that their argument lines up with the principled mode of reasoning, which assumes a 
form of social investment that prioritises impact over profit, that wants to see limits on profits as a 
result, and is based on principles rather than results. Based on a detailed reading, this is not quite the 
argument that Bolis and West make. They start their argument with a general statement: “The most 
impactful and successful of social enterprises in emerging economies—even in developed countries—
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are likely to generate only low-single-digit financial returns”. They back this up by pointing to the 
characteristics of social enterprises that make them impactful: working with marginalised 
communities, and making decisions that maximise impact, not profit.349  This appears to be an 
argument from principle. But further down their diagnosis of the problem and potential solution is as 
follows:  
To be sure, impact investing offers a spectrum of financial and social returns. The problem is 
that too many impact investors have predefined expectations of financial return that are both 
too high and too short term. There is therefore a need for greater transparency in reporting 
the social return as well as the actual financial returns (gross and net) achieved by impact 
investors. This, in turn, requires more independent research, starting with an understanding 
of the concrete realities, needs, and challenges of social enterprises.350 
Here they appear to be emphasising the importance of results as a way of determining the social status 
of an investment. By acknowledging the spectrum of returns, they are allowing the possibility that 
investors make high returns, and implicitly incorporate them into their definition of impact investing, 
given that impact can be demonstrated. But their concluding comment returns to a principle-based 
argument: 
impact investing needs to return to its original guiding purpose: to achieve social and 
environmental impact. We call on impact investors to agree to a voluntary code of practice 
that enshrines how the field should evolve—based on the intention to make decisions in ways 
that prioritize impact; to appreciate the challenges at the enterprise level; and to measure, 
verify, and report impact achieved.351 
They do not go as far as saying profits should be capped, but it is strongly implied, I think, by the call 
to “make decisions in ways that prioritise impact”. My suggestion is that they would like to make a 
more forcefully principles-based argument than they are, but that they are anticipating the reaction 
from people in the field. Further insight is possible by looking to the comments section below the 
article. Several respondents agreed with Bolis and West’s argument. Some of them voiced their 
concerns in blunter terms: 
Bolis and West hit the nail on its metaphorical head with this thought piece. I have been in 
the impact investing space now for seven years and am also skeptical of the “no tradeoffs” 
approach. … I suspect this is only going to get worse though as more online lenders begin to 
differentiate by referring to themselves as impact investors—all while pitching investors on 
10x returns. 
Great article.  The cause of this, which is entirely predictable, is that investment service 
providers are keen to label what they have got as “impact investments” but they are unable to 
settle for lower financial returns, as businesses.  They have huge marketing budgets and have 
unfortunately somewhat hijacked the agenda as they push to include what fits their business 
model into the definition of “impact investing”352 
                                                   
349 Bolis and West (2017). 
350 Ibid. 
351 Ibid. 
352 Ibid. In comments.  
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Clearly there are others out there who perceive a threat from the profit motive taking over. But the 
article also provoked strong disagreement. We can identify themes across the counterarguments put 
forward. Several people point to the heterogeneity of the field: 
so far, all we can do is talk in terms of broad brushstrokes regarding impact success, and write 
articles about myths, based upon anecdotal evidence around the nexus between impact success 
and financial returns. This can no longer stand. We can’t continue to talk about all of these 
asset classes, strategies and geographies as if they are going to attract the same type of capital 
and produce the same type of return, investment by investment, and the same type of impact. 
The idea that there is a clear yes/no answer to the question about whether there is a trade-off 
between financial performance and impact performance is, in our view, oversimplified. The 
true answer – as with any complicated question – is “it depends.” It certainly stands to reason 
that pursuing impact can often be good for the bottom line.353 
Arguments that look to the ends to justify the means are also present. This person uses the argument 
that social enterprises will only reach scale if commercial capital is used:  
There is room for grants and low cost capital for businesses that are experimenting on new 
business models to deliver essential goods and services at affordable prices. Commercial capital 
is required to bring to scale to those ideas that work354 
Reference is also made to the scale of the impact investing market overall. That is, some people 
consider the point of impact investing to be the influence it might have on the behaviour of 
mainstream finance: 
In particular, I’d like to flag [another person’s] comment about an “impact continuum”. 
While it may be tempting to establish a minimal floor for impact performance, I suggest that 
there is a rational argument to be made for “better” in all asset classes and investment 
strategies355 
In response, Bolis agrees with those who say that these principles should be applied as widely as 
possible. But she also reiterates the warning about profit dominating purpose: 
Of course – we are trying to push all private sector actors in this direction. This also reflects 
[another commentor’s] view that the end-game is to shift industry practices in a more pro-
poor and pro-environment direction. To move the needle on poverty our goal “must [be to], 
slowly but surely, change the way Wall St. and Fleet St. thinks and acts.” Yes, absolutely. But 
what happens when profit and purpose aren’t in alignment? Who will win out – investors or 
disconnected/unrepresented populations who these investments purport to serve? 356 
She goes on to highlight the problem that relying on reporting of ‘the facts’ about impact is 
inadequate: 
Given levels of disclosure and the extent to which impact is often assumed rather than proven, 
how would you ever know the difference? In traditional finance, there is only one master to 
                                                   
353 Ibid. In comments.  
354 Ibid. In comments.  
355 Ibid. In comments.  
356 Ibid. In comments.  
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serve. In impact investing it’s more complicated. We need to build in oversight mechanisms 
that protect the purpose side from being over-run by profit objectives when times get tough. 
We should enter into this space wide eyed about the power imbalances and information 
asymmatries [sic] at play within the investment value chain357 
So while Bolis eariler had pointed to the importance of more transparent and independent research, 
she also casts doubt on the protection such research might afford from the risk of profit-seeking.  
One further exchange is enlightening, starting with a comment from a couple of academic researchers: 
Could Bolis and West’s characterizations of impact investors’ beliefs, practices, and ultimate 
impact be correct? Yes. But, is there rigorous research to support (or to refute) most of their 
claims? No, not yet. Where Bolis and West see facts – evidence that impact investing has gone 
awry – we see hypotheses to be tested.358 
This is an epistemological argument. It asserts a version of what counts as valid knowledge, and 
implicitly rejects the validity of an argument based on the principle that the prioritisation of impact 
entails deprioritising returns. They go on to reframe several of Bolis and West’s arguments as research 
questions. But what is Bolis’ response? 
[This comment] is critical. Ours is a “viewpoint” piece that is a reflection of our lived 
experience and response to the prevailing literature. If this article spurs more independent 
research into some of the questions we’ve raised, we will consider this effort wildly 
successful. In particular, proliferation of research examining the experience of those seeking 
impact investing … is critical for the success of the field. Because, as stated above, the 
downside risk of a failed social enterprise – or failed social investment, to broaden beyond the 
socent [social enterprise] space – is borne also by the community it was set up to serve.359 
In other words, she accepts the need for more research, and as a result appears to accept the criticism 
that the grounds of her and West’s argument are flawed. To me, this exchange helps to make visible 
some of the epistemological assumptions shaping the conversation around social (impact) investing. 
This exchange suggests that end-focused, evidence-based arguments are dominant over those based on 
principles or values. Principle-based arguments, correspondingly, are difficult to make in this space. 
These are not assumptions that we can fully determine, but we can be aware of them, and the 
influence they have on what arguments are made, or not made.  
This exchange also serves to highlight how these two types of logic do not engage each other directly. 
On the one hand, the ends-focused logic, which seeks to maximise the volume of capital in the 
market, cannot perceive any merit in introducing principles which will only serve to limit the potential 
of the social investment market. The critical issue is that social investment remains committed to 
embedding social mission, and measuring and reporting social impact. From a means-focused 
perspective, on the other hand, this is insufficient. Given the starting point of the principled mode of 
reasoning, the issue is not just the results – the empirical facts about what has happened – but what 
might happen. Profit is limited on principle because of what is likely or possible if the line between 
public and private benefit becomes blurred. It is important that those who would pretend to pursue 
social impact while actually maximising their own gain are prevented from doing so. The aim is to 
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prevent the takeover of social investment by profit-motivated investors; it is decided in advance that 
their involvement on principle cannot be the best way to address social problems. 
CONCLUSION 
Whereas chapter 1 discussed the shared problematisation that defines and grounds social investment as 
a programme of government, and chapter 3 examines the market structure, this chapter has for the 
first time in the thesis begun to open up the debate around what it means to do social investment. The 
approach taken here is not to provide a definitive answer to this question, but to investigate how 
actors in the field reason through their response.  
Social risk and return provides important conceptual architecture in working through a model for 
social investment; since the risk/return model is an absolutely core component of conventional 
investing, it is an obvious starting point for determining what social investment means from the 
investor perspective. The documents used to inform this overview suggest, however, that there is a 
large degree of instability inherent in attempts to extend risk and return to allow for the social aspect. 
It is tempting to look at this instability and predict troubles on the road ahead for social investment – 
how can this field of practice ever consolidate and standardise its theoretical grounding when so very 
many dimensions are opened up by this idea of social return/value/impact?  But I will resist this 
temptation, partly because predictions do not help me to make my argument, and partly because the 
historical epistemology literature teaches us that conceptual issues with systems of knowledge 
production have no direct bearing on their success or failure. Statistics and cost-benefit analysis are 
two examples of knowledge production that from the beginning have faced fiercer critiques than the 
one I offer above, and yet they continue to play a central role in governing public affairs. What 
matters is what functions these systems are called on to perform, and whether there are any 
alternatives.  
The main purpose of providing this account of social risk and return is to equip us for understanding 
the terms of the debate around investor interests. The main bulk of this chapter demonstrates that we 
can dig beneath the question of risk and return to the basic assumptions being made around what 
kinds of returns are appropriate. Disagreements emerge here in a way that does not seem to be the case 
in conceptualising social risk and return. People disagree over what it means to be a social investor, 
and whether the social investment market should be trying to maximise capital flows that intentionally 
create impact, or trying to maximise impact using the tool of investment – a position that assumes that 
‘social’ status has direct implications for the ability to generate profit. Identifying the two modes of 
reasoning brings these differences to the surface. The next chapter continues this analysis by looking to 
the question of what counts as a social sector organisation. 
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CHAPTER 5: BORDER DISPUTES 
 “we are fundamentally stuffed if we think social investment means financing of charities and 
CICs.” 
Investor, quoted in report  
Angels in the architecture: Building the infrastructure of social investment (2013) p19 
Because what we see in the marketplace from the social enterprise perspective is a lot of 
people, a lot of these social enterprises are phenomenally enthusiastic about whatever venture 
is doing good in the society and think because they are doing good in the society, they are 
justified to receive funding … Whereas for lots of other commercial models out there, an 
SME line is quite challenging and they deserve to be funded too. 
Interviewee, BSC interviews (2013) 
Just as the question of investor returns is a source of disagreement, so is the question of what counts as 
a legitimate recipient of social investment. What makes an investee organisation ‘social’? It is through 
these questions that the borders of the SI market are policed. Some think that social investment should 
be for organisations that have their social status regulated in some way, while others think that it is the 
creation of impact that matters, not the legal form chosen by a company. The two modes of reasoning 
introduced in chapter 4 continue to be useful, because the differences fall along very similar lines to 
those identified in the case of investor interests.  
The issue of defining the demand side of the market takes on a more pointed character than the 
equivalent issue on the supply side. While it is hoped that investors can be enticed to invest their 
capital in the SI market, there are several instances where those distributing capital have needed to 
develop formal policies identifying who does and does not count as an SSO. This forces a clear 
articulation of the boundaries of the market. The chapter begins with three such examples, 
demonstrating that the only workable options available to regulators were company forms that ensure 
public benefit is prioritised over private gain; the third example makes the case for a new kind of 
company form that does not rely on the public / private distinction, suggesting a framework for 
regulating ‘profit with purpose’ businesses. It is shown that public / private benefit can be explained in 
terms of interest. Because these examples are specific to the regulatory structures of the UK, this 
element of the analysis is more geographically specific than the overall argument of the thesis. 
The second half of the chapter turns to a series of debates taking place in the sector over this issue of 
who should receive social investment, which are explained in terms of the two modes of reasoning. 
THREE FORMAL EXAMPLES 
We turn now to three examples of efforts to create a formal boundary between what counts as social 
investment and what does not. I am not presenting these definitions of social investment as definitive 
and clear-cut versions that everyone should agree with. Indeed, these are pragmatic responses made 
out of necessity. They are needed for the practices of social investment to continue, and so they are a 
best effort to tackle a thorny problem. And they help us to see what reasoning is used by actors when 
they are forced to make their assumptions explicit. 
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The introduction chapter explained that the thesis overall is focused on the UK, but that the debate 
and reasoning around social investment does not respect national borders, and so numerous reports 
are brought in from elsewhere, mainly the US. More than the thesis as a whole, this chapter is focused 
exclusively on the UK setting because it is tied to legal and regulatory features specific to the UK 
system. 
SOCIAL INVESTMENT TAX RELIEF (SITR) 
A proud feature of the UK social investment market is the tax relief created to encourage more social 
investment to take place by providing investors with a tax incentive. The legislation was passed in 
2014.  
Making a tax relief workable requires defining eligibility criteria. How, then, did the officials who 
wrote the legislation distinguish between investments that do and do not qualify for the tax relief? The 
consultation draft of the SITR legislation informs us that qualifying investments have to be into 
“qualifying social enterprises”. A qualifying social enterprise must take one of three regulated 
identities: a community interest company (CIC), a community benefit society (Bencom) that is not a 
charity, or a charity.360  These three identities are what is meant when reference is made to the 
‘regulated’ social sector. There is some complexity involved in the full range of possibilities this 
presents; the CIC and the Bencom are both legal forms for an organisation, whereas charitable status is 
granted by the Charity Commission and can be attached to a variety of legal forms. Our interest is in 
what restrictions the CIC or Bencom legal form, or charitable status, place on those who want to 
claim them.  
To determine this we have to look beyond the SITR legislation to the documentation of these three 
regulated identities. We discover that there are two principal tools deployed in regulating the activities 
of social enterprises: the ‘public benefit’ test for charities and the ‘community interest’ test for CICs. 
The regulation of the ‘community benefit’ aspect of Bencoms borrows from the charity and CIC 
legislation,361 so Bencoms will not be discussed directly. 
Guidance from the Charity Commission (the body that regulates charities in the UK) provides insight 
into the identity of charities. A charity “is established for charitable purposes only”, where a charitable 
purpose “is for the public benefit”.362 The public benefit test is used to determine whether a charity’s 
purpose is in fact for the public benefit. There are two aspects to the test: the ‘benefit aspect’ and the 
‘public aspect’. The benefit aspect means that a purpose must be beneficial, and any detriment or 
harm must not outweigh the benefit; the public aspect means the purpose should benefit the general 
public or a sufficient section of the public, and not give rise to “more than incidental personal 
benefit”.363 A variety of legal forms are permissible and so the precise nature of these restrictions varies, 
but regulation by the Charity Commission ensures that trading activity and the use of assets is 
restricted so that public benefit remains the priority.  
                                                   
360 HMRC, Social Investment Tax Relief: Consultation Draft (2013). p2  
361https://www.communitysouthwark.org/sites/default/files/images/Registered%20Society%20-
%20Industrial%20and%20Provident%20Society%20-%20Co-
operative%20and%20Community%20Benefit%20Society.pdf Accessed 13th April 2017. 
362 The Charity Commission, Public Benefit : The Public Benefit Requirement (2017). p4 
363 Ibid. p5 
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CICs have a different identity to charities, and are regulated by a different body. Guidance from the 
CIC regulator describes them as follows: 
CICs are limited companies which operate to provide a benefit to the community they serve. 
They are not strictly 'not for profit', and CICs can, and do, deliver returns to investors. 
However, the purpose of CIC is primarily one of community benefit rather than private 
profit.364 
CICs therefore have to meet the “community interest test”, which means they must “satisfy the 
Regulator that a reasonable person might consider that the CIC’s activities are or will be carried on for 
the benefit of the community.”365 In practice there are several components required to “satisfy the 
regulator”. The company must be able to identify the community that they exist to serve. They are 
subject to an ‘asset lock’, meaning assets are retained within the company, or can be transferred to 
another asset-locked body or for the benefit of the community, and if they are of a form where they 
can pay dividends, such payments are limited to a cap.366 
 The guidance explains the link between the asset lock and the test: 
There is a clear relationship between the asset lock and the community interest test in that the 
test may not be seen to be met if a reasonable person might consider that the activities of the 
CIC are being carried on for the benefit of the company’s directors, employees or service 
providers rather than for the benefit of the community.367 
Similarly, the dividend cap is intended to “[strike] a balance between encouraging people to invest in 
CICs and the principle that the assets and profits of a CIC should be devoted to the benefit of the 
community.”368  
If we refer back momentarily to our two modes of reasoning, we can see that both of these sets of tests 
and restrictions employ a logic consonant with the principled mode. They distinguish between public 
and private benefit. The Charity Commission talks about “public benefit” in contrast to “personal 
benefit”, while the CIC regulator uses the language of “community benefit” in contrast to “private 
profit” or the “benefit of the company’s directors, employees or service providers”. The language varies 
but both regulators are sketching the same dichotomy between activity for personal gain and activity 
for the gain of others.  
Returning to the tax relief, we can now see that SITR relies on these regulatory structures to identify 
what counts as a legitimate recipient of social investment. The investee has to have met the 
requirements of either the Charity Commission or the CIC regulator, which means they have to show 
that they are set up for the pursuit of public or community benefit. Some profit-making is permitted 
within the context of CICs, but it is restricted.  
                                                   
364 Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy, Office of the Regulator of Community Interest 
Companies: Information and Guidance Notes. Chapter 1: Introduction (2016a). p3 
365 Ibid. p10 
366 Ibid. p9 
367 Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy, Office of the Regulator of Community Interest 
Companies: Information and Guidance Notes. Chapter 6: The Asset Lock (2016b). p5 
368 Ibid. p8 
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It is important to note that this does not amount to a claim that the Government is committed in 
principle to the restriction on profits in social investment. In a document summarising the responses 
given to the consultation on how the tax relief should be structured, Government officials report that 
there was a “strong view” that the tax relief, if limited to the regulated social enterprise forms, would 
miss other kinds of social organisations. Why were the eligibility criteria not made more flexible? 
Because “there was no consensus or sufficiently robust alternative definition for unregulated social 
enterprises.”369 The regulation provided by the Charity Commission and the CIC regulator was the 
only (“sufficiently robust”) system known to the Government, at the point of drafting the tax relief, 
for formalising the difference between social and non-social. This tells us nothing conclusive about 
prevailing opinion on the matter, but it alerts us to established structures and possible ways of 
thinking about what it means to be part of the ‘social sector’. 
BSC’S INVESTMENT POLICY 
For our second example we turn to the policy published by BSC regarding what kinds of organisation 
are eligible to receive social investment. Just like those developing taxation policy, the managers at 
BSC have to apply a consistent policy in deciding where to invest. As wholesalers, they have to make 
sure that this policy is suitable for use by the intermediaries they invest in, and so it needs to be general 
enough to cover all different kinds of investment. Moreover, BSC’s policies have to be understood in 
relation to the source of money used to capitalise the institution. The money BSC manages is directed 
to the organisation by an Act of Parliament that contains its own restrictions and specifications for 
how the money is used.370 The Act specifies that “A distribution of dormant account money for 
meeting English expenditure” must be directed to one or more of three purposes, the third of which is 
“a social investment wholesaler”. How, then, did the Act specify what a social investment wholesaler 
is? It states: 
In this section—  
“social investment wholesaler” means a body that exists to assist or enable other bodies to give 
financial or other support to third sector organisations; 
“third sector organisation” means an organisation that exists wholly or mainly to provide 
benefits for society or the environment.371 
Where the SITR uses the more specific ‘social enterprise’, restricting the definition to regulated 
company forms, the Dormant Accounts Act leaves considerable room for interpretation of what 
counts as a ‘third sector organisation’. The question becomes: how do we identify an organisation that 
“exists wholly or mainly to provide benefits for society or the environment”? The interviews offer a 
brief window onto the internal discussions that took place as BSC was being set up. These comments 
come from an individual involved in developing the legal and governance side of BSC: 
one of the discussions we were having a lot early on was: what is a third sector organisation? 
What is an organisation that exists wholly or mainly to benefit society and the environment? 
… Our assessment was, you can put certain types of regulated entity in it as a starting point… 
                                                   
369 HM Treasury, Social Investment Tax Relief: Summary of Responses (2013). p6 
370 HM Government, Dormant Bank and Building Society Accounts Act (2008). 
371 Ibid. p. 10 
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Beyond that there's still room for other entities that are third sector organisations according to 
this wholly or mainly test. At the same time I think I was writing about social business… the 
idea of (let's say) ‘for-profit’ businesses that have a sociology that really is about creating 
impact but doesn't necessarily restrict the distribution of profits. Now, I think we need to lock 
it in a bit more than that. So we went for 51% of income and capital gains must be reinvested 
effectively. [Interviewee] 
These comments provide insight into how the need for restrictions on ‘eligible’ investees has been 
rationalised. He is grappling with the balancing act that is starting to become familiar: if you start with 
the position that SSOs (TSOs) should be thought of more broadly than just the regulated company 
forms (i.e. charities, CICs and bencoms), how should the wider pool of SSOs be differentiated from 
non-social, non-third-sector organisations? This new piece of legislation introduces into law the 
‘wholly or mainly’ test. For reasons he does not explain, in the case of BSC he considered it 
appropriate to “lock it in a bit more than that” with the requirement to reinvest at least 51%. The 
most likely reason for this measure, I would suggest, is that 51% acknowledges the ‘wholly or mainly’ 
test, as it means more than half of profits are devoted to non-private interests.  
We can see how these discussions fed through into company policy by turning to BSC’s website, 
which explains that: 
Big Society Capital can only invest in SIFIs providing finance to “Social Sector 
Organisations”. Social sector (or third sector) organisations are defined by the Dormant 
Accounts Act as those that “exist wholly or mainly to provide benefits for society or the 
environment”. We have interpreted this to include regulated organisations such as charities, 
Community Interest Companies or Community Benefit Societies, as well as some profit-
making companies or enterprises that have a clear social mission. These ventures need to be 
able to meet the principles set out in our Governance Principles.372 
The governance principles, in turn, state: 
1.1 A for-profit SSO will: 
1.1.1 have objects set out in its constitutional documents which are primarily concerned with 
the provision of benefits to society (see addendum detailing Social Objects); 
1.1.2 have a policy in relation to the distribution of profit after tax that ensures surpluses are 
principally used to achieve social objectives. Practically this means that the payout of 
cumulative profit after tax to shareholders will be capped at 50% over time, and therefore 
ensures that any surpluses generated over time will be mainly: 
• reinvested in the business; 
• applied in advancement of its Social Objects; or 
• distributed or donated to other social sector organisations. 
1.1.3 have a constitutional or contractual lock on its Social Objects, dividend and surplus 
distribution policy 
                                                   
372 https://www.bigsocietycapital.com/faqs Accessed 9th April 2017. 
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1.1.4 be able to demonstrate that the remuneration of its officers and employees, including 
salaries, benefits and all forms of distribution or other participation: 
• is reasonable and proportionate relative to market practice for social sector organisations 
generally; and 
• is disclosed in a manner consistent with the Statement of Recommended Practice for 
accounting by charities. 
1.1.5 make best efforts to preserve the social purpose or social mission of the SSO in the event 
of a change of ownership or control.373 
So a non-regulated SSO still needs various measures in place: stated commitments to being primarily 
concerned with community benefit; policies ensuring caps on the distribution of profits and controls 
on where surpluses will be directed; a “lock” on its social purpose; appropriate remuneration for 
employees; and preservation of social mission on change of ownership. What exactly do all of these 
conditions look like in practice? In the final section of this chapter we will discuss a blog post that 
touches on exactly this matter, from a commentator who considers this policy of BSC’s to be both 
unclear and too flexible to be effective. I will rely on his judgement rather than embarking on a 
detailed dissection of the technicalities. Putting this example alongside SITR, we can conclude that it 
must be really quite difficult to clearly specify a definition of SSOs that goes beyond the regulated 
forms. SITR decided not to try. BSC clearly felt they needed to, but ended up with a policy that is 
relatively complicated, and perhaps not very clear to potential investors or investees. The one thing we 
can say with certainty about BSC’s policy is that they maintain a conceptual distinction between 
public and private benefit, and in this matter they remain aligned with the principled mode of 
reasoning. An investee’s objects must be “primarily” concerned with community benefit; only 50% of 
profits may be distributed; and an organisation is considered to have ‘social objects’ if any purposes 
“concerned with other matters” – with matters other than community benefit – are “subsidiary”.374  
PROFIT-WITH-PURPOSE BUSINESSES 
Our third example is a creation of a determined cohort within the social investment field to expand 
the definition of who should be deemed legitimate recipients of social investment. This group 
challenges the association of ‘social’ status with limits on profits. A detailed working through of their 
ideas is found in the 2014 report Profit-With-Purpose Businesses, the output of the ‘Mission Alignment 
Working Group’ (MAWG), which formed part of the Social Impact Investment Taskforce (SIIT). As 
well as advancing arguments for adopting the idea of profit-with-purpose businesses (PWPs) into the 
social investment mainstream, the report contains a draft bill of legislation, the “Clark Bill”, designed 
to act as a template for the countries of the G8 to adapt in their own national legislatures. The Clark 
Bill may not have been put into law but, as we will see later in the chapter, it is a reference point in the 
debate over how the social investment market should be developed.  
The report opens with the statement: 
                                                   
373 http://www.bigsocietycapital.com/sites/default/files/pdf/Governance%20Agreement.pdf Accessed 9th April 
2017. 
374 http://www.bigsocietycapital.com/sites/default/files/pdf/Governance%20Agreement.pdf  Text contained in 
addendum on social objects. My emphasis. Accessed 9th April 2017. 
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It is becoming clear that substantial numbers of entrepreneurs are interested in creating profit-
distributing businesses for social impact. … If we can create the legal and market mechanisms 
to allow these businesses to thrive as identified, profit-distributing and mission-driven 
enterprises, they have tremendous potential to create social impact.375 
This is the premise for developing the PWP form. Companies effectively operating as PWPs could 
take a variety of legal forms, making them “hard to recognise”. PWPs “may find it hard to convince 
critical stakeholders – social impact investors included – of their social mission and their commitment 
to it, as the old dichotomy of non-profit versus for-profit becomes blurred.”376 Formalising PWPs, 
therefore, is about “creating the confidence, that we are talking both about real businesses, and about 
real commitment to create social impact for the long term.”377 That is, PWPs respond precisely to the 
problem of a lack of a ‘sufficiently robust alternative’ to existing regulated company forms.  
If restrictions on profit are removed, what takes their place? The suggested approach is built around 
three main components: ‘intent’, ‘duties’ and ‘reporting’. ‘Intent’ denotes “committing to a social 
purpose”, ‘Duties’ entails “Creating duties for directors and officers that relate to striving for and 
delivering the social purpose”, and ‘reporting’ refers to “Measuring and reporting on social impact – 
related to the intended social purpose and more broadly.”378 
 
From Mission Alignment Working Group, Profit-with-Purpose Businesses (2014) p12 
‘Intent’ and ‘duties’ are familiar from the previous examples. But ‘reporting’ is a new feature. This is 
the first time we have encountered it as a defining feature of a type of social purpose organisation. So 
how are these three components translated into specifications within the Clark Bill? The Bill is made 
up of 20 “recommendations for a legal framework.” There is only space to pick out the more salient 
details here.  
                                                   
375 Mission Alignment Working Group, Profit-With-Purpose Businesses: Subject Paper of the Mission Alignment 
Working Group (2014). p3 
376 Ibid. p3 
377 Ibid. p3 
378 Ibid. p12 
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Recommendation 7 specifies the characteristic that “is at the heart of what it means to be a social 
mission business”379: 
A social mission business must have a purpose to create […] social and environmental impact 
[…] The law of the country should either provide legal forms in which a company organized 
as that form has such a purpose or provide for the enforcement of an election of such a 
purpose in the constituent documents of the company.  
Recommendation 8 “follows logically” from recommendation 7, suggesting that: 
The duties of the directors and officers of a social mission business must include furthering 
the social impact purpose of the business and require them to have regard for stakeholder 
interests affected by the business.  
Recommendation 9 is that social mission businesses “must be required to prepare and periodically 
make available a report on the performance of the business as it seeks to create general social and 
environmental impact. […]”, while recommendations 11 - 13 state that social mission businesses 
should be permitted to be set up either with or without an asset lock, a profit lock, and a mission lock. 
Recommendation 14, however, specifies that: 
The law of the country should provide one or more means by which the social impact purpose 
of a social mission business may be enforced. 
And recommendation 15 suggests: 
The law of the country should provide mechanisms by which investors in and owners of a 
social mission business may provide for continuation of the mission of the business upon a 
sale of control.380 
The recommendations contain a lot of detail, but a rough summary would be: the business must have 
a stated social purpose and the duties of the directors must reflect this purpose; it is essential the 
business be treated in law as a for-profit businesses, and is not subject to the restrictions that are placed 
on charities; the business has a duty to report on this purpose, but what this report contains is 
contingent on the nature of the purpose, and the stage that the business is at in its development; the 
law of the country should provide a way to enforce the social impact purpose; there should be 
provisions in law for asset locks, profit locks and mission locks, but none of these is required. We are 
not in a position to judge how successful these measures would be in ‘locking in’ social mission, nor 
do we know how these measures would be received by an organisation trying to implement them. 
Instead, we can view these recommendations as a concerted attempt to specify in detail what it means 
to be a ‘social’ organisation given unrestricted profit distribution. The result is certainly more 
complicated than the charity and CIC regulation. It relies on specifying a range of possible measures, 
without saying that any individual measures should be compulsory. It is trying to be flexible, but as a 
result provokes the need for clarification. It suggests that reporting should be compulsory, for example 
(rec. 9), but also suggests that reporting is less important in the early stages of an organisation’s growth 
(p12).  
                                                   
379 The recommendations use the language of ‘social mission business’, a category that groups PWPs with ‘social 
enterprises’ (of the kinds already discussed). 
380 Group (2014). p17-26 
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The real significance of the PWP model is that it establishes new conceptual foundations for defining 
what it means to be a ‘social purpose’ organisation. In a manner that adopts the innovative mode of 
reasoning, profit is assumed to be irrelevant; the principle that public and private benefit sit in 
opposition is put to one side, and new mechanisms are suggested for determining the ‘social’ aspect of 
social investment. The change in emphasis can be seen in the way the report specifies the ‘spectrum of 
impact investees’, which ranges from sustainable businesses at one end to grant-based organisations at 
the other. Where once we might have thought of the dividing line falling between profit-making and 
non-profit organisations, the PWP report configures matters in terms of “asset-locked organisations” 
versus “organisations with no kind of asset lock”. What matters on this new model is not whether 
profit is present, but whether there are restrictions on its distribution.  
INTERESTS AND PUBLIC / PRIVATE BENEFIT 
These three examples help us to see some of the different positions regarding what counts as ‘social’. 
The two modes of reasoning help us to bring to the surface the contrasting basic assumptions being 
employed. Before we continue our engagement with the literature, it will be helpful to demonstrate 
that there is a close link between public / private benefit and interests.  
If we focus in on how public and private benefit are defined, we find that they are defined in relation 
to each other. Public (or community) benefit is defined not on its own terms, but in relation to what 
it is not, i.e. private benefit. Take, for example, a report produced by the Law Commission providing 
guidance for charities on whether it is appropriate for them to use their endowments to make social 
investments. It explains that: 
when charities (having already established their charitable status) carry out any activity; being 
a charity, they must continue to act for exclusively charitable purposes for the public benefit 
which, necessarily, requires them not to confer unacceptable private benefit.381  
If private benefit is an organisation’s purpose then the organisation will not be charitable. By 
contrast, if private benefit is merely a consequence of an organisation’s activities, that will not 
preclude charitable status.382 
Similarly, the guidance provided by the Government for interpreting the CIC regulation states that: 
the purpose of CIC is primarily one of community benefit rather than private profit. Whilst 
returns to investors are permitted, these must be balanced and reasonable, to encourage 
investment in the social enterprise sector whilst ensuring true community benefit is always at 
the heart of any CIC.383 
How can we gain better purchase on what assumptions are introduced by the concepts ‘public benefit’ 
and ‘private benefit’? This is where interests can play a role. I would suggest the following line of 
reasoning is at play. It is an important part of our culture that we can distinguish between the pursuit 
of profit and the pursuit of charitable ends. If we enter into a business transaction where private 
interests are being pursued, then we act quite differently to situations of philanthropy. We donate 
                                                   
381 Law Commission, Social Investment by Charities (2014). p39 Emphasis added. 
382 Ibid. p40 
383 Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy (2016a). 
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money to charities, but we transact with businesses, paying in exchange for goods and services. 
Thinking in terms of interests, we can see that different rules and conditions attach to these different 
types of activity. The pursuit of private interest is a kind of economic behaviour, perfectly legitimate in 
the context of market-based activity, which comes with a model of accepting risk and maximising 
one’s own gain. The pursuit of public interest takes place within a different framework, a scenario in 
which furthering one’s own position is absolutely not acceptable, because it would undermine the 
claim to be helping others. We have to be able to believe in the intentions behind such claims, because 
we do not necessarily have direct insight into whether those claims have been realised.  
To put it another way: in situations of market exchange, the parties on either side of the transaction 
are both engaged in order to further their own interests. It is clear what they are set to gain, and they 
have recourse to various measures if their interests are not met. In a situation of philanthropy, the two-
sided transaction does not exist. If I give to charity, the charity then goes on to help a third party. I am 
unlikely to have any knowledge of the third party’s interests, and whether they are being met by the 
activities that the charity undertakes as a result of my donation. If charities were allowed to generate 
profits, then my donation might simply turn into someone else’s private gain. 
I think that this is the kind of reasoning that sits behind the self-evidence of the difference between 
acting for public or for private benefit. It is also, of course, consonant with the principled mode of 
reasoning. The innovative mode of reasoning, in contrast, poses a challenge, because it seeks to move 
beyond the public / private benefit distinction, to offer a version of what it means to be ‘social’ that 
simply makes no reference to this distinction. We can in fact see this challenge taking place by looking 
to The Law Commission’s Consultation on Social Investment by Charities, published in 2014.  It points 
out that the ‘acceptable’ degree of private benefit is a matter for ongoing debate, but that those 
responsible for ensuring compliance with charity regulation have reason to be wary: 
[W]hether private benefit is unacceptable is a question of fact and degree and there will often 
be scope for argument. …
 
This can cause charity trustees concern, particularly as unacceptable 
private benefit may have unfavourable tax consequences for the charity or may threaten its 
charitable status. 384 
There have nevertheless been attempts to alter the regulation of private benefit in charities, in order to 
make it easier for them to take part in social enterprise and social investment. A review of the 2006 
Charities Act was undertaken by Lord Hodgson in July 2012 to precisely this end. Lord Hodgson 
takes a favourable attitude towards social investment, suggesting a range of measures to make it easier 
for charities to make social investments. He includes a comment on the matter of private benefit: 
I also consider that the wording of the test of private benefit should be altered in relation to 
investment. While it remains the case that private benefit must be ‘necessary’ in order to 
maintain the emphasis on public benefit, altering the second limb of the description to 
‘proportionate’ seems a better reflection of the reality of investment. 385 
The Law Commission’s Consultation tells us how this recommendation was received by Government: 
                                                   
384 Law Commission (2014). p43 
385 Lord Hodgson, Trusted and Independent: Giving Charity Back to Charities. Review of the Charities Act 2006, 
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This recommendation was opposed by the Charity Commission and rejected by Government 
on the basis that it threatened to undermine the fundamental concept of charitable status. […] 
Ultimately, the extent of acceptable private benefit goes to the heart of what a charity is.386 
This is just one example. It tells us that the reasoning I suggested above regarding the connection with 
interests is at least compatible with reasoning employed by official bodies, which we can assume is 
reflective of wider assumptions and points of view. More generally, the point here is to show that in 
the process of elaborating social investment as a programme of government, a line of reasoning has 
developed that seeks to ground a version of social investment in different intellectual territory. The 
PWP report is a well-developed example of this, but this kind of reasoning has a broader significance. 
The assumption that profit should not be a determining factor in deciding what counts as ‘social’ 
investment is widespread. The final section of this chapter will look to examples of the broader debate 
to illustrate how these assumptions interact with reasoning that prefers to maintain the distinction 
between public and private benefit.  
DEBATES 
BIG SOCIETY CAPITAL 
We will start with BSC. BSC is not involved in all aspects of social investment, but it is an integral 
component of the market, and its presence dominates wider discussions of social investment, as the 
examples below indicate. The interviews give us insight into some of the discussions taking place 
internal to BSC in the first years of its operation. The two modes of reasoning continue to be helpful 
in showing that there are multiple versions of what counts as social investment at play in the way that 
these actors reason about what BSC should be doing.  
Chapter 1 explains that BSC is a wholesale financial institution, and that it was capitalised with money 
directed by the Dormant Accounts Act, and by an investment of £200m from four high street banks. 
In determining its investment strategy and organisational mission, BSC’s management is bound by the 
terms stated in Act, as mentioned earlier, but also by the terms of the agreement with the banks. They 
are then accountable to several parties, including the social sector, in whose name the capital was 
devoted to social investment. The intricacies of this situation are beyond the scope of our discussion.387 
We just need enough detail to give context to the comments quoted below. Since all of BSC’s money 
is put into the same ‘pot’, the conditions imposed by the Act and by the banks apply to all of the 
funds they distribute. The agreement with the banks states that BSC is bound to generate a 4% return 
on the banks’ investment, and that the banks can resort to punitive measures if BSC fails to comply. 
This means that although BSC does not have to repay the Dormant Accounts money, it is bound to 
generate enough return for it to cover its own running costs and repay the banks. In addition, the 
provenance of the dormant accounts money, combined with the original justification for directing it 
to BSC rather than other ends, lends weight to the argument that these are public funds that are 
destined to provide finance to the social sector. 
These conditions and restrictions led to a three-pronged investment strategy. For each prospective 
investment agreement – and remember that BSC invests in intermediary bodies who then go on to 
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387 Considerably more detail is contained in a case study I co-authored: Daggers and Nicholls (2016a). 
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invest in the ‘frontline’ SSOs – three sets of criteria are applied. Does the investment help to build the 
market? Does the investment create social return? And does the investment create financial return? 
Such an approach, to say the least, was more complex than standard investing. As one of the 
interviewees commented: 
as time has developed my understanding of it in terms of looking at each investment three 
ways [has improved] – financial, social impact and market building, and which one is more 
important, and how do we achieve all three, and assessing the pros and cons – I mean it’s a 
much more complicated investment decision than the mainstream, which is really just risk 
and return. [Interviewee] 
These objectives by no means contained a clear decision making process for the individuals involved to 
follow. There was ample room for differences of opinion over how BSC should be directing its 
investments. It is in this context that we can identify some highly contrasting attitudes. Take, first, 
these comments from a senior figure within BSC: 
So I think we’ve got it right in that we’re focusing on building this intermediary market. It’s a 
hard story to tell and I think the difference is that obviously in 2006 things weren’t as hard on 
the front line as they are now.388 Things are really really, really tough at the front line. And so 
I think, you know, what seemed right in 2006 I think is still right, in terms of building this 
intermediary market, and it’s right to have a long term plan to build a social investment 
market. I think the challenge here is that the nature of the market is changing, both in terms 
of downsides and upsides. Before it was a bit of a theoretical, yeah it would be great to do 
that, because actually it would be a good thing to do. Now there’s a real need to do it, as 
opposed to theoretically it’s a good idea. It would be nice if SSOs were stronger, now it’s 
imperative that they’re stronger, it’s imperative that they get this money, and quickly. And I 
think that’s the flip, we need to be doing this right now, as opposed to having this ten year 
plan for how it might look in 10 years’ time, it’s happening much more quickly than we 
thought it was going to. [Interviewee] 
This interviewee feels a sense of urgency in ensuring the capital BSC is managing makes its way as 
quickly as possible to the front line. She recognises the benefit of building a market, but there is 
tension running through her comments, because she suggests that the lengthy process of market 
building should not be given precedence over the urgency of need for funding for SSOs.  
Contrast her comments with the following remarks, from someone who speaks from the perspective of 
the banks. He has been asked about the banks’ requirement of a 4% return on their investment: 
Both the Big Society Capital and the shareholders felt that having this commercial rate of 
agreement would support the business [BSC] in many senses. You're running at a commercial 
rate of return, would push and endeavour to be profitable, therefore sustainable in the long 
term. Because what we see in the marketplace from the social enterprise perspective is a lot of 
people, a lot of these social enterprises are phenomenally enthusiastic about whatever venture 
is doing good in the society and think because they are doing good in the society, they are 
justified to receive funding, grant funding or equity funding or bank funding. Whereas for 
lots of other commercial models out there, an SME line is quite challenging and they deserve 
to be funded too. They [BSC and the shareholders] felt that the organisation required to 
generate commercial rate of return to promote sustainability. [Interviewee] 
                                                   
388 In 2010 a change in Government saw the introduction of severe austerity measures and cuts in funding. 
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His view of the social sector is quite different. SSOs are not “justified to receive funding” just because 
they “are doing good in the society”. The difference between these two positions can be understood in 
terms of the two modes of reasoning. On one hand, in the first quote, we find the assumption that 
SSOs are deserving of finance. At least in relation to the funds managed by BSC, social investment 
should be made available to those organisations already trying to address pressing social problems. The 
suggestion is that this is where efforts should be directed, rather than in relying on new kinds of 
solutions being identified. This, of course, looks like the principled mode of reasoning, and sits in 
contrast to the claim that only by unleashing new forms of capital can the world’s social problems be 
solved. The point is that the social sector already exists, and is in desperate need of finance that is 
available on terms that SSOs can afford.  
On the other hand, the second quote suggests the opposite, that SSOs are not deserving of finance just 
because they are social. This position does not extend to visionary statements about the transformative 
possibilities of social investment, but it does place emphasis on financial sustainability as priority over 
responding to claims of cash-strapped SSOs. Profitability, he reasons, equals sustainability. A model 
that insists on profitability is a route to a more sustainable financing arrangement for sorting out social 
problems. This logic is consistent with the innovative mode of reasoning, though bounded in its 
claims. 
These comments also suggest that the reason for the banks’ insistence on receiving a 4% return was 
not just about protecting their own balance sheet. The imperative to create a return was expected to 
have a helpful disciplining effect.  The “commercial rate of return” would help to “promote [the] 
sustainability” of BSC as a financial institution. This point is made more explicitly by a third 
interviewee, with a senior management position in BSC. He reflects on the fact that all of BSC’s 
capital was placed into the same ‘pot’:  
Who knows what would have happened if we’d done it differently, because if we had had 
separate pools of capital then we would have had even more pressure from the sector to piss 
the money away, to piss the dormant accounts money away. Having the banks in the same 
pool did give us the reason to say – and I do honestly think that this pressure will go on and 
on and on as long as we’re here. The sector want money – they want grants, right? They want 
something that looks like a grant. And feels like a grant. Like a Futurebuilders loan.389 And 
that to me is not going to build any sort of long-term market, it’s just not. [Interviewee] 
In other words, being able to say that the banks required a 4% return made it easier for BSC to resist 
the demands of the social sector. Elsewhere in the interviews it is made clear that the 4% figure was 
agreed without any real expectation, at least on the side of BSC, that it would be repaid at least for the 
first few years. A kind of unspoken agreement was made that BSC would attempt to be disciplined in 
the way it distributed its funds, and the banks would choose not to use the mechanisms they have 
available for holding BSC to account. This is how the situation was described by somebody involved 
in the negotiations: 
The strategy that we took is that we would just kinda fudge it for the next four years that we 
got their money, basically, to be perfectly honest. And they knew that, we knew that. And it 
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just seemed to be a bit of a silly thing to do really, rather than just kinda go “well, this is what 
it is…” [Interviewee] 
In this light the 4% return figure takes on a more symbolic hue. It certainly suggests that some actors 
were prioritising market building over getting capital to the ‘front line’ – or at least that they 
potentially had more leeway in the terms on which they could provide the funds than they liked to 
communicate to the social sector. SSOs do not deserve finance, they appear to be saying, and their 
demands and claims must be filtered through the need to build a market.  
In the context of BSC the restrictions are such that these opinions cannot be acted on directly. Actors 
are not free to direct the money however they reason is most beneficial. They are bound by the terms 
attached to the money. But these comments give us some insight into how different parties think 
about the options available to them.  
WIDER CONVERSATIONS 
Looking beyond BSC, there is a wide variety of reports providing insight into how different actors 
reason through who social investment is for and how the market should be developed.  
We will start with a pair of examples which demonstrate some of the variation in language found in 
discussions about the social investment market. The first is the IVAR report already referred to in 
chapter 4, which recommends ways in which the social investment market can better meet the needs 
of small charities. Having done fieldwork with a number of SSOs that had taken on, or decided not to 
take, social investment, they identify the need for “A willingness [on the part of social investors] to 
engage with inexperienced charities to help them survive.” The values of the investor must be aligned 
with those of the charity, so that the charity could feel “confident in sharing and discussing financial 
challenges in the context of what was right for the organisation’s mission and beneficiaries, rather than 
what was most profitable.”390 An unspoken assumption made in this argument is that charities have a 
claim on the social investment market, which should take note of their needs, and that they are 
deserving of a different kind of treatment, that recognises the prioritisation of social mission. The 
report is an attempt to articulate a vision of social investment that starts from the perspective of 
organisations that are in need of finance. It pre-empts and rejects reasoning that starts from what is 
conventionally expected of organisations looking to take on investment. This is the salience of their 
assertion that SI should be about leaving investees in a stronger position to pursue their mission.  
In contrast, New Specialist Sources of Capital for the Social Investment Market suggests a version of social 
investment that bears almost no resemblance to the version in the IVAR report. This report builds on 
the premise that “a lack of appropriate finance may pose a significant barrier to market growth.”391 
The research identifies eight types of institutional investor that might in future direct more of their 
capital towards social investment. Strikingly, the focus here is on the preferences of the investors. There 
is no language about social need, or the needs of investees. The report sets up a vision of the social 
investment market as follows: 
It can be helpful to think of the social investment market as a spectrum with two types of 
investment opportunity at each end:  1. The need for risk finance capital required to support 
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UK social sector organisations, estimated at circa £500m.  2. A separate, multi billion pound 
opportunity to invest in more established social industries estimated as the ‘next £5bn’ of 
investment capital, to help scale up and grow the market.392 
The first of these ‘opportunities’ sounds quite familiar, but the second less so. What are these ‘more 
established social industries’? A footnote explains: 
Within this research, ‘established’ social industries refer to those less risky industries with 
some track record of performance, including but not limited to – sustainable forestry, 
microfinance, clean tech, social housing, healthcare, sustainable and environmental 
industries.393 
These industries are loosely described without any acknowledgment of the difficulties around 
identifying legitimate recipients of social investment. The authors explain “These two ‘ends’ of the 
market can be difficult to differentiate fully until viewed from investors’ perspectives.” Different kinds 
of investors, with different risk appetites, will be attracted to one or other end of the market.394 These 
authors conceive of social investment as including activities by investors who are not driven by positive 
social impacts, who invest into industries that do not meet standards of ‘social’ credentials. This is an 
extremely flexible version of social investment that would probably be rejected by many people in the 
sector, but it is helpful in illustrating the range of the debate. The IVAR report emphasises the needs 
of SSOs who, they argue, should not be judged by the same standards as those applied to mainstream 
business. The Sources of Capital report is focused on growing the market with reference only to 
investor preferences. They are both talking in terms of ‘social investment’, but there is little 
resemblance between them. 
This degree of variation causes problems for those trying to make general statements about what social 
investment is and how the market should be developed. Angels in the Architecture is a 2013 report 
which aims “to outline a vision for the social investment market and the ‘infrastructure’ required to 
deliver it, to take stock of the current state of the market and to make recommendations for the 
future.”395 Its author, Dan Gregory, sketches an overview of the market, based on consultation and 
interviews with market players. He observes: 
Some [respondents] … argue that “there should be expectation of market rate returns in the 
sector and no reason why that should not be the case”. Others argue that this sector will never 
be able to deliver commercial returns and doubt that terms of investors and investees can be 
reconciled
 
(as long as the social investment market is limited to the a defined social sector). 396 
The research is clearly encountering contrasting opinions about what degree of self-interest is possible 
or appropriate within social investment. Gregory extends this analysis by marking out two perspectives 
on the future of the market.  
The first of these perspectives places greater emphasis on the relationship between 
intermediaries and investees working on the frontlines and whether they can access finance 
that works for them. Many here argue that “a walled garden” is important - they are attached 
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to particular models of ownership, governance, control and profit distribution - and often 
want to protect the defined social sector against its ‘colonisation’ by commercial capital. …  
The second perspective … takes a different view … Here, the “game is shifting investment 
flows from areas which create less social value to those which create more”. … From this 
angle, a ‘walled garden’ can look too narrow or provincial, given the scale of the challenges 
facing society. … Investors, intermediaries and infrastructure bodies tend increasingly to be 
more concerned with impact above ownership (unless under direction from government 
otherwise) arguing that we need “other ways to think about social mission and social impact 
beyond social ownership and limits to profit distribution”.397 
Here we can see the same contrast we drew out above, between regulation that relies on public versus 
private and regulation that seeks new ground, reflected in these two perspectives. The first perspective 
aligns with the principled mode of reasoning; the second with the innovative mode. The passage 
continues: 
There is perhaps a growing frustration among some investors that social enterprises are, 
literally by their very nature, precluding opportunities for capital to be invested for social 
ends. As one intermediary puts it, “A social enterprise is a business that restricts itself from 
accessing equity.” Here, this is meant as a criticism, whereas many social entrepreneurs might 
say almost the same thing, except with pride.398 
We can bring to the surface an issue that has hovered in the background in our discussion so far. The 
case of legal form is not just a matter of principle. It has an influence on the ease with which 
investments are made, and so the development of the market. Within the context of social investment, 
if we remain committed to a version of the ‘social’ that restricts profits then we exclude ourselves from 
investment opportunities that seek to achieve social ends, but that cannot accept those limits.  
Gregory’s way of handling this situation is to draw a distinction between ‘access to finance’ and ‘social 
investment’, suggesting that “a clearer distinction [between them] is perhaps slowly emerging.”399 This 
is an unproblematic statement if we allow these terms to mean what Gregory wants them to mean, but 
it belies the fact that the term ‘social investment’ is so strongly associated with the project of 
capitalising the social sector. It also loses salience when we note that this distinction is not recognised 
elsewhere in the literature.  
The problem continues into 2016. What do we mean by ‘Social Investment’? by Phil Caroe, Director of 
Social Finance at a social investment organisation, is an attempt to clarify. He writes, “It was 
becoming increasingly clear to me how much confusion there is out there – not only a variety of 
different terms being used, but also the same terms being used by different people to mean different 
things.” His aim “is to find consensus in a short guide to act as our ‘touchstone’ and help us all 
communicate more consistently and effectively.”400 
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Caroe seeks to establish common ground in the collective attempt to use repayable finance to create 
“positive social impact”, then identifies four different objectives401 contained within this space, arguing 
that confusion arises from these objectives being conflated. One of the issues he identifies is as follows: 
it’s not always clear what to expect from investment with a ‘social’ label. Sometimes what 
investors mean is that it’s finance exclusively for social organisations. But investees may 
interpret the label to mean that there’s something different about ‘social’ investment 
compared with ordinary commercial investment – perhaps a willingness to accept lower 
returns and longer timeframes, and to not mind so much if it all doesn’t work out and the 
money can’t be repaid. So you can also understand the frustration from investees when some 
sources of ‘social’ investment turn out to be much more commercial than they expected.402 
He identifies tensions that grow out of differences in interpretation of ‘social investment’ very like 
those illustrated by the two examples above. How does he think that this confusion could be 
overcome? We need to “stop giving the impression that social investment is a thing with definable 
characteristics, and instead simply talk about how repayable finance could support their [charities and 
social enterprises’] mission.” The term ‘social investment’, he concludes, should be reserved for efforts 
to provide finance to SSOs at less-than-commercial rates, while ‘impact investing’ should be used to 
refer to the broader activity of investing for impact, in a manner associated with higher returns.  
Once more the effort to clarify, like Gregory’s, seeks to distinguish between provision of finance that 
recognises something different about the social sector, the logical consequence of which is sub-
commercial rates of return, and a kind of investment understood in terms of the creation of impact, 
not in terms of the financial returns that can be expected. Once more the divide we identify here maps 
on to the divide between the principled and innovative modes of reasoning. 
ONLINE DISCUSSION 
The final example is a blog post by a well-known commentator in the social investment space, David 
Floyd. The post, and the comments posted by various other practitioners in response, is particularly 
apt for our discussion because it brings together many of the issues referred to above: PWPs, BSC’s 
role and strategy, the significance of public money and the need for restrictions on profit. 
In January 2015, under the title ‘Purpose unclear’, Floyd published the post, opening with the 
statement: 
One of the most baffling developments of 2014 was the emergence (at least in social 
enterprise policy-world) of the ‘Profit-with-Purpose’ business.403 
Floyd is not convinced of the need for this new company form. He looks to the way that the need for 
PWP businesses is justified by those who support them: the main issue, he finds, is that existing legal 
forms do not allow sufficient flexibility. This is not a valid point, argues Floyd – look for example to 
the condition for membership imposed by Social Enterprise UK, an umbrella body, which is already 
very flexible. It allows 49.9% of profits to be paid out to investors. Furthermore, SEUK is happy to 
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accept social enterprises as members even if they do not have an asset lock. To add to this, if 
somebody wants to set up a social business that can distribute more than 50% of its profits to 
investors (i.e. with a conventional for-profit structure), they are free to do so, and market themselves 
to customers however they see fit. Doesn’t this provide enough flexibility already?  
Floyd reasons that there must be other reasons for this “bizarre wild goose chase”. One reason – and 
he considers it a good reason – is that there is a need to change the perception that making money and 
having a social purpose are incompatible. Here he quotes a colleague in the sector who says:  
there’s need for a new level of awareness-raising (partially with consumers/government and 
funders/investors but mostly with really talented, imaginative, ambitious entrepreneurs) that 
it’s ok to make money out of social purpose – if social outcomes are genuinely achieved and 
evidenced. 
This reasoning is an explicit articulation of the assumption behind the PWP report – private benefit is 
not incompatible with creating social impact, and this should be more widely understood. Floyd 
builds on this point with the rhetorical statement:  
Why shouldn’t people who want to earn a decent living, provide well for themselves and their 
families and make the world a better place in the process be encouraged to do so? It’s difficult 
to imagine many of us in social enterprise world offering any suggestions as to why not 
(although some of might [sic] argue that that’s often possible using a social enterprise 
structure, too). 
In other words, Floyd has no problem with the idea that social purpose and private benefit are 
compatible, but he does not think that further regulation is necessary to create a new company form. 
The provisions that could potentially be written into law, as set out in the PWP report, could be “just 
as usefully written into an investment agreement”.  
But Floyd is concerned about more than just the waste of time implied by developing unneeded 
legislation. He is concerned about BSC’s role in encouraging the development of PWPs. He suggests 
that BSC is in favour of the PWP idea because it acts as a potential solution to the sluggish growth of 
the social investment market. Why would this be the case? Because the current state of affairs is far 
from clear. Floyd refers to BSC’s governance principles, which we have also referred to in the section 
above, and concludes that the document “combines the clarity of wool with the flexibility of nylon to 
deliver a set of criteria that virtually any business could meet if it could be bothered.”404 Investors and 
investees alike, faced with such a lack of clarity over what counts as a social enterprise, are unlikely to 
get involved in social investment. From this perspective the PWP business fulfils a clear purpose, as it 
provides “a way for social investors to identify eligible profit-with-purpose businesses with confidence 
and familiarity” (from page 19 of the report).  
Floyd does not put it in so many words, but we can see that his objection to BSC’s role is grounded in 
the difference between public and private money. He writes: 
Few within either civil society or social investment world disagree with the idea that if 
Government is going to provide money for a social investment (and tax relief for it) it should 
provide a regulated registration system for those eligible to receive it (particularly if their social 
mission is not already regulated in some other way). 
                                                   
404 Ibid. 
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Instead of creating a new legal form, that is, clarity could be achieved by creating a register of 
organisations that are approved to receive the money from BSC. The rhetorical device he uses – 
“Few… disagree with the idea” – suggests that his claim, that public money should only go to 
regulated entities, reflects only what is generally recognised to be appropriate. My interpretation of 
this comment is that it implicitly appeals to the distinction between public and private benefit 
discussed above. Floyd is concerned that without regulation, public funds will be used to support 
private interests.  
This post, and the comments that it provokes, is particularly interesting because it contains an 
articulation, at different points, of both of our two basic positions. In the first half he supports the 
argument that private profit and doing social good should be seen as compatible. Non-regulated SSOs 
create social good and they should be allowed to call themselves social enterprises if they want to. But 
when it comes to the matter of public money, Floyd appears to be committed to the idea that there 
should be some way of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate SSOs. He clarifies his position in 
the comments section: 
While I’m very much in the liberal/broad church wing on ‘what is a social enterprise?’, I have 
no sympathy whatsoever for social investors and intermediaries who’ve received shedloads of 
government money on the basis that they’ll find ways to meet the finance needs of specifically 
social organisations who can’t access mainstream finance, who then say that social sector 
organisations represent a risky market where their cut and paste mainstream finance 
approaches don’t work. 
He therefore finds himself making a distinction between ‘social enterprise’ as a broad label and 
“specifically social organisations”; a distinction that once more begs the question of how this line can 
be systematically drawn.  
Comments from an individual called Dan Lehner (who in fact is the individual that Floyd quoted 
approvingly in suggesting that “it’s OK to make money out of social purpose”) help to bring the two 
basic positions into sharper relief. Lehner refers to his employer, a business set up, in his words, 
“explicitly to deliver social impact.” He emphasises that “we invest heavily in a team to evidence our 
impact – even at a time when cash is tight. Because that’s why we’re in business. It’s in our governing 
documents for all to see: impact first.” To him, this means his company: 
should surely be able to access support and cash (including government, philanthropic money, 
unclaimed assets and the like) if we can prove that we can help the funders achieve their social 
goals. There really is nothing more to it for me.  
Lehner is not only asserting that his company should be part of the social investment market, but that 
they should be entitled to support and investment of public as well as private money. If they can prove 
their social impact, there should be no objections. Floyd’s response is to say: 
I’m keen to see as many people as want to launching conventional private businesses that do 
good. If relevant to either them or investors, I also wish these organisations socially motivated 
investment based on what they do – as opposed to what [they] are – but I don’t wish them 
access to public funds allocated to Social Sector Organisations. 
One interpretation of this exchange is that Lehner pushes Floyd to clarify which basic position he 
agrees with, and the result is that we have a clear articulation of each, pitted in opposition to each 
 138 
other. Lehner says the pursuit of public and private benefit are compatible, and that his company is 
therefore qualified to any kind of funds, including public funds, in virtue of the social impact they 
create (and evidence). Floyd, in contrast, wants to protect social sector organisations’ claim to public 
funds, implying that organisations that are really social are those that are regulated, which in turn 
implies a limit or cap on private profit.  
CONCLUSION 
Where chapter 4 looked at what makes an investor ‘social’, this chapter looked at the ‘social’ status of 
investees. The three formal examples making up the first part of the chapter show what happens when 
actors in the market are pushed to mark out clear boundaries. The SITR and BSC’s investment policy 
both fall back on established ways of determining ‘social’ status: the prioritisation of public over 
private benefit, made visible through a variety of methods (such as taking on a regulated legal form, or 
embedding limits on profit distribution in the organisation’s governing documents). The PWP report, 
in contrast, attempts to expand the boundary, mapping out a version of the market that includes the 
‘regulated’ social sector, but also includes businesses that have no restrictions on profit distribution. 
The draft bill suggesting how to determine which organisations qualify to join this expanded version 
of the market includes a range of measures, including the measurement and reporting of social impact. 
The two modes of reasoning help to draw out the differences between these approaches. The first two 
examples seem to follow the principled mode of reasoning, while the PWP example works through a 
line of reasoning consistent with the innovative mode. The distinction between public and private 
benefit plays an important role in more established ways of determining ‘the social’. It is the core 
conceptual distinction allowing us to distinguish charities from businesses. I argued that the 
public/private distinction in this setting has an intrinsic link to interests. There are settings where self-
interested behaviour is entirely appropriate, but the regulation of charities based on the prioritisation 
of public benefit demonstrates the need to carve out a space where it is illegitimate. The principled 
mode retains a commitment to this distinction, and the innovative mode seeks to move past it.  
To reiterate, the modes of reasoning are not a way of classifying the opinions of different actors. They 
may or may not be recognised by actors in the field, because it is quite possible for the same person to 
employ both modes of reasoning, as the ‘debates’ section of this chapter demonstrated. 
Taken together, chapters 4 and 5 advance our understanding of how the vision for social investment is 
taken up and worked through by a variety of actors. The implications of this discussion operate at two 
levels. First, in drawing out differences of opinion, we can claim a more detailed and nuanced 
understanding of what social investment means to those involved. It is my hope that the disentangling 
I have managed to do might be seen as useful by those engaged in practice. It could be found to be 
relevant to practitioners, and to clarify much of the conceptual fuzziness they encounter on a day to 
day basis.  
Secondly, and more importantly, we have moved on a step in our argument. We can now see that the 
vision for social investment contains two quite different versions of what it means to do investment in 
a way that is social. By identifying the innovative mode of reasoning, we can see the radical streak 
running through social investment that seeks to effectively discard or remove embedded ways of 
thinking about what it means to be socially motivated. This does not amount to the argument that 
charity/social enterprise regulation should be abolished and every organisation should act as a business. 
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But it does mean that the difference between the social sector (traditionally understood) and the wider 
spectrum of social purpose organisations is understood in terms of the restrictions SSOs place on 
capital, rather than their particular suitability for addressing social problems. It denies the social sector 
the distinctiveness that grounds its contribution to a system of government. 
The principled mode of reasoning provides a way of drawing out those construals of social investment 
where the distinctiveness of public benefit-oriented action is respected, even if the assumption that 
public and private benefit are incompatible is deeply buried, and possibly not really visible even to the 
person making the assumption. Presenting the argument in this way, it becomes easier to see what acts 
as common ground, and what is contentious. We do not find reasoning that objects to the market per 
se, nor to the idea of repayable finance, nor even to the idea of profit. The crunch point comes with 
the idea that unlimited profit-making is compatible with social purpose, and that those pursuing a 
social purpose should be expected to meet standards specified by those focused on the financial 
viability of a market, rather than what is needed to ensure social needs are met.  
These dividing lines are in fact aligned with the well-trodden path between left and right. The 
principled mode of reasoning sits comfortably with the typically ‘left wing’ view that the market 
should be constrained, and that there is a space of social interaction that should be protected from 
profit-making. The innovative mode of reasoning supports the typically ‘right wing’ view that the way 
should be opened up for the market to coordinate interests uninhibited by regulations. The ‘invisible 
heart of the market’ proclaimed in the SIIT report, remember, invokes the doctrine of self-interest, 
and the notion of spontaneous harmony of interests. It is true that social investment gets dismissed as 
neoliberal marketisation in some quarters, but these are criticisms at the fringes, and have no traction 
on the practice of SI. I think this is an aspect of a kind of depoliticisation achieved by the vision for 
social investment, which is rooted in the modes of reasoning and argumentation that have become 
acceptable within its parameters. This issue will be addressed further in chapter 7. 
Measurement is our next concern. We already have some idea of its importance. In chapter 4 we saw 
that impact measurement is endemic to the concept of social value/return/impact, and is assigned an 
important role in making the idea of social investment more tangible. This importance only increases 
where the innovative mode of reasoning is being employed, as measurement is one of the main 
methods for differentiating between social investment and other forms, something confirmed in this 
chapter’s analysis. Chapter 6 therefore turns our focus to how the need for social impact measurement 
is conceived of within the vision for social investment.  
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CHAPTER 6: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL IMPACT 
MEASUREMENT 
Impact measurement is central to the practice of impact investing and vital to the growth of 
the impact investing market. Measurement demonstrates the social impact that these 
investments are having, which further legitimizes the practice. Without it, effective impact 
investing could not occur. Effective impact measurement generates value for all impact 
investment stakeholders, mobilizes greater capital, and increases the transparency and 
accountability for the impact delivered.  
From a report by a working group of the Social Impact Investing Taskforce,  
Measuring Impact (2014) p1 
Impact measurement is the last area of focus in this exploration of the logic of social investment. So far 
we have skirted the issue of measurement. We know that it is looked to for providing evidence of 
impact, and that it is particularly important on the innovative mode of reasoning, as it grounds claims 
to impact when other signifiers, such as restrictions on profit, have been removed. This opening 
passage helps us to open up the issue of measurement more fully, as it hints at the multiple functions 
assigned to SIM within the vision of a fully functioning SI market. 
We must be quite explicit about the scope of this discussion. Measurement and metrics extend into 
almost every reach of life. Within this broader picture of the growth of metrics, the measurement of 
social impact is a subfield in its own right. It certainly exists beyond the boundary of social 
investment. It could even be framed as another programme of government, one focused on increasing 
the effectiveness of social purpose organisations by encouraging a data-driven culture. There is no clear 
boundary between the logic of SIM and the logic of social investment, but articulations of the logic 
supporting the need for SIM are not made solely in relation to social investment. So we will be bound 
to draw on resources that do not respect the limits we set for ourselves in this study.  
This is not overly problematic – it will require careful handling of source texts, to be clear about limits 
to what can be said – but it does draw attention to an issue in developing this line of argument. How 
do we frame and discuss these measurement practices in a way that sufficiently acknowledges the 
complex, multifaceted context in which they are being developed? After all, the way SIM is conceived 
of within SI, and the broader SIM project, are not being developed in isolation.  
The first point to make is that I will not be discussing SIM practices themselves, but rather the need 
for SIM practices. To be entirely precise, I am discussing the way the need for SIM practices is 
reasoned through in the context of social investment as a programme of government. This means my 
aims are relatively contained: I am not looking to the broader context of the development of 
measurement practices, nor am I looking to offer an explanation of why SIM takes the form it does. 
The point is not that this broader context is irrelevant, but that it is not necessary to make the 
argument I want to make. 
This is because we already have the tools that we need to explore the role of SIM. They are contained 
in the notion of the production of knowledge, discussed in chapter 2. Poovey’s work makes it possible 
to see that there are commonalities over time, and the same issues are faced by somebody trying to 
measure impact in 2018 as were faced by a 19th century scientist trying to build an argument on the 
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basis of data points collected through observation: how are those data points systematised? and how do 
actors in the space rationalise the leap from particular to general? Of course, as we pointed out in the 
conclusion to that discussion (page 100), academic discussion probing the limits of what we know and 
how we know things have moved past the modern fact. There are significant and influential bodies of 
work looking at the role objective knowledge making plays in society, including Foucault’s work as 
well as the growing field of Science and Technology Studies. But it is still the case that much of the 
time, including in the context of social investment, the assumption is very much in place that facts 
about impact can easily be gathered and manipulated. So despite more recent developments in 
thinking about topics such as the role of measurement, paying attention to the problem of induction 
continues to yield dividends. 
The chapter starts with a brief introduction to what is meant when actors refer to ‘impact 
measurement.’ The next section points out that impact measurement faces the problem of induction, 
and so is amenable to analysis by the tools provided by Poovey. It is shown, first, that the need for 
impact measurement is conceived of both in terms of the need to prove impact, and also in terms of 
the need to generate information that is useful in making decisions, which suggests a focus on 
improving rather than proving. This is a debate that is found in the literature, but I argue that it 
cannot be fully understood without looking to the connection between impact measurement and 
accountability, and the need to protect the integrity of the field. The approach in this section is 
slightly different to that of previous chapters. The source material is sparser, more is left unsaid, and 
there is more ambiguity in the terms being used. As a result, I am less able to anchor the argument in 
the texts available. I nevertheless think it is possible to present a version of how the logic of social 
investment works with respect to the need for SIM. Drawing on Hacking’s concept of multivalence, 
the logic behind appeals for accountability is unpicked further, and connected up with the demands of 
the market model. Finally, the chapter considers the assumptions put in place around ‘impact facts’ for 
them to become a viable way of capturing, analysing and acting to bring about social change. 
THE SIM CYCLE 
We will begin this discussion with a brief overview of what it means to ‘do’ social impact 
measurement, based on a series of best practice guidance documents aimed at practitioners. 
The general wisdom on SIM – and this is corroborated by my experience providing impact 
measurement consulting services – is that it takes place through a cycle of activity. We can borrow a 
diagram from the WGIM report, which is a typical example:  
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From WGIM, Measuring Impact (2014) p9 
The “four phases” split out the process of designing a data collection system (plan), collecting data 
(do), analysing that data (assess) and then using the insight gained to review what needs to be changed 
in programme implementation (review). The “seven guidelines” then suggest a more detailed version 
of what should take place at each stage of the cycle.405  
Certain aspects of the cycle are particularly well resourced in terms of published guidance. One such 
aspect is the framework used to structure the measurement system.406 ‘Frameworks’ usually take the 
form of a ‘theory of change’ or ‘logic model’. There is variation across these tools, but they share 
common ground in the notion that social change can be broken down into a number of discrete 
components that are causally linked.It is common to find logic chains depicted as follows: 
From WGIM, Measuring Impact (2014) p8 
‘Input’ refers to the resources that go into an activity; ‘activity’ refers to the actions that take place 
under the remit of the programme in question; ‘outputs’ are a quantification of the “practices, 
products and services” created through the activities; ‘outcomes’ are the changes that take place as a 
result; and ‘impact’ is the broader social or environmental changes that follow from the outcomes. The 
arrow shapes in the diagram above are deliberate, because there is supposed to be a sense of flow over 
time.  
                                                   
405 Working Group on Impact Measurement (2014). p9 
406 The IRIS catalogue was an early iteration of social impact measurement for investors. It is a freely available 
database of indicators designed to give a comprehensive set of options for investors to choose from when 
deciding which metrics to use. While IRIS is still used widely by investors (as reported in Abhilash Mudaliar, 
Rachel Bass and Hannah Dithrich, GIIN: Annual Impact Investor Survey (2018)), it does not take a prominent 
place within the best practice guidance being used here. I would suggest this is because IRIS largely fails to 
include measures of outcomes, sticking instead to output measures, which are easier to define in advance. 
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Within these models, ‘outcomes’ become the focus of the measurement system – they are the discrete, 
identifiable, measurable changes thought to come about as a result of the organisation’s activities. The 
difference between outputs and outcomes is emphasised as important, because the vision of impact 
measurement is one that moves away from commonly used output-based measurement systems, to 
one that focuses on the changes (outcomes) that occur as a result of this activity.   
Once outcomes have been identified, data collection tools have to be specified. Organisations might 
write their own survey tools, or they might choose to use an ‘off-the-shelf’ tool – some kind of scale-
based measure or questionnaire developed, usually in a research setting, and then published. An 
example I have come across on numerous occasions is the Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Wellbeing 
Scale (WEMWBS), which asks respondents to score themselves on a series of statements such as “I’ve 
been feeling optimistic about the future” and “I’ve been feeling confident”.407 Respondents give two 
rounds of responses, one at the beginning and one at the end, enabling the calculation of a ‘distance 
travelled’ score. As an NPC report on the topic of ‘off-the-shelf’ tools explains, such tools have been 
tested and piloted for “validity and usability”, and can be used to “demonstrate change”. 408 
Once the data has been collected, it has to be analysed and then put to use. There are various factors 
highlighted as needing consideration in the guidance. The GECES guide, for example states that 
impact reporting should contain, among other things, “a clearly explained account of the effects of the 
intervention (outcomes, and identified beneficiaries, also explaining, at least in qualitative terms, 
deadweight, development and drop-off)”.409 With a hint of divergent views, the WGIM guide simply 
advises that organisations “Distill insights from the data collected: Review and analyze data to 
understand how investments are progressing against impact goals.”410 
There is one other approach that deserves to be mentioned alongside the good practice described 
above. This is the Social Return on Investment (SROI) methodology, which is built on the “seven 
principles of social value” 411, 412 SROI advocate the same kind of cycle as that described above, of 
specifying a framework, collecting data, analysing it and using the restults. It differentiates itself 
through its strong emphasis on the ‘stakeholder perspective’, arguing that it is only possible to 
understand the social value created by asking those who experience it, rather than defining outcomes 
in advance.413 Where the more general guidance gestures in the direction of the form analysis should 
take, SROI prescribes how the data should be analysed, even providing a spreadsheet tool that 
automatically completes the calculation. As we will see, the leader of the SROI network is a vocal 
contributor to the debate over how SIM should be done. 
                                                   
407 From https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/med/research/platform/wemwbs/wemwbs_14_item.pdf Accessed 13th March 
2017. 
408 New Philanthropy Capital, Using Off-the-Shelf Tools to Measure Change (2014). p3-4 
409 GECES Sub-group on Impact Measurement (2014). p31 
410 Working Group on Impact Measurement (2014). p10 
411 The seven principles are: 1) Involve stakeholders; 2) Understand what changes; 3) Value the outcomes that 
matter; 4) Only include what is material; 5) Do not overclaim; 6) Be transparent; 7) Verify the result. 
412 The SROI methodology was first developed in the US. Jed Emerson, referred to above, published in 2000 a 
paper introducing the idea (Jed Emerson and Mark Cabaj, ‘Social Return on Investment’, Making Waves, 11/2 
(2000).) It was picked up by people in the UK who created the SROI Network, which morphed into the Social 
Value UK and its international counterpart Social Value International. These are membership organisations for 
those committed to embedding social value into the way their organisation operates. They promote the 
principles of social value and the SROI methodology.  
413 Nicholls et al. (2012). p20 
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In attempting to summarise the latter half of the SIM cycle, we bump up against an issue lurking in 
the background: ‘analysing’ the data that has been collected means making a series of decisions about 
the principles that should be followed in conducting this analysis. How seriously should the need for 
robustness and rigour be taken? What does it mean to be robust and rigourous? How much data is 
needed for the results to be valid? What is validity? These decisions are already made for those using 
SROI, but this is only one of myriad approaches. In every case, a method is needed. The numbers will 
not just speak for themselves.  
One last aspect of the situation to highlight is the emphasis the guidance documents place on leaving 
room for the autonomy and choice of the organisations they are seeking to advise. The guidance 
presents an ideal world scenario, something to be aimed for, while acknowledging that the realities of 
resource constraints means it may not be possible, or will take some time to achieve. The WGIM 
report, for example, comments on “the importance of taking a realistic approach”, asserting that 
“impact measurement approaches must be proportional to the available resources, scale, and stage of 
maturity of both the investors and investees. 414  The notion of ‘proportionality’ is thus used to 
communicate that advocates of SIM are not suggesting that measurement good practice be pursued at 
any cost. 
THE ROLE OF IMPACT MEASUREMENT 
We now have an idea of what kind of process is being referred to when documents refer to social 
impact measurement. We are moving quite rapidly across a set of issues that in other circumstances 
would be worthy of much deeper consideration. The process of identifying outcomes and indicators is 
often one of translating quantities into qualities, for example, and even of translating some of the most 
personal and intimate aspects of an individual’s lived experience into metrics. Mennicken and Miller 
write about precisely these kinds of processes in their article ‘Accounting, Territorialisation and 
Power’,415 which contains analysis that could be fruitfully brought to bear on the spread of SIM. But 
to properly explore these processes we would have to go beyond the fact that these tools are being 
advocated, and look to how they are being used in particular times and places. That would be another 
study.  
For now, we will continue building our argument. Our task is to explore how SIM is drawn on within 
the logic of social investment. What functions is it called on to perform? As ever, we have to do more 
than just look for explicit statements to this effect. We are looking for a way to uncover the implicit 
assumptions being made by those elaborating this programme of government. The way to do this is to 
draw a connection back to chapter 2’s discussion of the production of knowledge.  
The connection is not hard to make: SIM, just like any other attempt to generate systematised 
knowledge, faces the problem of induction. SIM is fundamentally and inherently about collecting 
data, outcomes data, and then finding a way to reason through the leap from these observed 
particulars to more general knowledge about impact. This is exactly the set of questions outlined above 
in relation to the ‘analyse data’ stage of the SIM cycle.  
                                                   
414 Working Group on Impact Measurement (2014). p11 
415 Mennicken and Miller (2012). 
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If SIM can be analysed in terms of the production of knowledge, then SIM can be analysed in terms 
of different orientations to knowledge production. Examples from Poovey, Porter and Hacking’s texts 
were used to illustrate points of divergence between knowledge oriented to certainty, using statistical 
analysis, and knowledge oriented to a practical purpose, such as CBA, where the scrupulousness of 
method was deliberately relaxed. We can now see that these distinctions are helpful in looking to the 
conversation around what SIM should look like. To be clear, I am not saying that these examples, 
which happen to be historical, lend any weight to my argument because they are historical. I am not 
drawing any connections through time, suggesting the the historical examples mark a point of 
emergence of somehow fundamental knowledge categories that are identifiable in the present. Instead, 
I use these examples as a way of highlighting where I, or the reader, might otherwise make 
unexamined assumptions about attempts to generate knowledge. It might be the unexamined 
assumption is that all knowledge creation systems are aimed at discovering ‘the facts’ or ‘the truth’; 
these historical examples simply illustrate the sense in which different knowledge production systems 
are oriented to varied ends. With these examples in mind, it becomes easier to see how a similar 
configuration is present in the case of social investment.  
The argument I am making, therefore, is that if we approach the debate around impact measurement 
as it appears in these documents with an eye for different orientations to knowledge production, we 
find that we can indeed discern two contrasting such orientations. They are discernable in the to-and-
fro over whether SIM should be about establishing what impact has been created with as much 
certainty as possible, or if certainty should be demoted behind other considerations such as usefulness, 
timely feedback, and so on. That is, is SIM about proving impact, or about improving impact by 
informing decision-making? We can characterise the two sides of the debate as follows. 
Nesta’s widely recognised ‘standards of evidence’ approach provides insight into the reasoning behind 
the need to prove impact. Nesta’s approach is an attempt to make experimental methods palatable to 
SSOs by placing them in a framework that gradates the expectations of rigour. Nesta considers it 
important that “demand for evidence is appropriate for different stages of product or service 
development, that it doesn’t hamper innovation, and that it is realistic and proportionate.”416 As a 
result:  
Investees will be expected to move up through the levels over the life of an investment, giving 
increased certainty that impact on our target outcomes is being achieved. The higher levels 
involve more in–depth evaluation techniques, including randomised control trials (RCTs), a 
method which enables the impacts observed to be isolated to the product or service.417 
Nesta elaborates further than most on the reasons why RCT-type approaches are needed: 
We know that good intentions don’t necessarily lead to good outcomes. There are well known 
cases of people and organisations delivering services or products that mean well, who want to 
positively enhance the lives of their users and the wider community, but end up doing more 
harm than good. This means we need to get much better at understanding impact.418 
In other words, the direct observations of those trying to create positive social impact, even with the 
best of intentions, might be mistaken, and experimental methods are the best way to know for certain 
                                                   
416 Nesta et al. (2012). p3 
417 Ibid. p9 
418 Ibid. p4 
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that the intervention is having the desired effects. References to RCTs as a gold standard for SIM crop 
up fairly often. Reeder et al’s article on social impact measurement, for example, points out that “A 
prominent strand of debate among analysts argues that rigour in assessment is vital and that 
randomised control trials are the most powerful tool for achieving that rigour.”419 Similarly, these 
comments appear in a document on SIM in the ‘youth justice sector’: 
One particularly acute issue for impact measurement, particularly in youth justice, is 
attribution. Young offenders often receive several services at different stages of the criminal 
justice process, which makes it hard to ascertain how much each service contributes to change. 
… Randomised controlled trials or a good comparison method should ideally be used to 
prove a new approach works.420 
RCTs sit out at one end of the spectrum of rigour – they are some of the most time-consuming and 
technically difficult types of impact measurement. But even when RCTs or experimental methods are 
not mentioned explicitly, I think it is often the case that authors, when writing about the need for 
SIM, have in mind a process that proves or demonstrates that impact really is being created. The 
WGIM report, for example, states “Measurement demonstrates the social impact that these 
investments are having, which further legitimizes the practice.”421 While the word ‘demonstrate’ is less 
forceful than ‘prove’, in this context I think it suggests a need for SIM to show even the sceptics that 
investors claiming to create impact are in fact doing so. I think it is this kind of concern that is being 
expressed in this passage from the Inspiring Impact report: 
Poor quality impact measurement practice can lead to scepticism about findings. ’People 
don’t believe our findings,’ might become a regular refrain if these issues are not addressed 
and if standards are not raised. So building the capacity and skills of CSOs is critical to 
making impact measurement work for them, but also critical to preventing impact 
measurement as a field from being discredited.422 
This concern for demonstration and proof is made clearer by contrasting it with the other side of the 
ambiguity. Here SIM is about generating information to inform decisions about creating and 
‘managing’ impact. Here is a very explicit statement to this effect from Jeremy Nicholls on the 
purpose of SROI: 
SROI … can be compared with financial accounting in that the purpose of the [social value] 
principles and their application is to provide good enough information for those receiving the 
social returns to make decisions.423 
The GECES report also puts emphasis on decision making: 
In the case of all stakeholders, a key need for social impact measurement can be seen in 
decision-making. … All are aiming, to draw a parallel with accounting principles, to obtain all 
                                                   
419 Reeder et al. (2015). p8 
420 New Philanthropy Capital, Camilla Nevill and Tris Lumley, Measuring Together: Impact Measurement in the 
Youth Justice Sector (2011). p3 
421 Working Group on Impact Measurement (2014). p1 
422 Lumley et al. (2011). p16 
423 Jeremy Nicholls, ‘Social Return on Investment — Development and Convergence’, Evaluation and Program 
Planning (2016). p4 
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reliable (with all that that means in terms of objectivity and consistency as between persons 
and across time frames) information relevant for decision-making.424 
The point is not that decisions are important in their own right, but that decisions are being made 
about how to best create impact. I think it is decision making that is being invoked in comments such 
as this one, from the WGIM report, that their guidelines “are based on the fundamental principle that 
impact measurement should help impact organizations manage performance, learn [and] improve 
outcomes.”425 The term ‘performance’ is taken from business and expanded to mean performance in 
relation to the creation of impact. Just as managers of a business need indicators to help them decide 
how best to run their business, and maximise profit, so the managers of a social investor or an SSO 
need indicators of impact to help them decide how best to continue creating impact. SIM is about 
improving outcomes, not proving them.  
Now, the tension between these two orientations has not gone unnoticed. The criticisms, as far as I 
have seen, only go in one direction, with some actors attacking the preoccupation with proving impact 
(and nobody arguing that the focus should not be on informing decision making). The focus, they 
argue, should really be on improving impact.  Jeremy Nicholls, longtime standard bearer for SROI, 
asserts that the “focus on levels of accuracy for scientific proof” detracts from efforts to make “choices 
between different options for creating impact.”426 Similarly, a blog post by Ben Carpenter, colleague of 
Nicholls (and appointed his successor in 2018), states: 
Perhaps it’s time we stopped worrying about rigour when it comes to impact measurement. 
The parallels with highly rigorous academic evaluation are not healthy and if you look at 
businesses, low levels of rigour is used frequently to support decisions. (Low levels of rigour 
often better than nothing). As someone on[c]e said to me… “it’s about enough precision for 
the decision”427 
They do not quite say it precisely, but my interpretation of these comments is that they are aimed at 
attempts to use experimental methods to prove impact, defending instead the generation of impact 
data to inform decision making. 
A similar line of argument is found in a report published by Acumen Fund in the US, who in 2015 
publicised a new approach to impact measurement called ‘Lean Data’. In this report they claim that 
the “prevailing wisdom within the sector is that collecting data about social performance is 
burdensome and expensive, and some impact investors and social entrepreneurs would assert that it is 
a distraction from the ‘core’ work of building a financially sustainable social enterprise.” This is 
because “we’ve allowed ourselves to be convinced, incorrectly, that the tools we inherited from 
traditional monitoring and evaluation (M&E) methodologies are the only way to gather social 
performance data.” Using these “traditional” methodologies, “to state that an intervention has 
‘impact’ usually requires a high degree of certainty of attribution, based on the existence of a relevant 
control group against which to judge a counterfactual (i.e. what would have happened anyway without 
the intervention).”428  The Lean Data approach, in contrast, which relies on techniques for data 
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collection that use mobile data technology, means that “we can finally see – in close to real-time and at 
a fraction of the cost of traditional research studies – the data we need to understand if we are 
achieving our purposes as agents of change.” Using Acumen’s approach, the data collected gives an 
“indication” of social change. In most cases they do not use formal control groups, “largely because we 
have found it impractical in the context of the social enterprise.” 429 Acumen therefore make a direct 
attack on the portrayal of SIM as about proving impact and establishing findings with quasi-scientific 
certainty. In contrast, they emphasise light-touch data collection that gives an indication, rather than 
proof, so that decision makers can make better informed choices about how to maximise impact. 
Impetus PEF, a foundation based in the UK, similarly published its approach to impact measurement 
as a response to the confusion around what SIM is trying to achieve.430 
These examples tell us that the experience of trying to prove impact has proven sufficiently 
unsatisfactory to prompt these authors to speak out, and in the case of Acumen to spend considerable 
resources on developing and marketing an alternative approach.  
In some ways these two functions seem quite compatible. Indeed, there is huge potential for confusion 
here about the argument I am seeking to make. It seems very logical to suggest that a decision maker 
would want to measure impact in as robust a way as possible, to provide themselves with the best 
information for decision making. There is agreement that, in establishing impact, it is important to 
think about attribution, deadweight, displacement and so on. It is always important to be robust, it is 
always important to be transparent in one’s reasoning, and to use a clear, explicit method in backing 
up claims about impact. The contrast is not between a scientific approach to proving impact that is 
rigorous and robust, and a decision maker’s approach to improving impact which is sloppy and 
inconsistent. The language of method and rigour does not help us in drawing the distinction between 
proving and improving.  
The contrast is, instead, between different intended audiences for the information. When SIM is being 
used to prove impact, it is being prepared for an external (and potentially sceptical) audience, and used 
to convince them that impact is indeed being created. When SIM is being used to improve impact, on 
the other hand, it is being used internally. It acts as a system for generating information about what is 
taking place on an ongoing basis, to inform decision making. The salience of this contrast becomes 
clearer when we turn to the matter of accountability. 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTEGRITY 
To recap, this is the last of four chapters exploring the logic internal to SI as a programme of 
government. Our focus is on the way the need for measurement is formulated within this logic. So far 
we have drawn attention to the fact that there are different knowledge orientations present within the 
debate around SIM. These observations are not specific to social investment, and they are relatively 
straightforward to demonstrate based on the discussion around choice of method.  
But if we narrow down our focus to the logic of social investment, it is clear that this conversation 
around method is influenced by the uses to which SIM is (supposedly) put. I want to draw attention 
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to the interplay between SIM and two other aspects of the vision for social investment: accountability, 
and what we can call the ‘integrity’ of the SI market. 
What do I mean by these two things? ‘Accountability’ is curiously difficult to pin down. It is nowhere 
defined in the social investment literature. If we attempt to think for ourselves what it means for 
someone to ‘be accountable’, we do not find a simple, general answer to that question. It strikes me 
that it is a matter of opinion whether an individual or an organisation has been properly holding 
themselves to account, or been properly held to account by an outside party. That is, different parties 
may have very different opinions over whether an organisation is properly accountable, which will 
depend to a large extent on whether they are happy with the organisation’s activities. Similarly, an 
employee might in theory be accountable to their manager, for example, but if they contradict that 
manager’s instructions without consequence then it is not clear whether they ‘really are’ accountable 
for their actions. What it means to ‘be accountable’, I would suggest, is based very much in individual 
or group perspectives, or in a particular context, and cannot easily be ‘objectively’ determined. 
It is easier to pin down what is meant by the idea of the ‘integrity’ of SI. An obvious criticism faced by 
social investment is that it is not really social at all, it is just another form of profitmaking in disguise. 
This concern is referred to in various ways – more recently ‘impact washing’ has entered the SI jargon, 
echoing ‘greenwashing’ as a way of calling out companies that pretend to more environmentally 
friendly than they really are.  
Whether it is referred to as “the integrity of the impact investing market” or “potential mislabelling of 
an impact investment”(all phrases used by WGIM), social investment advocates want to be able to say 
with confidence that there is a difference between social investment and mainstream, profit-making 
investment. As we have highlighted at multiple points, it is the innovative mode of reasoning about 
social investment that faces the heaviest burden of proof, because it remains committed to the idea 
that social investment need not entail any restrictions on profit.  
Integrity, I am arguing, is a central concern of SI advocates, and it is intimately linked to both 
accountability and impact measurement. WGIM articulates connections between these three elements 
that support the direction I want to take my analysis. The report enshrines accountability in the first 
of “four overarching long-term priorities” for social investment, and links it to the notion of integrity: 
#1: Embrace impact accountability as a common value  
WHY: Unless impact investors hold themselves and each other accountable for living up to 
their commitments to invest with intent for impact, the integrity of the field will be 
compromised.431 
It also makes the following claim: 
Thus, mechanisms being developed to support impact measurement should … help minimize 
the risks around potential mislabeling of an impact investment. This involves the eventual 
integration and alignment of practices that can allow a range of investors to adopt social and 
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environmental impact considerations into their portfolios. This action would also serve to 
protect the integrity of the impact investing market.432 
If market integrity is an anticipated line of attack from sceptics about SI, then claims to accountability 
are a key line of defence. By calling for accountability in social investment practice, advocates 
anticipate the sceptics with the response: social investment is different because actors in the market 
willingly hold themselves and each other accountable for the impact they create. In turn, these kinds 
of accountability suggest some reliance on measurement, because accountability relies on there being 
knowledge or evidence of impact. 
There is a degree of conjecture in making these connections. They are not explicitly supported by the 
texts; rather they are compatible with what is said, if the large amount of ambiguity is interpreted in 
certain ways. The reason for setting up this formulation is to bring to light certain aspects of SI that 
have significant implications for the development of the field. 
How do we advance from here? The next step is introduce Hacking’s notion of multivalence. 
MULTIVALENCE 
‘Accountability’ is both descriptive and evaluative. Accountability refers to accounting for something – 
to counting, enumerating, establishing the facts. But it also refers to being held responsible, to 
subjecting oneself to the opinions of others, to doing the right thing. It therefore displays the same 
kind of multivalence that we have encountered at several points over the course of the thesis: in 
chapter 2 we summarised Hacking’s comments on the matter, and noted the presence of multivalence 
in Smith’s account of the market, which contains statements both of how things are and how they 
ought to be, and in chapter 3 we saw this multivalence at play in relation to the SI market. In this 
section I will suggest a schematisation of these two senses of accountability in the context of social 
investment, before going on to demonstrate how they are both present in the source material.  
On the one hand, we can consider accountability as accounting. Actors in the social investment 
market are called on to account for the social impact they create, which is another way of referring to 
SIM. As we have seen above, SIM is (usually) about generating numerical data about impact, both so 
the organisation can demonstrate its results, and so that it has a better understanding of its impact, 
and can make better informed decisions. These practices are associated with a form of accountability 
where the process of defining a measurement framework and then reflecting on the results means that 
organisations are considered and intentional about what they are trying to achieve and whether they 
are achieving it.  
On the other hand, we can think about accountability in terms of those in charge being held 
responsible for the decisions they make. This implies a process of managers being subjected to 
questioning by others, and being made to justify their decisions, potentially changing tack if the 
parties that the manager is accountable to deem it necessary. This version of accountability implies the 
views of multiple parties being acknowledged. The former sense is concerned with the facts about what 
has been achieved, while the latter sense is concerned with ensuring the right decisions are made. 
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This difference can be brought into relief by considering a situation where the impact being created is 
not welcomed by all groups. Consider an investment in building a new renewable energy plant in the 
north of England. The impact of this investment would be thought of in terms of a range of metrics 
such as how much energy is being produced from clean sources, improved access to clean energy, 
reduced pollution and so on. If we are thinking about accountability in terms of accountability for 
results, then the investors and investees would be held accountable for performance against these 
metrics. Has the project achieved the results expected of it? If not, why not? The results, moreover, can 
be used to demonstrate that the investment has indeed created impact, confirming its status as a social 
investment, and not just a profit-making venture.  
But the creation of the plant might not be welcomed by everybody. Local residents might feel it 
destroys natural beauty, or creates unacceptable noise, and so on. Accountability for results is no good 
to them, because they are unhappy with the changes regardless of how much clean energy is produced. 
These local residents might seek ways to hold the decision makers to account. Ideally, there would be a 
process before the changes taking place by which the plans are made available for scrutiny, and local 
residents have an opportunity to negotiate with the decision makers.   
This difference can be explained in terms of interests. If we construe the need for accountability in 
terms of accountability for results, the assumption is being made that the intended impact is welcome, 
and what matters is whether it is being achieved or not. It follows that interests are (assumed to be) 
aligned. Everyone is oriented to the same end. In contrast, if accountability is construed in terms of 
holding decision makers to account for the impact they intend to create, there is recognition that not 
everybody always wants the same thing, and that there may be situations where interests are not 
aligned. In this case, accountability mechanisms are needed to ensure that the impacted parties have 
some say in deciding what happens. Of course, this is a dichotomy that also maps onto the difference 
between the political and the technical. Accountability for results is important on a version of things 
where interests are aligned, and the question of accountability pivots on the technical matter of 
whether the stated impact has been achieved or not. Being held to account, in contrast, is important 
when the creation of impact is viewed as taking place in a political arena, where conflicts of interest are 
anticipated. 
ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY 
We have marked out two forms of accountability. This will now help us to consider the mechanisms 
that would be suitable in ensuring these different kinds of accountability, not, to be clear, whether 
accountability is in fact ensured in any given instance of social investment.  
Chapters 4 and 5 have already touched on a number of different mechanisms for accountability 
available to actors in the social investment market. These are the mechanisms used to help ensure 
social status: SIM, regulated legal forms, embedding social mission in governing documents, and so 
on. If we think once more of accountability as being held responsible, we can see that a number of 
mechanisms present themselves as suitable.  
Governance structures are an option. If a company embeds a commitment to social mission in its 
governing documents, then the people running the company can be held accountable by the board. 
We saw in chapter 5 that the draft plan for profit-with-purpose companies included various measures 
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for adapting governance structures, and the possibility is acknowledged in other settings. The Angels in 
the Architecture report, for example, reports comments from an interviewee: 
GOVERNANCE AND OWNERSHIP MODELS: … One [interviewee] described a 
“massive accountability gap between investors and intermediaries and the people they are 
benefiting. The ultimate beneficiaries have no voice and have no way to hold them to 
account.” Some nascent infrastructure bodies recognise this challenge, arguing themselves that 
emerging structures “have to be collaborative, and collective either legally or in principle… 
independent of any one investor”.433 
Guidance on CIC regulation reinforces this point, stating that “An effective board will take steps to 
ensure that there is accountability and transparency both internally and externally.”434  
As well as internal governance measures, accountability can also be enabled through third party 
oversight. CICs are already subject to light-touch regulation by the CIC regulator, while charities are 
subject to more intensive regulation by the Charity Commission. As we saw in chapter 5, both of these 
bodies regulate on the basis of ensuring any private benefits are subordinated behind public or 
community benefit.  
But what about those actors who advocate a version of SI in line with the innovative mode of 
reasoning, who are keen to define SI far more broadly than the regulated social sector? There are 
isolated examples of actors calling for third party oversight of the social investment market. One 
suggestion for what this might look like comes from an SSIR article titled Accountability: The Golden 
Opportunity in Impact Investing. The article opens: 
While impact investors rightly focus on positive investment returns, they should also be on 
the lookout for the social and environmental harm that their investments might cause—
because in the final analysis, some of those investments do more harm than good. If impact 
investors adopted a stronger focus on rights-based development and accountability, they could 
make better decisions and improve their impact.435 
The author points to examples of “projects sold as impact investments” having “devastating effects”, 
arguing that “When failure happens … then the people harmed need a forum to raise grievances”. She 
suggests that impact investors “create a freestanding accountability office” that ensures SI is in line 
with “rights-based development”.436 
Taken together, these versions of accountability suggest either internal governance processes or 
external stakeholder engagement that are about holding decision makers responsible, whether it is 
about ensuring that they remain committed to the social mission, or ensuring that any unintended 
side effects are properly recognised, and negatively affected parties compensated.  
These versions of accountability sit in contrast to accountability as counting and measuring social 
impact. This second form of accountability is made possible through SIM practice. The quote above 
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from the WGIM report about “embracing impact accountability as a common value” continues as 
follows: 
WHAT: While many impact investors and investees increasingly understand that impact 
measurement is important, not everyone acknowledges its inherent link to impact 
accountability … Investees often have mixed feelings about measurement because, while it 
should help them achieve financial and societal objectives, it can feel like a burden which 
distracts them from their core operations. Similarly, while investors increasingly understand 
the importance of impact measurement, too many of them still view it as part of monitoring 
and evaluation activities rather than a way to improve and increase their impact.437 
These authors go as far as asserting an “inherent link” between measurement and accountability. They 
are not the only ones to make connections like this.  A second example is a more academic paper 
trying to establish clarity around what measurement should be aiming to achieve. It opens as follows: 
Since the early 1990s, the refrain of “accountability” has been ascendant, with funders, 
taxpayers, concerned citizens, and clients demanding that nonprofits be more transparent 
about their fundraising and spending, how they are governed, and what they have achieved 
with the resources entrusted to them. A more recent manifestation of this discourse has 
centered on the mantra of “impact,” or demonstrating results in addressing complex social 
problems such as poverty and inequality.438 
These authors associate impact with “demonstrating results”. Further down, they refer to how impact 
measurement is used to satisfy “external accountability expectations”.439 In this context, accountability 
seems to mean being able to show external stakeholders that impact has been created, and in sufficient 
quantities. The EVPA guide also makes a connection between accountability and the results of SIM, 
i.e. that SIM produces evidence of impact that can be used to hold the SSO to account. They develop 
this notion by connecting accountability to the degree of rigour being used. “Depending on how 
accountable you expect your investees to be,” the EVPA guide states, “you can increase the rigour of 
your analysis and thereby reduce the risk of any impact claims made.”440 Investees who undertake the 
longer and more complex SIM processes can say with more certainty what impact they are having, and 
in this sense are more accountable. This suggests that organisations with less robust, lighter touch SIM 
processes are less accountable due to the greater uncertainty over their claims to impact. This begins to 
take us into murky territory – the connection between impact data and social risk and return – but the 
example stands to show that accountability in the minds of these authors is closely linked with SIM.  
Setting things out in this way hopefully convinces the reader that these two senses of accountability are 
distinct, and that they are associated with different mechanisms available in social investment. Before 
we go any further, it is worth acknowledging the argument that is sometimes made that measurement 
processes can be used not just for accounting and enumerating (one sense of accountability), but also 
for holding decision makers responsible (the other kind).  
I have in mind here the argument made specifically in relation to SROI that the process of stakeholder 
consultation undertaken in the course of specifying the outcomes framework is an opportunity for 
beneficiaries to hold the delivery organisation to account. One of the seven principles of social value 
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that structure the SROI approach is “value the things that matter”. The Guide elaborates on this 
principle: 
Financial proxies should be used in order to recognise the value of these outcomes and to give 
a voice to those excluded from markets but who are affected by activities. This will influence 
the existing balance of power between different stakeholders.441 
It also states that one of the reasons why SROI is beneficial is its role in: 
creating a formal dialogue with stakeholders that enables them to hold the service to account 
and involves them meaningfully in service design.442 
The emphasis within SROI is on ensuring that the data collection framework is based on consultation 
with stakeholders, not a top-down imposition of what management thinks its impact is. It is down to 
stakeholders to say what social value is being created by an intervention. The methodology recognises, 
however, that it is not feasible to include every single outcome mentioned in the consultation process. 
It is up to the analyst to apply the ‘materiality’ test, asking whether each of the outcomes are material 
to the analysis: 
materiality is a concept that is borrowed from accounting. In accounting terms, information is 
material if it has the potential to affect the readers’ or stakeholders’ decision. A piece of 
information is material if missing it out of the SROI would misrepresent the organisation’s 
activities.443 
Stakeholders’ comments, therefore, are filtered through the materiality requirement. This passage from 
a 2016 article reviewing the progress of SROI sheds further light on the connection between 
stakeholder engagement in SROI, materiality and accountability: 
Social Value International’s perspective is that organizations should be accountable for the 
effects that their activities have, for the material outcomes caused by the organization that can 
be attributed to it … This is a wide view of materiality, considering what is material from the 
perspective of stakeholders … This does not mean that an organization would need to 
account for every effect that individual stakeholders argue are [sic] material. Judgements are 
inescapable in materiality decisions and this leads to the need for independent assurance of 
those judgements. The assurance provider is, in effect, acting on behalf of those who have 
been affected is assessing whether these judgements are reasonable. … Nonetheless the 
starting point is that those without power and without a voice will be less likely to find ways 
to hold organizations to account for the effects of their activities and so the materiality 
decision is designed to ensure that these effects are included.444 
Here, Jeremy Nicholls acknowledges that the materiality requirement places decision making power in 
the hands of the analyst, rather than the stakeholders, and that ideally independent assurance would be 
used to ensure that the analyst’s judgements are fair. This kind of independent assurance does not 
currently exist. There is a third party assurance service provided by Social Value International, but this 
assures the quality of the analysis, and does not check the accuracy of the reporting against 
independently collected data. The assurance process therefore would not be able to verify the analyst’s 
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representation of stakeholder views. We can therefore cast doubt on the extent to which stakeholders 
taking part in an SROI consultation are really given an opportunity to hold the delivery organisation 
to account. 
In any case, SROI is only loosely drawn under the same umbrella of SIM, and much of the time, 
where SIM is appealed to, the process being referred to is more like the basic steps described in the 
first half of this chapter. That is certainly the case with the WGIM report, because it goes on to 
elaborate a best practice version of SIM that follows these steps.  
If we consider the possibility that this more general form of SIM practice, in which a framework is 
specified, data collected and analysed and delivery improved based on the findings, can play a role in 
ensuring decision makers are held responsible, then I think we encounter more fundamental problems. 
Measurement requires a framework specified in advance, that guides data collection. Beneficiaries and 
other parties are then asked to provide data in a specified format. This data is not an open invitation 
for the expression of opinions. Measurement means beneficiaries are asked to respond to the questions 
asked. They are not given an opportunity to comment on whether the questions are appropriate, or 
suit their situation. The process of producing impact metrics requires a quite specific form of data. 
Of course, it may be that (some) beneficiaries are included in the process of specifying the 
measurement framework. This suggests an openness to multiple opinions at the stage where the 
organisation is deciding what exactly their intended impact is. But if impact data is going to play the 
functions asked of it – deepening understanding of impact across the organisation, and allowing 
comparison over time and across locations – those outcomes become at least partially fixed. 
Measurement requires consistency across geographies and over time. It is part of the programmatic 
delivery of social change. This suggests incompatibility with a process of questioning what is being 
done, and potentially changing tack.  
My intention here is to bring attention to the incompatibility between accountability for the way 
things are done and measurement. They make different starting assumptions. This has no bearing on 
the motivations or intentions of those who attempt to use measurement in this way. It may well be the 
case that much of the time, in practice, measurement processes are combined with forms of 
stakeholder consultation that do genuinely try to understand the needs and views of those affected, 
and to be responsive to them. My point is that those latter forms of consultation are not measurement 
practices, and they are not what is meant when actors talk about the importance and need for SIM in 
social investment. It may well also be the case that organisations prioritise responsiveness to 
beneficiaries over consistency of data collection, in which case their SIM will not be able to prove their 
impact, and is less likely to be useful in improving it, because benchmarking and comparisons will not 
be possible. There are, in fact, signs that SIM practice has already started to move away from the best 
practice described above towards what is being called ‘impact management’. This is a topic for 
discussion in chapter 7.  
MEASUREMENT AND THE MARKET 
So far we have made the argument that accountability for results is different from accountability for 
how things are done, and that the former is most obviously enabled by measurement mechanisms, 
while the latter is most obviously enabled by governance and oversight mechanisms. At this stage, I am 
suggesting this schematisation as a way of looking at the issue of accountability in the vision for social 
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investment. As I noted at the start of this section, the way that the term is being used is hardly 
specified at all. Actors do not always explain what they mean by accountability. We are therefore 
limited in how firmly we can root these observations in the source materials. I have used a number of 
examples above that seem to correlate with one or the other view. I think the main strength of the 
argument, however, lies in joining up this discussion around measurement and accountability with the 
concept of the market. Given the ambiguity and lack of specification we face over references to 
accountability, my claim is that the following account makes the most sense in explaining the role of 
accountability in social investment.  
The two modes of reasoning come back into play here. The principled mode is not of prime interest 
here. Entailing an emphasis on regulated company forms, or at least on ensuring impact is prioritised 
over profit, this way of thinking about SI places less faith in the market mechanism, seeing SI as one of 
numerous techniques for creating impact. But if we adopt the innovative mode, we seek to move the 
territory of ‘social’ investment onto ground that is agnostic towards profit-making, instead 
emphasising the intention to create impact, and the collection of data to inform decision making and 
demonstrate results. I now want to make the argument that reasoning in the innovative mode entails 
appealing to a version of accountability that is compatible with the operation of a market.  
In making this argument, I am suggesting that when actors make general statements about the need 
for accountability such as those quoted from the WGIM and GIIN reports above, they have in mind 
measurement practices that enable a kind of accountability for results, not governance and oversight 
mechanisms that would introduce radically different elements to this market to those found in 
mainstream finance. We have already encountered this argument in chapter 5, with the insistence that 
social investment can be made into the ‘unregulated’ social sector – organisations that have no 
regulation with respect to their social status. The Clark Bill in the PWP report acknowledges a whole 
range of possible governance mechanisms, but emphasises that none of them should be compulsory. 
The message is that organisations in the SI market should be able to decide for themselves what 
mechanisms they use, whether they embed social mission in their governing documents, specify duties 
of directors and officers of the company to pursue social mission, and so on. The one exception is 
measurement, which features in the definitions of social investment. The SIIT, as a reminder, defines 
social impact investments as “those that intentionally target specific social objectives along with a 
financial return and measure the achievement of both.”445 
From this perspective, calls for actors in the market to hold themselves accountable take on renewed 
significance. The GIIN, for example, aspires to “create a world” where “businesses and investors will 
hold themselves accountable to multiple sets of stakeholders.”446 Viewing matters in terms of the 
market allows us to see that the direct implication of this claim is that businesses and investors hold 
themselves accountable rather than being held to account by any outside parties. I think that external 
governance and accountability mechanisms are not being talked about because they are incompatible 
with the growth of a market. They would constitute a barrier to entry. Of course it would be very 
difficult to create such mechanisms in a way that was effective, considering how variable social 
investment practice is, and the degree of disagreement and conceptual fuzziness over the basic tenets of 
the field. But these are problems that plague impact measurement as well, and yet we see enormous 
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energy and resources going into realising the potential of SIM. There is no parallel effort for 
governance and oversight, and very few calls for such things to be developed. I contend this is because 
they do not play a significant role in a vision of social change made possible by the market and 
measurement.  
This is why I think that when actors make calls for accountability in social investment, particularly 
when they reason along lines consistent with the innovative mode, they are referring to a kind of 
accountability for results enabled through impact measurement. Crucially, the multivalence 
characteristic of the term makes it possible for actors to invoke a political form of accountability for 
the way things are done while simultaneously referring to technical practices that are fully compatible 
with the operation of a market. This is a significant plank in the overall argument of the thesis, that 
social investment puts forward a vision of social change that relies on technical mechanisms for solving 
social problems. The multivalent nature of accountability helps to explain why social investment so 
convincingly occupies a thoroughly political terrain without recourse to political mechanisms. 
This discussion also gives us greater perspective on the material earlier in this chapter regarding the 
multiple functions assigned to SIM. Measurement not just enables accountability, it is also useful to 
the organisations engaging in it. The debate around proving or improving impact tells us that actors 
see measurement as something that generates information that is useful for decision making. To the 
extent that actors recognise the difference between these two impulses, the argument is usually made 
that the emphasis should move away from an unhelpful preoccupation with proving impact.  
But if measurement is also being called on to play a function with regards to accountability, then this 
debate can be reinvigorated. SIM oriented to proving impact could plausibly play a role in enabling 
accountability for results. It would provide information that outsiders could use to establish whether 
and how much impact has been created. SIM oriented to improving impact, on the other hand, plays 
a much less obvious role in enabling accountability for results. Not only is that information oriented 
to generating indicators for internal use, the results are grounded in the judgement of the analyst. If 
that analyst has incentive to skew the analysis in one direction or another, the results are not obviously 
useful for holding that organisation to account. 
I am not arguing that these inconsistencies ought to be addressed, but asking how and why it is that 
SIM practice continues in this manner despite these inconsistencies. By bringing calls for 
accountability into contact with the market and measurement, I think it becomes clearer that 
measurement is looked to as a solution for a range of problems, all of which are indispensible 
components of the vision for social investment.  
These questions are critical to the ongoing expansion of social investment. If this analysis is persuasive, 
it is implicated whenever somebody talks about the integrity of the field, because any reference to 
integrity or the risk of ‘impact washing’ invokes the possibility that actors will enter the field who are 
not really committed to impact, thus threatening the very identity and distinctiveness of social 
investment as different from investment as usual.  
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SOCIAL CHANGE AS ‘IMPACT’ 
We turn now to a different line of attack in understanding the role SIM plays in the context of SI. 
SIM can be analysed in terms of the epistemological nature of the knowledge it generates about 
impact. As we have already set out, the SIM cycle involves gathering facts about impact, and then 
analysing them. We will now turn our focus onto the nature of these facts, which display the same 
kind of duality we have found at multiple points over the course of our discussion. 
The way impact data is treated within discussions of impact measurement and its role in social 
investment strongly suggests ‘facts’ that behave just like the observed particulars Poovey discusses. As a 
reminder, Poovey describes the duality as follows: 
On the one hand, facts seem (and can be interpreted as being) simply the kind of deracinated 
particulars that Bacon claimed to value; on the other hand, facts seem (and can be said) to 
exist as identifiable units only when they constitute evidence for some theory – only, that is, 
when a theoretical reason to notice these particulars and name them as facts.447 
In chapter 3 we noted this duality is present in the market, and the designation of supply and demand. 
Something similar is going on with SIM. Consider the SIM cycle described above. It is clear and 
explicit that the first stage in the measurement process is to define a measurement framework, because 
that is how one decides which outcomes should be measured. Furthermore, that framework lends 
structure to the analysis once the data has been collected. I am arguing that these measurement 
frameworks are used, borrowing Poovey’s words, to determine “a theoretical reason to notice these 
particulars”. The other side of the duality is also clearly in place, because impact facts are very much 
treated as “simple descriptors” of “deracinated particulars”. In this sense, impact facts display the 
duality Poovey identified, which is present in any impact data that is used to support systematic 
knowledge about impact. It is present whenever a piece of information is gathered that is then 
recorded, aggregated and numerically manipulated, the reasoning that went into collecting that 
particular number lost from view.  
This might sound like a criticism, stopping just short of labelling SIM as meaningless. That is not my 
intention. Poovey’s work demonstrates that the kind of duality exhibited by impact facts have been a 
feature of scientific and social scientific knowledge since Bacon, in the eighteenth century. Identifying 
the same feature here is not a criticism in itself. I do not have the right to say what forms of knowledge 
are meaningful or not. Meaning is found by those who generate and use these numbers. There are 
plenty of systems of knowledge production that could be criticised on similar grounds – financial 
accounting, for example – that have an established role in the functioning of modern society.  
The point here is to ask what this feature of SIM as a kind of knowledge production makes possible. It 
is this duality that makes it thinkable that complex, heavily context-dependent features of reality can 
be meaningfully captured through techniques such as scale-based measures. It opens up a new frontier, 
a version of social change backed up by metrics. I think that the mixed pedigree of SIM is important 
here. Many of the techniques used in SIM practice were not developed in this context, but have 
instead been borrowed from other settings. Accounting practice, economic modelling, social science 
research and psychological testing have all been drawn on to provide the techniques used in SIM and 
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– crucially – their conceptual backing. These techniques have existed for some time. The SI context is 
different because the measurement of social change is combined with its management. Once more, this 
is the difference between proving and improving. A new frontier is opened up because a whole range 
of organisations are finding themselves newly susceptible to demands for impact measurement. It is 
not just researchers and academics seeking to understand impact, but SSOs and investors. And because 
these organisations are not seeking to establish knowledge for knowledge’s sake, SIM good practice has 
also drawn on performance management and organisational strategy. This can be seen in calls for 
proportionality in SIM, recognising that SIM requires resources and has to be balanced against other 
demands.  
As these varied influences have coalesced in the context of SI, ‘impact’ has emerged as an abstract 
noun in its own right, something that can be both measured and managed, broken down into 
component parts, enumerated, and tracked over time. Social investment is not the only domain in 
which impact has assumed such a status – higher education being another example – but it is 
distinctive to social investment that impact has come to be used in a parallel sense to social change 
itself. Furthermore, impact has enabled an understanding of social change that assumes it can be 
brought about even by those who are some distance from where the impact is taking place. Briefly, I 
would like to highlight a few examples of the most optimistic reasoning about the possibilities afforded 
by impact data. 
OPTIMISM ABOUT DATA 
The assumption that social change can be measured, based (I am arguing) on the duality in impact 
facts, and bolstered by a broader excitement around the possibilities opened up by large volumes of 
data, has made it quite possible to become enormously optimistic about what SIM might make 
possible.  
Consider, for example, the ideal of standardisation often stated as a long-term goal for SIM. The goal 
is for SSOs across the social sector to all generate the same kinds of impact facts, so that these numbers 
can be aggregated, manipulated and compared across sectors and geographies. “Comparability is key 
to creating an efficient marketplace”, writes the WGIM, “where decisions between investment 
opportunities can be made in a timely manner, objectively, and with minimal costs.”448 This goal relies 
on the creation of (deracinated) impact facts that can be extracted from the context in which they are 
generated.  
One of the purest versions of this vision is in the ideal of converting impact data into financial form: 
Capital markets work best when all relevant parties can quantify and agree upon the financial 
value of a good being traded. The financial value of the social and environmental outcomes 
achieved by impact investments is not, for the moment, as easily quantifiable. But this is 
changing. Currently, calculating the cost and/or return of an impact investment or outcome is 
often constrained by the intangible nature of many of these outcomes and the considerable 
resources often required to quantify and attribute these outcomes, which can put a financial 
strain on an organization. Yet, participants recognize that quantification is essential for the 
growth of the marketplace.449 
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The optimism is palpable. Just imagine what would be possible if we could collectively agree on a way 
to quantify social outcomes in a manner consistent enough to assign financial values. This optimism is 
made possible by existing SIM practices that depend on the deracination of impact facts. 
One of the most striking examples of the optimism over what data can make possible is an initiative 
called the ‘Impact Genome Project’. The Genome will “will systematically code the vast evidence-base 
drawing from corporate, NGO, academic and government resources in order to quantify outcomes, 
identify key success factors and create critical benchmark data in this vital area.” 450  It “turns 
unstructured data from academic studies, nonprofit programs, and expert opinion into the Impact 
Genome®, a structured knowledge system of effective program components, best practices in 
measurement, and simplified impact reporting.” 451  The parallel with the better-known Human 
Genome Project is intentional, creating the impression that the key to understanding social change 
can be discovered in the same way that scientists are discovering the genes that cause various human 
traits. This is a project that assumes underlying consonance of outcomes, outcomes that underpin 
“unstructured data” from thousands of different studies. One of the most prominent figureheads for 
this initiative is a man who freely admits he has no knowledge of the social sector, but has been 
brought in because of his experience in the tech industry.  
One final example is the growing excitement around ‘blockchain’ technology.452 The potential of 
blockchain for social investment has been picked up by (among others) an organisation called The ixo 
Foundation. A white paper published on its website opens with a quote from the WGIM report about 
the importance of impact measurement, and goes on to make the following statement: 
All impact investments need verified impact data, to prove that value has been delivered, to 
get evidence for results and to improve how impacts are achieved. Verified impact data should 
also increase accountability and reduce inequalities and injustices by ensuring that the right 
goods and services are delivered to the right beneficiaries.453 
In light of the earlier discussion of accountability, this claim comes off as enormously optimistic, if not 
naïve. As we know, the issues surrounding the ability of SIM data to enable accountability extend far 
beyond issues of verification. Further into the white paper, it becomes clear that ixo Foundation’s 
proposal is built on one of the clearest articulations I have seen of the consonance between the market 
and measurement as two mechanisms for solving social problems. In this paper, the improvements to 
data infrastructure made possible through blockchain represents a “compelling market opportunity”; 
the “marketplace for Impact Data”, currently inefficient and fragmented, will soon become a “fast-
scaling, decentralized marketplace in which verified impact data is produced and traded through 
networks”.454 
The Impact Genome and ixo are extreme examples, but they help to illustrate the extent to which it 
has become taken for granted that social change, and social problems, can be understood in terms of 
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impact, and that impact is intrinsically amenable to data-driven intervention.455 This is the sense in 
which impact measurement introduces a raft of assumptions, just like the market does. Engaging with 
SIM means buying into a view of social change that sees it as measurable and amenable to 
management. 
INTERESTS AGAIN 
To tie up this discussion of the duality of impact facts, we can return to one of our main themes: the 
role of interests. The duality inherent in impact facts enables a kind of disinterested knowledge about 
impact. Poovey identified the ways in which the modern fact enabled the production of knowledge 
that appeared to be disinterested. Something similar is happening here. The neutral status of the 
market relies on actors in the market only pursuing their own interest. The duality in impact facts 
means that impact can be treated as a matter of fact, as something outside of interests. Impact is 
something to be maximised as part of a technical process.  
But for the creation of impact to be absolutely uncontentious in this way, another assumption has to 
be in place: the assumption that impact is inherently good. It is quite simply taken for granted, in the 
vast majority of reasoning about the social investment market, that impact should be increased as 
much and as quickly as possible.  
We have already touched on this issue with the example of a renewable energy plant creating 
unwelcome impact. This kind of eventuality is sometimes recognised in the literature in terms of 
‘unintentional negative impact’, which is something that has to be minimised. This example comes 
from a report about impact measurement from an impact investing fund: 
We were acutely aware that, as impact investments deliver their intended results, unintended 
impacts also occur, whether for the target end user or for other stakeholders. These 
consequences may be positive or negative. For example, an investment in a low-cost solar 
lighting company that seeks to improve respiratory health (by reducing kerosene usage) will 
create employment as it scales up its salesforce. If those employed increase their skills and 
income more than they would have done otherwise, then positive societal impact is occurring 
beyond the investment’s original intention. Conversely, if the lights are being manufactured 
by an organisation that uses child labour, or the lights rely on polluting batteries, there is 
negative social and environmental impact.456 
In this example, the investors emphasise how keen they are to understand the needs of their 
beneficiaries. They use “case-by-case outcome assessments by gathering feedback from relevant 
stakeholders, understanding what performance looks like for each and aiming to eliminate the negative 
and increase the positive.”457 I give myself no right to comment on the intentions or motivations of 
this investor, nor to question their integrity, but their reasoning helps to demonstrate a more 
fundamental point about the nature of impact. Where negative impact is acknowledged as a 
possibility, we are still operating on the assumption that impact can uncontroversially be classified as 
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either positive or negative. The concept of impact does not allow for the possibility that what makes 
something positive or negative is a topic of ongoing contestation.  
So while the concept of impact makes room for the possibility that the intended impact might be 
accompanied by unintended negative impact, as a kind of side effect, it cannot accommodate the 
possibility that intended impact might be seen as negative by some parties. Viewed in this way, it 
becomes clearer that impact is conceived in a way that is amenable to the market. Impact is a matter of 
fact.   
CONCLUSION 
This is the last chapter exploring the logic internal to SI. The argument regarding accountability and 
integrity is admittedly on less stable ground than preceding chapters, because I am drawing 
connections between elements that are not often talked about together. Much of the conversation 
around SIM is not specific to the growth of the SI market, and much of the conversation around the 
growth of the SI market includes only brief comments about the importance of SIM. Accountability 
and integrity are both referred to without close examination. We can almost glean more from the 
things that are not said than the things that are said – It is not spelled out that accountability is 
conceived of solely in terms of SIM, but there is very little discussion of other forms of accountability 
mechanisms, and no connections made between these other mechanisms and the need to protect the 
integrity of the field. 
The argument is worth making in this way because it captures a crucial aspect of this project to change 
the way we solve the world’s social problems. The issues addressed in this chapter help to explain how 
a form of financial market can extend itself so confidently into this domain. SIM means SI has a 
response to calls for accountability; as we have seen, the multivalence of the term introduces a crucial 
kind of ambiguity, making it possible to refer both to actors involved being held responsible for their 
actions, in a manner not present in mainstream investment, and to actors measuring and accounting 
for the impact they create, in a manner that only answers a limited range of questions.  
It would be easy to imply that this double meaning of accountability allows actors in the market to get 
away with not really being held to account. On the contrary, I am not making a distinction between 
true and false accountability. I am not advancing an argument for what it would mean for actors in 
the market to be truly accountable for their actions. Instead, I am bringing attention to the flexibility 
contained in this term. This feature of social investment is a crucial component in making the 
argument that SI is a thoroughly political project. We can now see that the persuasiveness of this 
vision relies on the technical nature of the mechanisms it uses. Social investment makes it possible to 
do politics without being political.  
Meanwhile, the duality in impact facts play a crucial role in making thinkable a fact-based version of 
social change, which in turn is fully amenable to incorporation into the mechanisms of a financial 
market. This observation strengthens the argument that claims around SIM should be understood in 
relation to the demands of the market structure.  
We have now covered sufficient ground to move beyond the logic of social investment to a more 
pointed discussion of the politics of social investment, and the effects of framing reality in this 
manner.  
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CHAPTER 7: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL 
INVESTMENT 
The paradigm is shifting. Together we can bring a revolution to improve lives. We can seize 
the opportunity to tackle social and environmental issues in new and more powerful ways. We 
can do so by setting measurable outcome objectives for social sector and for-profit 
organisations alike and by measuring their progress in achieving them. … Regular businesses, 
large and small, will become increasingly aware of their social impact, setting social, 
environmental and financial objectives and measuring progress towards achieving them. This 
is the revolution that impact investment portends. Across the world, we can harness 
entrepreneurship, innovation, capital and the power of markets to do good. If we achieve our 
goal, in future the invisible heart of markets will guide the invisible hand to improve the lives 
of those who would otherwise be left behind. 
From the Social Impact Investment Taskforce’s main report,  
Impact Investment: The Invisible Heart of Markets (2014) p42 
In this thesis I set out to develop a critique of social investment. My intention has been neither to 
dismiss SI as problematic, nor to cheerlead for this new way of doing things, but to bring to the 
surface the underlying assumptions and taken-for-granteds that make this field of activity possible. In 
this way, it becomes easier to see both what opportunities are opened up and what possibilities are 
foreclosed by recent developments. 
The past four chapters have set out a detailed exploration of the logic of social investment. 
Distinguishing between the principled and innovative modes of reasoning helps us to pull apart quite 
different ways of thinking about social change and the role of finance in bringing it about. This 
provides us with much-needed clarity in getting to grips with the debate, and for making the 
argument that the innovative version of SI (in particular) stakes out neutral grounds for action. As we 
have seen, interests are (assumed to be) aligned, facts are gathered, and decisions are made. The vision 
for social investment is about building the right mechanisms, ensuring that the market is encouraged 
into life, and that we crack the problem of measuring impact in a standardised, straightforward way. I 
have suggested that, in navigating the considerable ambiguity present in the debate, the interpretation 
that makes most sense  hands over the question of social problems, as far as possible, to the market, 
not least by construing social change as fact-based, and accountability as entailing not oversight or 
regulation but the production of evidence – facts – about impact. 
But this neutral, technical domain of activity has been set out in an undeniably political space. What 
do I mean by ‘political’? I mean it in the everyday sense of the word – social problems are the domain 
of politics to sort out. Political systems are set up to try and ensure the needs of everybody in society 
are met. Democratic processes enable a choice between competing versions of how these systems 
should work. The epigraph to this chapter is provocative in using the language of politics – talk of 
“revolution” and “improving the lives of those who would otherwise be left behind” – but attaches this 
rhetoric to neutral, technical processes of investment.  
I also use the term ‘political’ in the more precise sense that is the inverse of ‘neutral’. Where the vision 
for social investment assumes the alignment of interests, we can ask: on what grounds is such an 
assumption made? Should we not assume instead that interests, sooner or later, will not align? That 
one person’s version of what counts as good and desirable will be different from, and quite possible 
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incompatible with, the next person’s? I want to call out the social investment project – and particularly 
the ‘innovative’ version of this project – for what it is: an intensely political attempt to change the way 
we understanding what social problems are and our options for addressing them.  
After all, should we not be wary of a group of people who in many ways are accustomed to their 
interests being served by the way the world is set up – that is, wealthy investors – setting out a vision 
for solving social problems that happens to leave their position of privilege intact? This is a crucial 
point, but it needs immediate qualification. I am in no way suggesting that every investor in the SI 
market, or even the architects of this market, have set out deliberately to create a foil just for their own 
benefit. I make no charges of disingenuousness. I am not challenging their many heartfelt statements 
of good intentions. That would be to diminish the power of this analysis. Social investment is not a 
story of the powerful oppressing the weak. It is a story of those who believe in the power of markets, 
and of data, to change the way the world works. The point is to accept these good intentions but to 
continue to ask: what effects are being created by conceiving of possibilities in this way? My approach 
is to accept the reasoning as it is set out by those advocating this model, and to bring to the surface the 
implications of this way of viewing the world. As a result, the argument I present gains far more 
traction on how things are being done, and gives reason to pause and think again.  
There are a number of political implications that follow directly from accepting the problematisation 
on which social investment is based. First among these is the assertion that the state has proven itself 
ineffective in dealing with social problems, not just because it does not have the resources to do so. 
Accepting this assertion cuts out whole swathes of possibilities for addressing social problems, and 
obscures options for replenishing the state’s resources by revisiting the rules governing the transfer of 
wealth from private to public hands. Reform of corporate tax simply does not feature in social 
investment’s vision for solving social problems.  
But we can pursue a more detailed and nuanced account of the politics of social investment. As set out 
in the introduction, the word ‘political’ is used here to refer to the inverse of ‘neutral’, where neutrality 
is found in the assumption of (possibility of) the alignment of interests, and in the (possibility of) 
generating disinterested knowledge about the market and about impact. The politics of social 
investment, then, lies in exposing the way in which the ‘neutrality’ of social investment is created. 
Foucault, Poovey and Hacking together help us to see the mechanisms by which neutrality, or 
objectivity, is created. This has been a point of discussion throughout the thesis; in this last chapter, 
the emphasis is on demonstrating that we are thereby engaged in identifying the politics of social 
investment. As the notion of the political suggests, this is a way of setting out why this (creation of) 
neutrality matters – it matters because it has effects on what is thought of as possible or impossible.  
This final chapter identifies these effects by looking to three examples of where the logic internal to SI 
is under strain. This helps to reveal where actors, having accepted the basic framework provided by SI, 
end up employing strained reasoning rather than challenging the basic assumptions of the field. The 
first example is the ‘puzzle of low demand’ – the confusion caused by low levels of demand for social 
investment from SSOs in the first few years of the SI market, despite the significant 
undercapitalisation of the sector. The second is the challenge of doing social impact measurement, and 
the reaction of those who have attempted to implement the guidance. The third is the risk of ‘impact 
washing’, and the attempt to hold oneself accountable. 
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THE PUZZLE OF LOW DEMAND 
Chapter 3 explored the way the market for social investment was introduced as a way of 
understanding the current state of capitalisation of the social sector, and the strategies needed to 
improve this state of affairs. SSOs came to be understood as the ‘demand side’ of the market. This 
framing of reality brought with it a series of expectations, one of the strongest of which was that the 
creation of the market would lead to a healthy volume of investment transactions taking place. The 
creation of BSC, in particular, in the words of one of its founding management team, adopted a “very 
‘build it and they will come’ approach to the market.”458  
We are now in a position to see that actors in the market create a puzzle for themselves. They assume 
that building the market mechanism will enable parties to transact. The questions then start to arise: 
why are these transactions not occurring in sufficient volumes? Why is the market developing more 
slowly than expected? What can be done to grow the market? What are the barriers to its 
development? Given that we have demand for and supply of social investment capital, the question 
becomes: what is preventing them from interacting properly? How can this nascent market be brought 
to maturity?  
It is in this way that the market framework inserts itself into reality, and becomes invisible. While 
there undoubtedly were examples of organisations that were looking for investment capital, which 
found their needs met by the new sources of capital made available under the banner of social 
investment, overall the levels of demand for SI were lower than expected. In the words of an 
interviewee at BSC: 
Interviewee: …you know the SIFIs should be coming to us with lots of proposals and yet, 
you sort of feel, there’s a lack of, we need to have more engagement with the SIFIs. There 
should be more actively coming to us with deals. We should be holding back the doors, them 
coming to us, you know, … all these intermediaries should be desperately trying to put 
together proposals. Instead of which you sort of feel they’re holding back and taking their 
time and not being quite as aggressively trying to get this investment as you thought they 
were.  
Interviewer: do you think that’s partly because of their own deal flow? 
Interviewee: Yeah. Or lack of ambition or possibly… I don’t know  - or maybe the terms on 
which we are able to lend won’t be as attractive as elsewhere. 
In this discussion, and in most of the other discussions around the development of the market, the 
question is not asked: should we reassess how the expected level of demand was arrived at? Instead, 
actors in the market, committed to seeing matters in terms of supply and demand, end up finding 
sometimes quite convoluted ways of reasoning through the supposed ‘lack of demand’.  
One example of this comes from a discussion from the BSC interviews between a senior staff member 
and the interviewer about the idea that they might have to take social investment to the social sector, 
rather than waiting for them to come and ask for it. He made the statement: “I think the thing we are 
going to have to do now more of is a lot more rolling up our sleeves and going to find deals ourselves.” 
The exchange goes on: 
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Interviewer: what was interesting [about what you just said] was the “going out and doing 
deals”. It is starting to behave more like a traditional market. So in a traditional venture 
capital market you have a lot of deals come to you but, generally, good VCs [venture 
capitalists] go out. The hard part is going out and finding the good deals.  
Interviewee: Is that right? See, I don’t even know. 
Interviewer: The VCs, even the big ones, even the ones that are doing fund of funds will get 
tonnes of proposals, but the really good proposals are generally the ones that they go out and 
find. Because the guys that don’t need the capital actually are the ones you need to go 
negotiate with to actually be able to be put into the fund. Those are the really good funds. 
Interviewee: That is very interesting. Anything that helps us make that comparison can be 
very useful for us, because it is beginning to get a bit of traction but it is a different way of 
working. It is quite a lot more work, quite a lot more shoe leather, it is quite a lot more sitting 
on trains… 
Interviewer: And it is also possibly convincing intermediaries that they don’t necessarily see 
all of the value of having to take the money with some of the strings attached. Even going into 
– this is a bit outside of the conversation – but going into places that are used to getting grant 
money and trying to convince them to take and/or equity money, because they have been 
doing a great job and they could actually use the equity money or debt money to expand, but 
that is not always an easy sell, because grant money comes in with a lot less strings attached. 
So that is where is will start getting interesting, is when you guys start to push some of these 
providers to provide more equity and debt-like instruments – and again it goes down to the 
front line: how do you convince some enterprises, when it is easier to get grant money, why 
would you get debt or equity?… And I think it is an overall big market problem that needs to 
be addressed. 
In other words, they agree that SSOs need persuading that grant funding should be turned down in 
favour of loans or equity. It is a “big market problem” that SSOs do not understand the opportunities 
that are available to them through investment, and the persuasion of SSOs that they do in fact want 
investment is part of what needs to happen for the market to develop.  They do not appear to consider 
the possibility that the lack of demand is exactly that – a sign that potential investees do not want 
investment, for whatever reason. They have already accepted the designation ‘demand side’ applies to 
the social sector, and so they search for explanations why this demand is not being realised.  
A similar logic is at play in this report on investment readiness: 
Culturally, it appears there are still considerable barriers to charities taking on social 
investment – almost half of our survey respondents were not interested in investment. The 
majority view of this group believed that charities should not use loans to finance their 
work.459 
The survey showed that almost half of the SSOs surveyed “were not interested” in investment. But this 
fact is framed as a barrier to social investment – that is, the SSO that is not interested in social 
investment is supposedly experiencing their own lack of interest as a barrier to accessing investment 
that they do not want. This is a nonsensical statement, and it arises because the authors are having to 
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somehow consolidate the fact that (on the one hand) the demand for social investment, by definition, 
comes from SSOs, and (on the other) that SSOs often say that they do not want social investment.  
Something similar is happening in this BSC strategy paper, which lists a lack of investment readiness 
as one of the reasons for a lack of demand: 
This lack of demand [for social investment] is partly a reflection of lack of supply of capital, 
but it also reflects the lack of investment readiness in the social sector as well as the lack of 
relevant services available to help frontline social sector organisations become investment 
ready.460 
Does it make sense to claim that lack of demand for SI can be attributed to SSOs not being ready to 
take on investment? Perhaps, if we think of demand in terms of the number of applications being 
made for finance – the more SSOs who are ready to make applications, the more demand there is. But 
the claim becomes a good deal murkier when we think of demand as an expression of the interest and 
motivation of organisations on the demand side. The statement that a lack of investment readiness 
helps to explain a lack of demand is built on the assumption that SSOs want social investment, and 
that they want to reach a state where they are deemed ‘ready’ to take it on. On what grounds are such 
assumptions made? On the basis that SSOs make up the demand side of the market.  
Of course, in itself the slightly awkward reasoning used to understand the social sector in these reports 
is not a particular cause for concern. It is far more significant that this new way of doing things 
introduces changes to what is expected of actors in the market. One of the clearest signifiers of such 
change is the emergence of the notion of ‘investment readiness’. It is not just that organisations on the 
demand side are expected to seek out social investment, it is also expected that they will display certain 
attributes deemed necessary by investors. As the idea of building the SI market took hold in the UK 
social sector, investment readiness became something of a conceptual touchstone, and several reports 
have been published examining the ‘state of investment readiness among SSOs’, and what needs to be 
done to improve it. 
Tellingly, just like accountability, investment readiness is not closely specified. Even the evaluation of 
the UK Government’s ‘Investment and Contract Readiness Fund’ (ICRF) does not provide a 
definition.461 The meaning of the phrase is assumed, attaching to the intuition that investors need 
certain assurances in place if they are going to invest their capital. SSOs who cannot convince investors 
that they are a viable proposition can be thought of as not yet investment ready. The success or 
otherwise of the fund in improving investment readiness was judged by the success of support 
recipients in taking on new contracts or investments. That is, you know investment readiness has been 
achieved when an organisation takes on an investment.  
It is worth drawing attention to an aspect of the shift from grant funding to investment that easily gets 
lost in the self-evidence of what it means to be investment-ready. Repayable finance means 
introducing the return requirement. Recall that social investment is built on the problematisation of a 
social sector that is dependent on grant funding, a practice deemed best left behind. The presentation 
of investment as a solution to the problem of undercapitalisation effaces a crucial difference between 
grants and investment: unlike grants, investment requires a return, or at the very least the repayment 
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of capital. Except for the minority of SSOs who already operate on a model that generates revenue, 
many SSOs, in order to realise their demand for SI, would have to fundamentally alter their mode of 
operation.  
The puzzle of low demand, as I have called it, is something of a flash point. It is where the clash 
between expectations and reality is particularly clear – the volume of transactions is represented by a 
(relatively unambiguous) number, that can be compared to the projections, and shown to be much 
lower. But it is in fact a way of bringing into play a whole range of expectations over what it means to 
be a ‘demand side’ actor in a market for investment. We will recall from the very beginning of the 
thesis that Cohen’s vision for social investment is one that drew on his experience building the market 
for venture capital. This parallel is drawn by others, such as the interviewer in the discussion quoted 
earlier in this chapter. If this is the model for investment on which social investment is based, then we 
can identify a few further assumptions about the basic functioning of this market. 
Venture capital relies on investors being willing to put their capital at risk, taking on ambitious 
entrepreneurs with untested ideas. Though most of these ideas will fail, every so often an idea is 
successful, and is rapidly scaled up, generating huge profits. These gains are what makes the risk worth 
taking. The notion of risk taking is central to the idea of social investment: it enables and encourages 
innovation of a kind that the state is (supposedly) unable to support. If this is the model, then we 
begin to see what kind of expectations might be introduced when requiring SSOs to meet unspecified 
demands for investment readiness. At minimum they need sufficient financial nous to convince the 
investor they can manage money. They need to be entrepreneurial, with an appetite for risk. They 
need to have ambitions for scale. They need to have a robust business model, with a solid plan for 
both financial revenue and impact. Not every social investment will work like this, but the success of 
the market depends on at least some entrepreneurs delivering (financial and social) returns on a huge 
scale.  
While the language of the market for investment was adopted by a critical mass of actors in the 
market, these aspects of venture capital, which are even more distant from the culture of the social 
sector, were certainly not accepted without question. The parallel with high risk, high growth 
investing certainly raised many eyebrows, and was actively resisted on numerous fronts. “The sector is 
now driven by new rules of engagement”, one particularly critical report comments, “largely dictated 
by how to find new markets and how to raise the loan capital necessary to reach those markets. … 
there must now be growth and there must be scale.”462 My argument here is that the introduction of 
the social investment market as a framework for understanding matters made it possible for these 
expectations to gain some traction in the space. It became meaningful to ask why SSOs were not 
meeting these standards. The terms of the debate have been changed.  
It is because of these changed expectations that one of the BSC interviewees can talk about an 
“entrepreneurial deficit” in the social sector. It is because of these changed expectations that ex-finance 
professionals are moving over to the social sector in droves, confident that their financial skills will be 
welcomed in the endeavour to improve the investment readiness of the social sector. It is because of 
these changed expectations that SSOs, even if they were never set up to generate revenue, and even if 
they have no obvious way of earning revenue without fundamentally altering the nature of their 
operation, have to justify their choices with reference to standards of ‘sustainability’ and ‘diversity of 
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income streams’. Even where the extremes of the venture capital market are not drawn on, the idea 
that there can be a functioning financial market in the social sector unavoidably brings with it sets of 
practices and principles that become ‘commonsense’ extensions of what it means for the market to be 
a success. The examples provided here only scratch the surface of the changes that are undoubtedly 
taking place.  
Crucially, I am not intending to insert any value judgements. I am not painting a picture of a social 
sector beseiged by capitalists. There may be benefits to pushing SSOs to think about the sustainability 
of their financing, just as these shifts might be damaging to areas of social need that have no clear way 
to operate on these terms. My intention is to make clearer the nature of the changes we are talking 
about when we discuss the advancement of social investment, and in this sense to identify the politics 
of this programme of government. 
ASSUMING INTERESTS 
We can deepen our understanding of the puzzle of low demand by considering one particular set of 
assumptions introduced by the market structure, regarding interests. As a reminder from our 
discussion of liberalism, in terms of interests, the market achieves what can never be achieved through 
political means. Given that individual subjects are understood to be motivated by their own interests, 
and that the political sovereign cannot claim knowledge of these interests, the market represents a 
superior mechanism for dealing with the problem of governing people according to their interests. The 
effectiveness of this mechanism lies in it operating without any claim to knowledge of individuals’ 
interests. This is one way of understanding why the market is so fervently believed in as a political 
solution. It allows freedom, and leads to superior results, without clumsy and inadequate intervention 
from a centralised authority. This vision of the market has been transplanted across to the social 
sector.  
The point here is to demonstrate that in importing the market in this way, recruiting it in this new 
approach to solving social problems, social investment also imports with it a set of assumptions about 
the interests of the individuals involved. These assumptions encounter problems when they attempt to 
incorporate the social aspect of social investment.  
First and foremost, the political capabilities of the market system rely on individuals being given free 
reign to pursue their own interests. Markets function because it is in the interests of market players to 
transact. This is the sense in which I have talked about the market as a neutral or technical mechanism 
– it coordinates interests that are exogenous to it, without coercion and, if allowed to operate 
undistorted, arrives at a form of equilibrium. Eventually, everybody’s interests will be satisfied. This is 
the doctrine of self interest, and the idea of the ‘spontaneous harmony’ of interests. It follows from 
here that if we are talking about the market for social investment, we are assuming that the parties to 
each investment deal consider it in their interests to transact. Both sides are drawn to compete in the 
marketplace because there is something to gain. One side wants to invest capital, the other wants to 
access this capital, and both want to create social impact. 
But in the case of social investment we can bring this most basic of assumptions into question. Indeed, 
one of the most straightforward explanations for the aspects of market development described in terms 
of a ‘lack of demand’ and a ‘lack of investment readiness’ is that it is not in the interests of these parties 
to transact. Now, it would be simplistic to view the actors in any market as already having fully 
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formed interests that cannot or should not be influenced by anybody else. Marketing and advertising 
attempt to persuade consumers that they should buy certain products. There is nothing to say that 
advocates of social investment should not try to persuade the social sector that it is a good idea. 
Indeed, this takes us back to the comments from the interviews quoted above; it is commonplace in 
venture capital markets for investors to go out and find ventures and persuade them to take on 
investment. Certainly there is ample awareness that education for the social sector about social 
investment will be very important in growing the market.  
But there is still something odd. In a conventional market model we would expect that the person 
trying to do the persuading is the person supplying the good; the company creates adverts to persuade 
consumers to buy its products, so that it sells more and generates bigger profits. It is in their interests 
to persuade customers to buy the goods. In the case of social investment it is much hazier whose 
interests are being pursued by building the market. It is often the case that those doing the persuading 
are on neither the supply side nor the demand side, but rather take a position outside the market. The 
Government and BSC are two prominent examples here. These players are engaged in encouraging 
both sides of the market that it is in their interests to transact. They are not getting involved on the 
basis of their own interests. We argued in chapter 3 that the SI market emerged not from the 
spontaneous growth of parties making and receiving investments, but because a narrow group of actors 
identified a solution to a problem. We might now begin to suspect that in specifying a market as a 
solution, they created a dynamic in which those charged with building the market for SI are effectively 
assuming knowledge of the interests of those parties who are supposed to take part. This is precisely 
the kind of paternalism objected to by opponents of the state as a centralised political apparatus. 
For the social sector, when they are referred to as the demand side for the market, we can therefore see 
that the assumption is made that it is in their interests to take on social investment. I am not 
suggesting that SSOs are being coerced into taking on social investment against (their own assessment 
of) their own interests, but that the disjuncture noted above is the product of implicit assumptions 
about the interests of SSOs coming up against the reality of what the SSOs perceive their own interests 
to be. In this light, notions such as a ‘lack of investment readiness’ or ‘barriers to investment’ start to 
look like a response to the need to bridge this gap.  
There is, of course, another set of individuals involved in any given case of social investment: the 
‘beneficiaries’, ‘clients’, ‘end users’, or what we might call the ‘impacted parties’. They are part of the 
market because they experience the impact intentionally created by investors. We therefore have a 
situation where a specified group of individuals is affected by an investment deal, but they are not 
party to the investment transaction. There is no clear formulation of the interests of this group within 
the logic of social investment. They enter the equation through the integration of social impact 
measurement, and potentially through the need for accountability. As we have established, social 
impact, in the context of social investment, is a domain of facts. The question of the interests of those 
impacted is therefore sidelined by the imperative to measure the changes they experience. The politics 
of this situation is explored below, in relation to accountability. 
THE CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL IMPACT MEASUREMENT 
Social impact measurement is another area where we can make comparisons between the idea of SIM 
(described in chapter 6) and what it is like for actors trying to put these ideas into action.  
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Just like thinking of matters in terms of the market introduces a series of assumptions that have to be 
consolidated with reality, so does the idea of measurable social impact introduce a series of 
assumptions about the kind of knowledge that is possible about the social change created through 
social investment. ‘Social impact’, remember, has become the way of referring to social change and the 
solution of social problems. Social change, therefore, is assumed to be measurable. This is a major 
assumption, and it encounters problems.  
At this point we have at our disposal a series of reports that discuss the issue of doing social impact 
measurement. These actors have encountered significant difficulties in generating meaningful insight. 
We can be quite precise about where these problems lie: this collection of reports demonstrates that 
impact facts do not always behave in the way suggested above, as deracinated particulars. Despite these 
difficulties, the need for data and numerical representation is not brought into question, and 
enormous amounts of energy are being expended on developing the notion of impact so that it is able 
to fulfil the functions assigned to it. The assumption of the measurability of social change is not under 
scrutiny.  
To open this discussion, a comment from one of the BSC interviewees, made in 2015, provides 
insight into the difficulty being experienced by actors: 
We’ve done some substantial work here [at BSC] recently on impact and what our role in 
impact measurement should be. I’d have to say that it is one of the areas that disappoints me, 
is the lack of progress that has been made. Not just the UK, globally. If I look back to where 
we were five years ago, there’s been an awful lot of resources spent by an awful lot of people, 
and we’re still [in the same place] … that is a testament to how horrendously difficult it is. 
And the fact that comparing the value that I get from putting some kid in the East End into a 
job, vs building a well for clean water for a village in Africa, I mean it’s totally a personal 
judgement. It’s not like a dollar is a dollar wherever you look. [Interviewee] 
This interviewee points to lack of comparability across outcomes as a source of difficulties. He hints at 
problems that we can find explored in more depth in published materials.  
Oranges and Lemons: The State of Play of Impact Measurement Among UK Social Investment Finance 
Intermediaries present the analysis of interviews and document reviews with ten UK SIFIs about their 
impact measurement practice. The aspect that I would like to draw out of this discussion is the 
authors’ formulation of the difference between “less systematised and more systematised” approaches 
to impact measurement. While more systematised approaches, they write, offer advantages such as 
producing “more quantitative data, and … more consistency,”  thus enabling comparison between 
investments and over time: 
the limits of quantification and consistency remain clear: no SIFI is ready to do away with 
individual case studies (either for internal or external reports), or with taking a personalised 
approach to each investment. And at a higher level, the fact that the systems in use are all 
unique to their SIFIs speaks of how personal these systems really are.463 
Counterintuitively, the Oranges and Lemons report found that the most systematic and quantitative 
approaches to impact measurement were developed in contexts where the SIFI had a close working 
relationship with the investee. The system was used not to develop impersonal, numerical data, but to 
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provide “a process” for how “in depth individual knowledge of each investee” is built. The results of 
these systems “are not expected to stand alone”.464 These comments suggest a drastically different 
picture of what is made possible by impact measurement to those optimistic examples described above. 
We know that those examples rely implicitly on the creation of impact facts that display the kind of 
duality identified by Poovey. They assume that data collected can be expected to stand alone, to 
populate databases and be subject to numerical manipulation. Here, instead, even the most systematic 
versions of impact measurement found by these researchers do not treat their impact data as 
manipulable in this way. Impact facts do not behave as observed particulars. The term used in this 
report to capture this finding is “sticky data”: 
very often the understanding is rich, but the underlying information is “sticky”. It doesn’t 
transfer easily from that person to other formats, and doesn’t slot neatly into spreadsheets, or 
separate into clear quanta of data. It sticks to the person, to their reports, and to their presence 
in meetings.465 
This allows us to start to build a picture of the reasoning employed in doing SIM when it is brought 
into contact with the reality of ‘impact’. At least some of the time, actors encounter difficulties in 
reasoning through the generation of impact facts that can be extracted from the context in which they 
are generated.  
FROM MEASUREMENT TO MANAGEMENT 
A slightly different issue identified by actors in the field is the tendency for organisations doing SIM to 
collect data, but then to use it simply for reporting to funders or commissioners, rather than to inform 
service delivery. The need to change emphasis is framed in terms of the need to shift from impact 
measurement to impact management. A consortium of SSOs in the UK are involved in running the 
‘impact management programme’, still ongoing in 2018. The Access Foundation, sister organisation 
to BSC, distributes grant funding through this programme to help build the capacity of SSOs to adopt 
an impact management approach.466 “There is a disconnect between measuring impact, and actually 
using the insight gained to manage performance and make decisions,” the launch material explains. 
“While impact measurement is often initially driven by the needs of funders and commissioners, there 
is a real missed opportunity if there is no connection between this and how the organisation is 
managed and how it improves. Access has coined the term impact management (as opposed to 
measurement) to try to capture this.”467  
The main (publicly visible) output of the programme is a website offering “practical tools and 
guidance for charities and social enterprises” for managing impact. The website describes five types of 
data that organisations should be collecting. Three of these types of data should be collected routinely: 
“user data”, “engagement data” and “feedback data”. “Outcomes data” (“Information on the short 
term changes, benefits or assets people have got from the service”), however, should only be collected 
“occasionally”, and “impact data” (“Information on the long-term difference that have resulted from 
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the service”) should only be collected in “exceptional circumstances”.468 When we look at the detail, 
then, “impact management” departs significantly from SIM best practice as it is described in chapter 
6. It de-emphasises understanding outcomes and impact, focusing in on operational data about who is 
involved in an intervention, their characteristics, the degree and nature of their involvement and their 
feedback. This suggests that on an ongoing day-to-day basis, impact is knowable (and manageable) 
simply through direct experience, supported by data about delivery. That is, the management of 
impact by a frontline organisation does not require data about the changes – the outcomes and impact 
– that this intervention brings about. A more robust evaluation of impact is appropriate in certain 
circumstances to demonstrate to outside audiences what impact has been created. This represents a 
significant step away from some of the core claims made on behalf of SIM – on this form of impact 
management, the data collected is largely not about impact at all.  
Confusingly, the term ‘impact management’ has been used elsewhere in a different sense. We look 
now to a report produced by an impact investment fund, Skopos, in partnership with Bridges 
Ventures, a prominent consulting firm in the social investment space. They describe a different 
problem. Skopos are committed to generating and using impact data, but they have encountered issues 
in finding meaning in their results: 
There has been a great deal of focus to date within the impact investing field on the 
challenges of impact measurement (all of it urgently needed). In trying to measure Skopos’ 
effectiveness as an impact investor, however, we encountered another fundamental challenge: 
measuring impact performance (even if possible) does not in itself allow Skopos to draw any 
meaningful conclusions about whether their impact investments are a success.469 
The report has been published to share with the sector how they responded to this challenge. In order 
to differentiate themselves from ongoing attempts to improve impact measurement, they describe 
theirs as an “impact management approach”. They looked to traditional financial investing for 
inspiration in finding a way to use data to determine success: 
Traditional investment provided us with a helpful paradigm. Successful financial 
performance is typically determined according to whether it reflects the underlying goals of 
the investor – in terms of liquidity, financial risk and financial return. Applying a similar logic 
to impact performance meant that our starting point was to get a good understanding of 
Skopos’ impact goals.470 
The solution they arrived at is to redefine the stages of SIM as follows: 
Step one: define what success looks like 
Step two: choose strategies most likely to achieve our definition of success 
Step three: understand whether success is occurring and respond as necessary471 
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Step one is then broken down into “establish goals” and “identify indicators”. This is the point at 
which we encounter the familiar concept of ‘outcomes’ as part of a logic chain. Skopos’ goals are 
framed in terms of outcomes. Their concept of a ‘goal’ also incorporates both impact return and 
impact risk. This is part one of step one. Part two of step one, identifying indicators, maps onto the 
what we referred to in chapter 6 as identifying measurement tools. As we saw there, it is the 
measurement tools that generate impact facts. In the Skopos report, the authors describe a problem 
with numbers capturing the volume of outcomes achieved: “these indicators are difficult to make sense 
of without context.” They also needed their figures to allow comparison across multiple investments: 
“Skopos’ success is defined by how well the overall portfolio meets its goals. We needed a set of 
portfolio indicators to which investment-specific indicators could ‘roll up’ to convey overall portfolio 
performance.”472 Once more, we encounter the problem of comparability. Whereas in Oranges and 
Lemons the people involved saw the data as context-bound, reluctant to abstract away, Skopos takes a 
different tack: 
We found that the solution to both challenges lies in a simple scoring system. We consider 
investment-specific impact targets (expressed both qualitatively and quantitatively), judge 
whether they represent higher or lower performance on the relevant ranges of impact return 
and risk and assign a corresponding score (from 1 to 3), which can be compared to Skopos’ 
goals, also expressed as a score. A scoring guide helps calibrate judgements across (what are 
very diverse) investment opportunities.473 
These numerical scores then allow for graphical representations of the progress across a portfolio: 
From Skopos Impact Fund and Bridges Impact, More Than Measurement (2016) p15 
Here we find more reason to think that impact facts might not be meaningfully detached from the 
context in which they are generated. The scoring approach developed here does prompt the question: 
could this be what SIM turns into? Could this be a form of impact measurement that allows 
comparability, and facilitates aggregation and numerical manipulation? For the answer to this question 
                                                   
472 Ibid. p14 
473 Ibid. p14 
 176 
to be ‘yes’, this approach to SIM would also need to fulfil all of the other functions assigned to it. It 
would encounter difficulties, particularly on the matter of accountability. These scores are generated 
by the analyst using their judgement to triangulate multiple sources of information. They might be 
useful for improving impact – for informing decision making – but they are less suited to 
demonstrating impact to a sceptical outsider.   
The Skopos report includes a call for “a shared convention for describing impact goals”. We can see 
continuity between this report and a much more substantial project, managed by the same people at 
Bridges Ventures, called the Impact Management Project (IMP). Not to be confused with the Impact 
Management Programme described above, this international effort is probably the most substantial 
effort to change the conversation around impact measurement. This project is not focused on the 
difference between proving and improving, or on whether organisations are using their impact data to 
inform delivery. It is, rather, concerned with establishing the “shared fundamentals” of impact. It is 
therefore responding to a different problem: impact investors still do not have a way of 
communicating straightforwardly and unambiguously about impact.  
The first stages of the IMP involved extensive consultation with practitioners in order to establish 
consensus on “how we talk about, measure and manage impact”. The aim is to establish common 
ground that everyone can agree on. They draw a parallel with finance in explaining the need for such 
“shared fundamentals”: 
In finance, we use shared fundamentals about performance – such as return, volatility and 
liquidity – to describe and manage against our respective financial goals. … Investors also 
need shared fundamentals for understanding the effects that different underlying enterprises – 
or portfolios of enterprises – have on people and planet. Without this, we are faced with a 
growing array of labels that make it hard to understand which investment products offer 
investors the best chance to achieve their intentions and goals.474 
The website “publicly shares” this “consensus”, claiming that these “shared fundamentals will make it 
easier to work together to improve our positive impact on people and the planet, and try to prevent 
negative impact.”475 The IMP has therefore taken on the ambitious task of providing conceptual 
groundwork that underpins (rather than displacing) all of the existing knowledge and practices related 
to SIM. They explain: 
This convention describes consensus on principles and procedures for sharing our impact 
expectations with each other, which can act as a foundation for positioning and linking to 
different frameworks, standards and measurement approaches.476 
Their starting point is the observation that “All enterprises have effects on people and the planet”; 
impact management, then, “is a process of figuring out which effects experienced by people and the 
planet are material, both positive and negative”.477 They suggest a four stage process: “understand the 
experience of people and planet” [i.e. impact], “define your intentions and constraints”, “set impact 
and financial goals”, and “deliver and improve impact”. The first of these stages is achieved by 
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breaking impact down into five dimensions: “what”, “how much”, “who”, “contribution” and 
“risk”.478 
I personally do not understand how the process described in detail on this website can underpin the 
SIM process described in chapter 6. It shares many of the same concepts. My suspicion is that despite 
its claims, it is an alternative way of understanding and collecting data about impact. But it operates at 
such a level of abstraction that it is very difficult to tell from published material precisely what it is 
advocating. I would need to engage with the IMP in far more detail to be able to make fully informed 
statements about how it matches up with the SIM good practice described above, and the nature of 
the impact facts it advocates. We will use just one brief example, from a report written to share the 
findings of a pilot programme in which a number of investors used the IMP framework to analyse 
their own portfolios. This is one of three main implications reported by the investors in trying to 
collect data to assess performance against goals: 
Impact management demands a shift from measuring only what we expect to happen, to 
managing the effects that we know are occurring. Impact management recognises that all 
enterprises have impacts that are positive and negative, intended or unintended - and through 
different parts of their business model (from products/services to distribution to operations to 
supply-chain). To make an informed investment decision, an investor needs transparent, 
consistent and comprehensive reporting of an enterprise’s total material effects on people and 
the planet.479 
This passage tells us a number of things. First, the IMP is firmly in line with the innovative model. It 
sees impact as something that is created by “all enterprises”, stepping even further away from the idea 
that there is something distinctive in efforts to address social problems that warrants a conceptual 
boundary between social investment and non-social investment. They are starting to look the other 
way, asking not ‘what makes an organisation social?’ but ‘given that all organisations create impact, 
how can negative impact be reduced and positive impact increased?’ Second, it suggests that the 
“effects we know are occurring” can somehow be separated from “what we expect to happen”. This is 
a version of an investor’s engagement with the world that starts with establishing what effects are 
occurring, invoking the possibility of investors leaving all expectations at the door and approaching the 
question of impact with an open mind, allowing themselves to perceive these effects before deciding 
which of them are material, and should be measured. It is unclear to me what this process entails. If an 
investor is to approach complex, messy social reality with the question of what effects their investment 
will create, surely the only way to avoid a deluge of information is to start with an idea of what she is 
looking for? Third, this openness suggests to me, at the least, an ongoing process of consultation, of 
meaningful engagement of those who are affected, and responsiveness to their views and experience. 
How else could these ‘effects’ be established? If that is so, the last sentence in this passage, emphasising 
“transparent, consistent and comprehensive reporting” of these effects suggests tension in the aims and 
processes of the IMP. It seems to be trying to consolidate impulses that are not obviously compatible, 
as we established in chapter 6’s discussion of the incompatibility of the demands of measurement and 
accountability for the way things are done. 
What the IMP does tell us for sure is that a huge amount of energy is being invested in bottoming out 
the notion of impact. It is a fascinating attempt to move past the confusion and ambiguity 
                                                   
478 http://www.impactmanagementproject.com/understand-impact/ Accessed 17th April 2018. 
479 Impact Management Project, GIIN Investors’ Council Pilot: Trends, Findings and Feedback (2018). p11 
 178 
characterising SIM, to anchor the concept of impact, once and for all. Though we cannot be sure what 
kind of data is being advocated through the IMP, we do know that it is unambiguous in its view of 
impact that can be uncontroversially designated as either positive or negative: “Everything we do 
affects people and the planet” runs an eye-catching statement on the website home page. “Managing 
impact means figuring out which effects are material - and then trying to prevent the negative and 
increase the positive.”480 
Our final example in this section is a report by NPC assessing and reporting the impact of a 
prominent impact investing firm, the KL Felicitas Foundation. This report differs to the Skopos 
report because the authors are retrospectively assessing impact, rather than developing a method for 
ongoing use. But just like Skopos, they comment on the difficulties associated with finding meaning 
in the impact data they have available: 
When aggregated by theme, the investments are contributing to some impressive outcomes. 
The question to ask, however, is are those social returns good enough? This is difficult to 
assess, unless targets are set (itself hard to do), or investments delivering similar services in 
similar contexts are compared.481 
In this case, there was an “absence of data that enabled” such comparisons. Furthermore, they observe 
“there is no single common metric that can be meaningfully applied to the entire Foundation”. “The 
range of activities and support provided are too diverse … In addition, impact is evident at different 
levels for both the beneficiaries … and directly for investees themselves”.482   
Once more, impact facts are not comparable. They are context-bound. Once more, the actors involved 
are determined to find some way to generate systematic knowledge about impact. As ever, the quality 
of the data is a work in progress, and the endeavour to improve the robustness and consistency of data 
collection practices is an ongoing project. But NPC clearly set themselves the task of finding meaning 
in the data they had available, rather than suggesting analysis be deferred to a future date. Their 
response was to develop what they have called an “Impact Assurance Classification”. Like Skopos, it 
uses scoring. The classification demarcates five components of good impact practice (outputs, 
standardised metrics, clarity of mission, data to show change, and additionality), and suggests a 
scoring scale from 0 to 3 against each of the components. “This results in an overall impact practice 
score, which is then used to identify the Impact Assurance Classification of each investment—from 
stage 1 to 4.”483 An organisation at stage 1 would have relatively underdeveloped and inadequate 
impact measurement practices, while stage 4 would indicate well developed, high quality impact 
measurement, including “good use of standardised metrics”, “clear theory of change”, “up to date 
quant data showing effect” and “demonstrating additionality using control or comparison group”.484 
In other words, their assessment of impact relies on the analyst’s judgement not of impact facts, but of 
the systems used to generate impact facts. The report does still look at the impact facts that are 
available, but they are pushed to develop the IAC by the desire to abstract away from local, particular 
knowledge to an overall view of impact.  
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This discussion helps us to see that the ‘analysis’ stage of the SIM cycle poses a series of challenges. 
Actors struggle to derive meaning from the facts they have collected. There is agreement that 
comparison points are needed, but comparison to what? The emphasis falls on setting targets, defining 
in advance ‘what success looks like’. But these approaches sever the link with the question of what 
impact is created, which in turn causes problems for claims to accountability. It seems like whichever 
way they turn, actors encounter problems with the imperative to measure impact.  
What is political about this set of affairs? The political nature of SI, I am arguing lies in the way it sets 
the terms of the debate. It opens up some possibilities for action and forecloses others. In this 
conversation around the challenges of impact measurement, we never encounter the argument that 
perhaps measurement is not possible, or appropriate. It is absolutely taken for granted that it is 
possible, and absolutely necessary. This is not up for debate. From our extended discussion of the logic 
of social investment, we know that to bring the need for measurement into question would be to bring 
the core, fundamental tenets of this programme of government into question. This option is 
foreclosed. As a consequence, actors will continue to pursue the vision of a universally accepted, 
standardised, straightforward, functioning system for measuring impact, just like we have built for 
financial accounting. Energy and resources will continue to be poured into this project, because the 
benefits of achieving this goal will be so great.  
There are, however, effects created by framing reality in this way. I would like to finish this section 
with a brief anecdote from my time working as a consultant. I worked on a short project with a small 
SSO in the north of England. This SSO worked with young people, helping them to navigate the gulf 
between formal education and work. They had hitherto depended on grant funding, but had been 
successful in applying to the Government’s Investment and Contract Readiness Fund (ICRF). This 
meant they effectively won a grant that was already committed to paying for the services of agencies 
that would assist them in improving their ‘readiness’ for taking on investment or contracts. A basic 
component of ‘readiness’ was a system for measuring social impact. By the time I became involved, a 
colleague of mine had already been to visit this organisation, had run a theory of change workshop and 
built a ‘measurement framework’ – that is, a table in a spreadsheet, mirroring the theory of change, 
setting out which kinds of data they would collect when. My task was to help them move on a stage in 
analysing their data and beginning to use it in running the organisation. When I arrived, the manager 
had printed out a series of charts, presenting their newly available data. As I strove to understand 
precisely what the conversation was going to achieve, I came to realise that this individual simply had 
no idea what he was supposed to do with this information. He had no training in handling 
quantitative data, and had risen to a relatively senior level in the organisation because he had worked 
his way up through the ranks, and had once been in the same position as those young people the 
organisation existed to serve. There were no colleagues available to help him.  
The assumptions of social investment as a programme of government, in that instance, came up short: 
they rely on actors in the field having the training and ability to think along the right lines, to see what 
data could be used for. This man had an implicit understanding of the needs of his organisation’s 
beneficiaries, but no ability to handle data. Now, it is possible to argue that this is what is required, 
that progress means people like this man acquiring necessary new skills and building their 
understanding of measurement; it is also possible to argue that measurement undermines and destroys 
an approach based on experience, relationships and sympathy, to the detriment of these young people 
in need. This is another debate; I seek only to highlight the gulf between the way measurement is 
presented, and the way it is experienced. The imperative to measure compels an enormous shift in the 
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way many organisations work, but this shift is not recognised as relevant within the terms of the 
debate over social investment.  
THE RISK OF ‘IMPACT WASHING’ 
Unlike the puzzle of low demand and the challenge of SIM, the risk of ‘impact washing’ is not very 
well specified. Actors point it out as something that needs to be avoided, in an unspecified manner 
that has something to do with a commitment to measurement and something to do with being held 
accountable, or holding oneself to account. As far as I have seen, ‘impact washing’ is perceived mainly 
as a future risk, rather than something that is already a significant problem.  
It will be fascinating to see, as the sector develops, how organisations find a way to pin down a well-
reasoned-through, internally consistent approach to the myriad and poorly defined imperatives 
regularly repeated in reports and at conferences around the importance of measurement and 
accountability. I do not believe it will be possible to properly satisfy all of these imperatives at once, 
and so actors are going to have to make choices about the approaches they take.  
At this stage, we can look to one particular example of the attempt by a fund to hold itself to account 
for its claims to impact: the NPC/KLF report that we have already discussed. 
We have already set out the method that this report used, which relies on the Impact Assurance 
Framework. NPC face the challenges of SIM set out in the previous section, and their response is to 
focus not on the impact data itself, but on the tools and processes used by KLF to generate impact 
data, which NPC scores against a set of newly created criteria. This is significant because it means KLF 
are being held accountable for the processes they have for measuring impact, not for the impact they 
are creating.  
Thinking back to the different forms of accountability described in chapter 6, this means KLF are not 
being held to account for the results they have achieved, because NPC are assessing their efforts to 
measure impact, not the results of that measurement. Nor is there any sign that KLF are being held to 
account for the kind of impact they decided to create. In fact, I would suggest the approach taken by 
NPC demonstrates that the question of whether impact is good or desirable was some distance from the 
minds of the authors. Their starting point was to assume that any impact created by “the Kleissners”, 
the married couple who founded KL Felicitas, was positive, and that they should be given the benefit 
of the doubt in relation to the considerable degree of uncertainty over the volume and attribution of 
data. Based on this starting assumption, they then set out on their task of devising a structured 
representation of the information they had available.  
Of course, it may be that the report was not intended to hold them accountable, or not in the ways we 
describe, and so we are holding them up against standards that they do not recognise. But if that is the 
case, the question is raised: if the report of an independent, specialist impact measurement consultancy 
about the impact of one of the most prominent impact investing funds is not the forum for holding 
the fund to account, then what is the forum?  
This is a political matter because it exposes how, as things stand, claims to accountability, and to 
evidencing and proof of impact, have no teeth, and no direct implications for the way things are being 
done. The main threat is not from renegade impact investors who are not ‘really’ motivated by impact. 
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It is, rather, from investors who are truly motivated by impact, who think they are holding themselves 
to account, when in reality the mechanisms they are using to generate knowledge about impact are 
inadequate for providing anything but the most superficial understanding. To compound the issue, 
NPC present their analysis as a method suitable for replication by others:  
This review for the KL Foundation, and the parallel development of a suitable measurement 
framework to assess impact, has provided a model of transparency and methodology that, we 
hope, others will follow. We have shown not only that it is possible to measure impact, but we 
provide some guidance on how to go about it.485 
I make no claims to insight into the relationships that the Kleissners have with the people impacted by 
their work. They might have close relationships and feedback mechanisms that are not described here. 
But as far as this report goes, they could well be simultaneously entirely ignorant and consider 
themselves particularly well-informed. ‘Impacted parties’, often some of the most disadvantaged 
people, could easily find themselves on the receiving end of well-intentioned ‘impact’ that has already 
been assumed to be positive, their opinions gathered only through measurement systems that have 
already decided what questions to ask, and what kind of information is important. Based on the 
current debate within impact investing, a future like this is entirely possible. 
CONCLUSION 
Social investment is a programme of government that puts forward a new way of thinking about and 
acting on social problems. Most of this thesis was devoted to exploring how this programme of 
government sets out neutral grounds for action, insodoing ensuring that certain forms of action, and 
modes of reasoning, are validated and celebrated, while others are undermined and dismissed. In this 
chapter, the focus has been on emphasising that the creation of this neutrality is itself a political act, 
because it sets the terms of the debate. It changes the kinds of conversations it is possible to have about 
what financing for SSOs should look like, what should be expected of investors, what is feasible for 
measuring social change, and so on. These changes have been explored in relation to three areas of 
discussion in which the logic of social investment is strained, because these areas of strain make it 
easier to see where the assumptions required by this programme of government are precluding other, 
more straightforward forms of reasoning. Given that the framework of the market has been accepted, 
actors struggle to explain why the different components of the market fail to behave as they are 
expected to. Similarly, given the importance and meaningfulness of measuring and managing impact 
has been assumed, actors are driven to continually develop the techniques and frameworks they have 
for handling and giving meaning to the information they collect. There have not yet been any 
flashpoint cases of accountability that pushes actors in the market to more clearly articulate what is 
meant by these claims, but the stage is set for investors to generate knowledge of impact in a way that 
could easily fail to ensure any form of accountabilty to those affected. 
This chapter has not provided a definitive account of the politics of social investment. Far from it. 
This would not be possible even in another hundred thousand words, because it is a dispersed, 
contingent matter, specific to every locale where things are being done differently because of this 
programme of government. In any case, to attempt to catalogue all the effects of social investment 
would miss the point, because the intention of this study is to develop the tools for analysis. The 
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argument set out here puts us on a stronger footing for the ongoing critique of social investment as it 
unfolds into the future.  
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CONCLUSION 
In the weeks before submitting this thesis I attended an event. A report was being launched by NPC 
and the KL Felicitas Foundation, a follow up to the report discussed in chapter 7. The same Impact 
Assurance Framework was being used, this time combined with KLF’s financial data. The tone of the 
event was triumphant. We were told the Kleissners’ portfolio proves that impact investing can 
outperform mainstream capital markets on financial return. “This is the end of the tradeoff debate”, a 
speaker stated firmly at one point. The report also proves that it is possible to measure the impact of a 
portfolio. By “applying” the three impact tools – the UN’s SDGs, the IAC, and the IMP’s five 
dimensions of impact (which is apparently becoming “standard terminology” for talking about 
impact), the analysts at NPC were able to produce a “complete picture of impact”.  
The Chair of the event also asked the panel about the Bolis and West argument discussed in chapter 4. 
Charly Kleissner thinks they “didn’t do a service to the industry” in putting forward this argument, 
suggesting they are “caught up in the old terminology”. Liisa Kleissner chipped in to tell the audience 
that she had debated the authors at a conference – the debate is in fact available to watch online486 – 
and that she had won the debate, because “they use the old dichotomy. We don’t look at capital that 
way.” In person, the Kleissners radiate a striking moral certitude. They are absolutely convinced that 
they are making the world a better place, and setting an example for others to follow. Liisa, in her 
closing statements, describes her and her husband’s endeavour to “right this ship called mother earth”, 
before exclaiming: “don’t people see why this is a moral imperative?” 
I am recounting these details in order to illustrate what kinds of discourse and reasoning have now 
become possible. The Kleissners can present themselves as moral guardians, working tirelessly to bring 
impact investing to mainstream capital markets, setting a shining example by investing 100% of their 
personal wealth in impact investments. Their moral certitude comes from contrasting their own 
strategies with a “broken” financial system that pursues only personal profit. Meanwhile, NPC can 
make claims to a “complete picture of impact”, to have developed a “light touch and practical” way of 
assessing impact across a portfolio, even though this assessment does not in fact assess impact at all – it 
assesses the quality of the systems used to measure impact, which NPC knows “from experience” tends 
to be associated with strong impact performance. I am not appointing myself judge over the systems 
people create to understand impact. NPC and associates are free to develop whatever frameworks they 
deem useful. The problem I am identifying is that these are the systems, it appears to me, that are 
looked to for ensuring accountability. Efforts to create impact, the report states, “need to be 
transparently measured and widely reported. Without such transparency, the risk is that impact falls 
short of expectations, investors are disappointed, and the field fails to grow, loses momentum, or 
worse.”487  These risks are telling: they are all related to the success of impact investing, firmly 
grounded in the perspective of the investor. They are not alert to the risk that their interventions in 
the world might not be welcome. This report is not an enquiry into whether the impacted parties, 
whoever they are, are as radiantly positive about the impact as the Kleissners are.  
These comments would probably come across as slightly strange or off target to the report authors. 
After all, investors do not tend to have direct relationships with the people all the way at the other end 
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of the chain, the beneficiaries of the work undertaken by the investee organisation. There are very 
good practical reasons why this form of data collection is not feasible. My comments are not about the 
method they used in their research, but about the way that they conceptualise ‘impact’. Aside perhaps 
from identifying a degree of hubris, I do not in fact want to single out KLF and NPC as doing 
anything objectionable. I am not contradicting their claims or casting doubt on their motivations. 
Rather, I am pointing out that it has become entirely thinkable that investors can make a profit while 
addressing the world’s social problems. It has also become entirely thinkable that the solution to social 
problems, in the form of ‘impact’, can be meaningfully engaged with through frameworks like the 
IAC.  
Indeed, the Kleissners are not alone in their fervour and optimism over the potential for social 
investment. It is visible in the SIIT reports, and plenty of the other documents I have quoted 
throughout the thesis. To use another example from my own experience, it was also visible at the 
meeting of a research council set up to support a project within the UN, designed to encourage the use 
of impact investing for meeting the SDGs. Some attendees at this meeting were wedded to the idea 
that investment could be the solution to meeting the SDGs, if only we could work out how to 
measure impact properly. They piqued the interest of the assembled academics – they appeared to 
think – by suggesting that the person to hit on this solution could win the next Nobel Prize in 
Economics, an idea proposed by Ronald Cohen himself. A space has been created in which impact is 
being conceptualised in terms of data of a kind that sits in parallel to the data fuelling the financial 
markets. Combined with the volumes of capital that could be opened up if ‘the argument is won’ and 
mainstream investors come on board – volumes far greater than the paltry resources from 
philanthropic and public sources – the growth in impact investing places us on the brink of a 
“revolution”.  
And yet, this is a peculiarly painless revolution. Social problems are solved, while investors can 
continue to make the same financial returns as they do with conventional investing. My argument 
offers an explanation for how this win-win solution has come to gain such traction: this (appearance 
of) painlessness is achieved by introducing a certain mode of reasoning through the nature of social 
change and the possibilities for action. Social investment has provided a way of reasoning about social 
change that simply requires us to accept that impact and the market are matters of fact, and that social 
investment represents a logical, rational response to these facts. 
LIBERALISM 
From the vantage point we have now reached, we can reflect back on the version of liberal 
governmentality present in social investment. The emergence of the subject of interest several centuries 
ago transformed the nature of governmental power. Liberal governmentality accommodates the 
subject of interest. The social is configured around this figure, finding a way to recognise the subject of 
interest on the terrain of government without asking her to compromise her interests. So what version 
of the social, and what version of interest, is brought about through social investment? 
Starting with some of the most abstract and general observations, Poovey described the social as 
transmitting an assumption of social order. This assumption is markedly clear in the attempt to 
measure and manage social impact. What is the attempt to discover the ‘fundamentals of impact’, as 
the IMP puts it, if not an attempt to uncover the shared foundations underpinning all our societies? It 
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would not make sense to use the same scale-based measures in different settings, then to aggregate and 
compare the results, if it were not assumed that some kind of social order underpins the results. The 
attempt to generate data about impact that can then be abstracted away is based on the assumption 
that meaningful comparisons can be made. These assumptions are particularly clear within the 
innovative mode of reasoning, where the focus is on scaling up and replicating activity, and generating 
an overview of impact from the investor perspective. But they are visible wherever there is an attempt 
to systematise and measure impact. 
Most of our reflections on liberalism need to take into account the difference between the two modes 
of reasoning. They support two different versions of interest and the social. On the innovative mode, 
the investor (and possibly also the entrepreneur) looks remarkably like Foucault’s subject of interest. 
She does not have to sacrifice her interests – market-rate financial returns are available for those who 
want them. Lower financial returns might be expected in some cases, but it is the investor’s choice 
whether she makes such investments. She is left to act according to her preferences. But this means 
that the motivation to create social impact is somehow internal to the investor’s interests. We can all 
have confidence in the future of social investment, the argument goes, because we are increasingly 
seeing signs that investors are in fact oriented to creating social impact with their money. This 
argument sidesteps the need to compel investors to make their capital available, which would be 
incompatible with inviolability of the pursuit of interest. The moral argument might be made for 
investors to invest for impact – Liisa Kleissner’s moral imperative – but the moral argument is never 
made for investors to invest for lower financial returns than they would be happy with. Furthermore, 
once the moral decision has been made to invest for impact, impact is not a moral matter. Creating 
impact is a domain of economic activity, undertaken by the subject of interest. Indeed, the promise of 
social investment lies in bringing the techniques and behaviours of the subject of interest to bear on 
solving social problems. In this way, impact as a fact-based version of social change sits comfortably 
with governing according to interests.  
The picture of interests within the principled mode of reasoning is less clear. If the starting point is the 
needs of SSOs, and recognition that the pursuit of social mission has direct implications for the levels 
of financial return that can be expected, then investors are conceived of as sympathetic to these needs, 
and willing to treat investees differently. They are motivated by something other than self-interest, or 
rather, they are willing to put their self-interest into second place behind the desire to support social 
good. This version of the subject appears to be an amalgam of the subject of interest and the subject of 
right. They pursue their interest, but recognise another kind of responsibility too.  
I think the elaboration of social investment shows that Foucault was right when he talked about the 
incommensurability of the subject of interest and the subject of right. They are governed differently. 
They are both governed through their reason, but they respond to different forms of reason. We have 
already seen the contrast between the forms of reason employed: the innovative mode of reasoning is 
end-focused, and the principled mode is means-focused. This opposition plays out in relation to these 
two forms of subjectivity. The subject of interest is characterised not just by consideration of her own 
interests but by economically rational behaviour. She calculates how best to use the resources she has 
to maximise her interests. The subject of right, in contrast, reasons as a political subject who has rights 
and responsibilities. It seems to me that the innovative mode attempts to make social problems 
amenable to the kind of rational calculation characteristic of the subject of interest. The principled 
mode, meanwhile, attempts to combine both forms of subjectivity. Neither of them offer a new form 
of subjectivity. It is still about interests. I do not think that social investment moves us past the 
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political terrain that we have inhabited for some time. And I think the intransigence of impact as an 
object of knowledge could occupy collective attention for some time before it is realised that social 
investment is not the revolution it claims to be.  
Foucault described two forms of neoliberalism in the course of his lectures. I have deliberately avoided 
referring to social investment in terms of neoliberalism, because it is a loaded term that attracts 
controversy, and becomes a topic of discussion in its own right. I do not want to spend time discussing 
whether social investment is or is not neoliberal. But three brief points of connection can be made 
between what we have seen in social investment and the observations Foucault made.  
The first concerns the transition that Foucault identified within the model of homo oeconomicus. As we 
explained in chapter 2, in his early incarnation as the man of exchange, he represented an “intangible 
element with regard to the exercise of power”.488 Later, with the intellectual innovations of neoliberal 
economists, this figure turns out to be “eminently governable”,489 because he acts rationally and 
therefore predictably. I think we can see this model at play in the excitement around impact. There is 
a sense in which investing for impact is a rational thing to do, a logical engagement with a data-driven 
set of practices. 
The second point of the connection is with Foucault’s observations about the version of the social 
elaborated by the neoliberals. We described in chapter 2 how the American neoliberals formulated a 
version of the social that is amenable to analysis in economic terms. The Chicago School theorists 
flexed their muscles by extending the model of self-interested rational behaviour to all areas of social 
life. Social investment, and more specifically ‘impact’ as a way of understanding social change, is doing 
something similar. Impact has no boundaries. As the IMP states, front and centre, “Everything we do 
affects people and planet”.490  Impact, on the innovative mode of reasoning, is a web cast over all 
human activity. It is a version of social change that is programmable, and amenable to management 
within the structure created by the investment of financial capital. 
The version of impact formulated within the principled mode of reasoning does not quite operate in 
the same way. This version of the social needs protecting from the incursion of self-interest, profit-
extracting behaviour. It suggests a model of human interaction unaffected by the profit motive, a 
social space in which individuals think not about their own gain but about the needs of others. The 
social is a space where individuals work together to bring about a better society. These activities need 
financing, and it might be that repayable finance is a good option. But this version of the social is not 
amenable to coordination and improvement by the ‘unleashing’ of market forces. As we have pointed 
out, however, the imperative to measure has vitality beyond the borders of investment practice, and 
this version of the social is not conceived in isolation from such attitudes to knowledge production. 
The third point of connection relates to attitudes to the state. Foucault recognised in American 
neoliberalism the constant testing of the need for government according to the logic of the market. 
The economic grid “anchor[s] and justif[ies] a permanent political criticism of political and 
governmental action.”491 By 2010, it was possible for Ronald Cohen to simply dismiss the state’s 
abilities to ‘solve social problems’. This is a starting assumption, part of the problem that social 
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investment is aiming to solve. Given the state’s failure, social investment represents a new, innovative 
response. The innovative mode of reasoning formulates a version of the social that hands the solution 
of social problems over to the market, advocating the conceptual opening up of what it means to be 
‘social’ or ‘impact driven’, attracting as much capital as possible into the market, and leaving it to the 
drive and innovation of investors and entrepreneurs to identify solutions and bring them to scale. The 
state is assigned the role of creating an ‘enabling environment’ through creating a friendly regulative 
environment. The state may also become a market actor, by assuming the role of an investor alongside 
private investors. The principled mode of reasoning is more open to the exercise of political 
sovereignty, whether it is the regulation of what it means to be a social enterprise, or third party 
oversight of claims to be creating impact.  
By making a point of the ineffectiveness of the state in solving social problems, the vision for social 
investment is establishing a version of liberal governmentality that has entirely moved beyond 
welfarism, which is characterised by the direct provision of social services by the state. Dean talked 
about the ‘post-welfarist regime of the social’, but his account envisages ongoing involvement by the 
state, which plays a role as commissioner of services. His analysis might have some traction with the 
ongoing development of SIBs. But social investment, according to the innovative mode of reasoning 
in particular, goes a step further, relegating the state to a supporting role in solving social problems. 
Relaxing momentarily the critical distance I have created with my topic, I would like to point out a 
certain irony. The matter of state ineffectiveness has direct implications for a matter close to the heart 
of any free market advocate: taxation. Taxation is never talked about in the context of social 
investment. It has been assumed out of the picture. If states have proven themselves incapable of 
solving social problems, then we have no reason to examine policies regarding the resources available 
to them. It simply is not relevant, and their impoverished nature, especially when compared to the 
wealth held in private hands, is a background feature. We discover irony in the views of social 
investment advocates when we find reference to wealth inequality as one of the worst social problems 
we face. A basic tool for addressing wealth inequality is taxation. Tax redistributes wealth. And yet, 
somehow, social investment offers a way to solve social problems, including wealth inequalities, that 
paints taxation out of the picture. An actively redistributive mechanism, taxation, is instead replaced 
by a mechanism that returns financial capital to those who already hold the most wealth, with interest.  
The fact that this argument is simply not made is a sign of how successful social investment has been 
in marking out new political terrain, where certain options are simply not even considered.  
CONTRIBUTION TO SCHOLARSHIP 
With the account of social investment behind us, we can highlight the contribution this thesis makes 
to existing scholarship. 
In the introduction we looked at a number of studies offering a critique of social investment that 
framed it in entirely negative terms. It should now be clear what I meant by describing this thesis as a 
critique that is not a criticism. I consider it to be a substantial contribution to the critical literature on 
social investment that I hope might be of use to other scholars working on this topic. In particular, I 
provide an account of why there continues to be such confusion over the terminology and concepts 
used to understand and frame SI for analysis. Instead of trying to offer solutions to the problem of 
ongoing confusion, this work offers a way to understand why this confusion persists. This may help to 
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clarify the terms of the debate. As an example of scholarship that fails to overcome the confusion 
present in the debate, we can take the work of Emma Dowling, who states: 
Some investors accept below-market returns because they have explicit social or ethical 
commitments, yet overall, social investment markets are supposed to operate in the same way, 
that is with the same kinds of characteristics of risk and return, as any other kind of financial 
market, including an orientation towards competitive rates492 
Following the discussion of the tradeoff debate in chapter 4, we can see that Dowling here skates over 
an immensely contentious set of issues, and a core site of ambiguity in the social investment project, 
without any acknowledgement that this might not be a representation that everyone would agree with. 
This thesis provides a comprehensive account of the development of social investment that should be 
helpful to other scholars wanting to enter this area, alerting them to the faultlines in the debate, the 
areas of contention, and allowing a more nuanced account of how their research fits into the wider 
whole. My work is a platform for engaging with other scholars working on the border between 
academic research and industry. For example, my arguments around SIM and accountability would 
support Kate Ruff’s work at the intersection of SIM and evaluation, where she is advocating a 
“solution” that entails evaluators “accepting some new relationships with data and new roles in the 
field”.493 
The thesis also lays the groundwork for more fruitful conversation between social investment research 
and research into closely related areas of practice. Philanthrocapitalism is one such area. McGoey and 
Thiel, for example, explore the notion that “individual mega-wealth is collectively beneficial”: 
we explore the mechanisms that enable wealthy donors to position themselves as apparent 
benefactors of humanity, including a reliance on metrics that appear to justify the claim that 
targeted philanthropic expenditures can and are reducing global wealth and health 
inequalities, but which raise unanswered questions surrounding the actual effects of the 
outcomes claimed494 
There are several points of contact here. The authors root their analysis in some of the same material – 
the ‘spontaneous harmony of interests’ doctrine – and show how it is used to justify a set of affairs that 
might otherwise be viewed, as social investment might, as simply benefitting one group of privileged 
actors at the expense of anothers (though, as chapter 7 explained, this is not in fact the argument that I 
am making). Similarly, McGoey and Thiel point to the role of metrics in cementing this position, 
arguing that “a new, muscular reliance on metrics that appears to confirm that large-scale philanthropy 
‘works’ … but which upon close inspection reveals the opposite”495. Metrics, of course play a central 
role in social investment. It may be possible, in time, to advance a similar critique of social investment 
as McGoey and Thiel have of philanthrocapitalism, in which the narrative is compared to some other 
source of information that tells a different story. For the period in which I was studying social 
investment, however, there was so much instability just in the terms being used to communicate on 
the topic that this warranted attention first. As the field consolidates, there may be more scope for 
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establishing points of comparison between the dominant narrative and the ‘reality’ of social 
investment. 
The work of Emily Barman has already been discussed at length in the introduction, but there may 
additionally be links helpfully drawn with STS and the ‘pragmatic turn’ in sociology more broadly. 
Millo and MacKenzie, for example, published an article titled ‘The usefulness of inaccurate models: 
Towards an understanding of the emergence of financial risk management’, which seeks to 
differentiate between the accuracy of the models underpinning risk management and the usefulness of 
these models.496 The authors of this article, and those who were interested in its findings, may be 
interested to see the parallels with the way SIM is developing in the context of social investment. In 
particular, they mark a shift from merely calculating risk to managing risk – “nowadays risk is 
regarded as a man- ageable factor rather than merely a measurable, quantifiable and calculable entity” 
(p639) – which appears to foreshadow the shift we have noted from impact measurement to impact 
management. This thesis provides grounds for comparison across disparate areas of practice. The 
comparison also carries the potential for extension of this research in future. That is, I have 
emphasised how the approach taken in this thesis is particularly suited to the stage of maturity of 
social investment. As the field consolidates, different forms of research will become possible. The 
analysis of risk found in the work of Millo and MacKenzie, as well as Michael Power,497 could provide 
a fruitful point of conversation and contrast in tracking the development of ‘impact’. As a final 
comment, though I have been clear that I do not consider this work to advance scholarship on 
Foucault’s writings, my assessment of the work of Miller and Rose on governmentality and the social, 
found in chapter 2, is a contribution to these attempts to come to grips with the changing nature of 
governmental power.   
These are just a few possible examples. The thesis might also be considered a contribution by those 
studying the changing morals of markets, by providing insight into how the market offers a framework 
for acting on social problems. While my argument makes no direct comment on the moral 
implications of these changes, the analysis could help other scholars to penetrate the layers of 
obfuscation and confusion to take account of the difference between (for example) the innovative and 
principled modes of reasoning. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Since I determined the main focus and scope of the thesis there have been developments in the field. 
In some ways, the vision of the market for social investment now feels out of date. A brief account of 
these developments will help us draw the argument to a close.  
It appears to me that the double problematisation of this programme of government is no longer so 
firmly held together by a single solution. That is, there are strong signals that activity in the UK is no 
longer so closely attached to building a market for social investment. BSC, despite being yoked to the 
market building project by its status as capital wholesaler, published a strategy paper in 2015 setting 
out policy priorities regarding social investment for the 2015 general election. In contrast to earlier 
papers of this kind, it barely mentions the market for social investment. In 2016, shortly after a new 
CEO assumed control, BSC published a “note” that invited views and comments from the sector on 
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BSC’s “view of the social investment landscape”. It explains that BSC “was established in 2012 to help 
accelerate the development of social investment in the UK” – the ‘market’ that usually followed the 
word ‘investment’ has been quietly dropped.498  
A more conclusive sign of change afoot is the report published in March 2018 by Social Investment 
Business (SIB), a prominent SIFI. The report reviews the publicly funded investment and contract 
readiness programmes delivered over the preceding six years. The press release accompanying the 
report includes these comments from the new CEO: 
we now think it’s time for a change of focus and to put to bed the phrase ‘investment 
readiness’. Helping organisations get ready to raise investment is a good thing but it shouldn’t 
be the primary goal. The characteristics of ‘investment ready’ organisations such as resilience, 
flexibility and sustainability are valuable regardless of whether investment is raised or not. 
Encouraging these traits will help more organisations be in the best position to do what 
matters most - improving the lives of the people they work with.499 
Unlike the numerous ex-finance CEOs of prominent social investment institutions, this person comes 
from years of work in the social enterprise sector. It appears that the problem of the 
undercapitalisation of the social sector is starting to be thought about in ways detached from market 
building.  
At the same time, the problematisation of traditional finance markets is alive and well. The NPC/KLF 
event is a prime example of this programme of work, and demonstrates, along with the IMP, that 
there is substantial activity taking place that is focused on making social problems amenable to direct 
intervention by those with private wealth. Impact, according to the IMP, is created by every 
organisation. The remit gets broader and broader. We can be sure that even if the language and the 
details of the problematisation change, the attempt to grasp social problems from within the 
frameworks and assumptions of markets and the pursuit of profit will continue for some time to come.  
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